Abstract
Infrastructure PPPs suffer from a major paradox. On the one hand, they are built to last several decades. During this time, several unplanned events take place, some related to the project themselves and others result from the global context in which these projects operate. On the other hand, these PPPs are, most of the time, supported by contractual arrangements that both agents intend to be as exhaustive as possible to foresee any possible contingency and to design the adequate mechanisms to address these contingencies. In fact, many of the contracts have an underlying OBC (generally included in the annexes), where it is possible to find all cash-flow projections, supported on macro-economic estimations (interest rates, inflation rates, economic growth, etc.).
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Notes
- 1.
As an example, the shadow toll highways in Portugal were changed to real toll highways. To accept this renegotiation, the concessionaires required that the government assume the demand risk and pay an availability fee for the highways. This eliminated one of the major sources of uncertainty for concessionaires at the expense of the public budget.
- 2.
- 3.
An option that can only be exercised at the expiration date is called a European option. One that can be exercised at any time until the expiration date is called an American option.
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Cruz, C.O., Marques, R.C. (2013). Contractual Flexibility. In: Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36910-0_3
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