Skip to main content

Contractual Flexibility

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships

Abstract

Infrastructure PPPs suffer from a major paradox. On the one hand, they are built to last several decades. During this time, several unplanned events take place, some related to the project themselves and others result from the global context in which these projects operate. On the other hand, these PPPs are, most of the time, supported by contractual arrangements that both agents intend to be as exhaustive as possible to foresee any possible contingency and to design the adequate mechanisms to address these contingencies. In fact, many of the contracts have an underlying OBC (generally included in the annexes), where it is possible to find all cash-flow projections, supported on macro-economic estimations (interest rates, inflation rates, economic growth, etc.).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    As an example, the shadow toll highways in Portugal were changed to real toll highways. To accept this renegotiation, the concessionaires required that the government assume the demand risk and pay an availability fee for the highways. This eliminated one of the major sources of uncertainty for concessionaires at the expense of the public budget.

  2. 2.

    For more on the “collar option”, see Dailami et al. (1999), Irwin (2003) and Chiara et al. (2007).

  3. 3.

    An option that can only be exercised at the expiration date is called a European option. One that can be exercised at any time until the expiration date is called an American option.

References

  • Aldardice P, Horwich H, Feldman R (2001) Risk finance for project finance: the expanding horizon of credit enhancement. J Proj Finan 6(4):30–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexandre I, Estache A, Oliveri A (1999) A few things transport regulators should know about risk and the cost of capital. Policy Research Working Paper No. 2151, World Bank

    Google Scholar 

  • Altshuler A, Luberoff D (2003) Mega-projects: the changing politics of urban public investment. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Amram M, Kulatilaka N (1999) Disciplined decisions: aligning strategy with the financial markets. Harvard Business School Publishing, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Baeza MA, Vassallo JM (2010) Private concession contracts for toll roads in Spain: analysis and recommendations. Pub Money Manag 30(5):299–304

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bain R (2009) Error and optimism bias in toll road traffic forecasts. Transportation 36(5):469–482

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barros PP (2009) Economics of health care. Almedida, Lisbon (original title in Portuguese: Economia da saúde)

    Google Scholar 

  • Bettignies J, Ross T (2009) Public–private partnerships and the privatization of the finance function: an incomplete contracts approach. Int J Ind Organ 27(3):358–368

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bing L, Akintoye A, Edwards PJ (2005) Critical success factors for PPP/PFI projects in the UK construction industry. Constr Manag Econ 23(5):459–471

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black F, Scholes M (1973) The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J Polit Econ 81(3):637–654

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bollen N (1998) Valuing options in regime switching models. J Deriv 6(1):38–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bollen N (1999) Real options and product life-cycles. Manag Sci 45(5):670–684

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brennan MJ, Schwartz EE (1985) Evaluating natural resource investments. J Bus 58(2):135–157

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bruzelius N, Flyvbjerg B, Rothengatter W (2002) Big decision, big risks: improving accountability in mega projects. Transp Policy 9(2):143–154

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cantarelli CC, Flyvbjerg B, Molin EJE, Wee B (2010) Cost overruns in large scale transportation infrastructure projects: explanations and their theoretical embeddedness. Eur J Trans Infrastruct 10(1):30–41

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiara N, Kokkaew N (2009) Risk analysis of contractual flexibility in BOT negotiations: a quantitative approach using risk flexibility theory. Int J Eng Manag 1(1):71–79

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiara N, Garvin MJ, Vecer J (2007) Valuing simple multiple exercise options in infrastructure projects. J Infrastruct Syst 13(2):97–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Copeland T, Antikarov V (2001) Real options: a practitioner’s guide. W.W. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox JC, Ross SA, Rubinstein M (1979) Option pricing: a simplified approach. J Financ Econ 7(3):229–263

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cruz CO, Marques RC (2012a) Using probabilistic methods to estimate the public sector comparator. Comput Aided Civ Infrastruct Eng 27(10):782–800

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cruz CO, Marques RC (2013b) Exogenous determinants for renegotiation of public infrastructure concessions. J Constr Eng Manag, Submitted

    Google Scholar 

  • Cruz CO, Marques RC (2013c) Flexible contracts to cope with uncertainty in public-private partnerships. Int J Proj Manag, Forthcoming

    Google Scholar 

  • Cruz CO, Marques RC (2013f) Using the “economic and financial re-equilibrium” model to decrease infrastructure contract incompleteness. J Infrastruc Syst, Forthcoming

    Google Scholar 

  • Dailami M, Lipkovich I, Dyck J (1999) INFRISK: a computer simulation approach to risk management in infrastructure project finance transactions. Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 2083, World Bank

    Google Scholar 

  • Dixit AK, Pindyk RS (1994) Investment under uncertainty. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Dong F, Chiara N (2010) Improve economic efficiency of public-private partnerships for infrastructure development by contractual flexibility analysis in a highly uncertain context. J Struct Financ 16(1):87–99

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Engel E, Fischer R, Galetovic A (2006) Renegotiation without holdup: anticipating spending and infrastructure concessions. NBER Working Paper No. 12339

    Google Scholar 

  • Esty B (1999) Improved techniques for valuing large scale projects. J Proj Financ 5(1):9–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Flyvbjerg B, Holm M, Buhl SL (2003) How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects? Transp Rev 23(1):71–88

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flyvbjerg B, Holm MKS, Buhl SL (2004) What causes cost overrun in transport infrastructure projects? Transp Rev 24(1):3–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flyvbjerg B, Holm MKS, Buhl SL (2006) From Nobel Prize to project management: getting risks right. Proj Manag J 37(3):5–15

    Google Scholar 

  • Fowkes D (2000) Leasing in project financing. J Proj Financ 6(1):21–32

    Google Scholar 

  • Geltner DM, Miller NG (2001) Commercial real estate analysis and investments. South-Western Publishing, Mason

    Google Scholar 

  • Gifford JL (2003) Flexible urban transportation. Elsevier, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Guasch JL, Straub S (2009) Corruption and concession renegotiations Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America. Util Policy 17(2):185–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hong H, Shum M (2002) Increasing competition and the winner’s curse: evidence from procurement. Rev Econ Stud 69(4):871–898

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Irwin T (2003) Public money for private infrastructure. World Bank, Washington, DC

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kaming PF, Olomolaiye PO, Holt GD, Harris FC (1997) Factors influencing construction time and cost overruns on high-rise projects in Indonesia. Constr Manag Econ 15(1):83–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kester WC (1984) Today’s option for tomorrow’s growth. Harv Bus Rev 62(2):153–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Kodukula P, Papudescu C (2006) Project valuation using real options. J. Ross, Fort Lauderdale

    Google Scholar 

  • Kujawski E, Alvaro ML, Edwards WR (2004) Incorporating psychological influences in probabilistic cost analysis. Syst Eng 7(3):195–216

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kulatilake N (1993) The value of flexibility: the case of a dual-fuel industrial steam boiler. Financ Manag 22(3):271–280

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Latimore D (2002) Calculating value during uncertainty: getting real with “real options”. Technical report, IBM Institute for Business Value

    Google Scholar 

  • Leslie KJ, Michaels MP (1997) The real power of real options. Mckinsey Quart 3:4–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Liu L, Napier Z (2010) The accuracy of risk-based cost estimation for water infrastructure projects: preliminary evidence from Australian projects. Constr Manag Econ 28(1):89–100

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loosemore AM (2007) Risk allocation in the private provision of public infrastructure. Int J Proj Manag 25(1):66–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luehrman TA (1998) Investment opportunities as real options: getting started on the numbers. Harv Bus Rev 7(4):51–67

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie P, Preston J (1998) Twenty-one sources of error and bias in transport project appraisal. Transport Policy 5(1):1–7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marques R, Berg S (2010) Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries. J Infrastruct Syst 16(4):334–342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marques R, Berg S (2011b) Public-private partnership contracts: a tale of two cities with different contractual arrangements. Public Admin 89(4):1585–1603

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mason SP, Merton RC (1985) The role of contingent claim analysis in corporate finance. In: Altman E, Subrahmanyam M (eds) Recent advances in corporate finance. M. Irwin Publications

    Google Scholar 

  • McKee M, Edwards N, Atun R (2006) Public-private partnerships for hospitals. Bull World Health Organ 84(11):890–895

    Google Scholar 

  • Megginson WL (2010) Introduction to the special issue on project finance. Rev Financ Econ 19(2):47–48

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neufville R (2004) Uncertainty management for engineering systems planning and design. In: Engineering systems symposium

    Google Scholar 

  • Neufville R, Scholtes S (2006) Maximizing value from large scale projects: implementing flexibility in public-private partnerships. Briefing Paper

    Google Scholar 

  • Neufville R, Scholtes S (2011) Flexibility in engineering design. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Neufville R, Lee YS, Scholtes S (2008) Flexibility in hospital infrastructure design. Working Paper, MIT

    Google Scholar 

  • Niazi A, Dai JS, Balabani S, Seneviratne L (2006) Product cost estimation: technique classification and methodology review. J Manuf Sci Eng 128(2):563–575

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Odeck J (2004) Cost overruns in road construction – what are their sizes and determinants? Transp Policy 11(1):43–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Panayi S, Trigeorgis L (1998) Multi-stage real options: the case of information infrastructure and international bank expansion. Quart J Econ Financ 38(3):675–692

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Park CS, Herath HSB (2000) Exploiting uncertainty-investment opportunities as real options: a new way of thinking engineering economics. Eng Econ 45(1):1–36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prencipe A, Tell F (2001) Inter-project learning: processes and outcomes of knowledge codification in project-based firms. Res Policy 30(9):1373–1394

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raftery J (1994) Risk analysis in project management. E & FN Spon, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ross SA (1995) Uses, abuses, and alternatives to the net-present-value rule. Financ Manag 24(3):96–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saleh JH, Mark G, Jordan NC (2009) Flexibility: a multi-disciplinary literature review and a research agenda for designing flexible engineering systems. J Eng Des 20(3):307–323

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shah S, Thakor A (1987) Optimal capital structure and project financing. J Econ Theory 42(2):209–243

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shan L, Garvin MJ, Kumar R (2010) Collar options to manage revenue risks in real toll public-private partnership transportation projects. Construct Manag Econ 28(10):1057–1069

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skamris MK, Flyvbjerg B (1997) Inaccuracy of traffic forecasts and cost estimates on large transport projects. Transp Policy 4(3):141–146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smit H, Trigeorgis J (2003) Infrastructure investment as a real options game: the case of European airport expansion. Financ Manag 32(4):5–35

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thompson CR, McKee W (2004) Financing and planning of public and private not-for-profit hospitals in the European union. Health Policy 67(3):281–291

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Touran A, Lopez R (2006) Modeling cost-escalation in large infrastructure projects. J Constr Eng Manag 132(8):853–860

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Trigeorgis L, Mason SP (1987) Valuing managerial flexibility. Midl Corp Financ J 5(1):14–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Ubbels B, Verhoed ET (2008) Auctioning concessions for private roads. Transp Res Part A 42(1):155–172

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang T (2005) Real options “in” projects and systems design-identification of options and solution for path dependency. PhD thesis in Engineering Systems, MIT

    Google Scholar 

  • Weck O, Neufville R, Chaize M (2004) Staged deployment of communication satellite constellation in low earth orbit. J Aerosp Comput Inf Commun 1(3):119–131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson OE (1976) Franchising bidding for natural monopolies – in general and with respect to CATV. Bell J Econ 7(1):73–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yu W, Lai C, Lee W (2005) A WICE approach to real-time construction cost estimation. Autom Constr 15(1):12–19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zavadskas EK, Turskis Z, Tamošaitien J (2010) Risk assessment of construction projects. J Civ Eng Manag 16(1):33–46

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhao T, Tseing C (2003) Valuing flexibility in infrastructure expansion. J Infrastruct Syst 9(3):89–97

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart O, Moore J (1999) Foundations of incomplete contracts. NBER Working Paper No. 6726

    Google Scholar 

  • Brealey R, Myers S (2001) Principles of corporate finance. McGraw-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Cruz, C.O., Marques, R.C. (2013). Contractual Flexibility. In: Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36910-0_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36910-0_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-36909-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-36910-0

  • eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics