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A Simple Key-Recovery Attack on McOE-X

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Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7712))

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a key-recovery attack on the online authenticated encryption scheme McOE-X proposed by Fleischmann et al. at FSE 2012. The attack is based on the observation that in McOE-X the key is changed for every block of message that is encrypted in a deterministic way. This allows an adversary to recover the key by using a standard time-memory trade-off strategy. On its best setting the attack has a complexity as low as 2 ยท2n/2, while this should be 2n for a good scheme. Taking AES-128 as an example this would result in an attack with complexity of 265.

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Mendel, F., Mennink, B., Rijmen, V., Tischhauser, E. (2012). A Simple Key-Recovery Attack on McOE-X. In: Pieprzyk, J., Sadeghi, AR., Manulis, M. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7712. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35404-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35404-5_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35403-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35404-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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