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Political Institutions and the Distribution of Income

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The Greek Economy and the Crisis

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Abstract

This chapter includes the key issues relating to political institutions of societies, as factors of growth and development, with particular reference to the government, the public sector and public administration (size, quality). We comment on lobbying in the Greek economy and the organization of labour and capital. The political institutions are treated as balance points of opposing forces in society and as the main mechanisms of income and wealth distribution. At the same time, however, they form institutions, while the fact that they express economic interests in a delayed manner is a determinant of their reform capacity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As only the MPs of the ruling party suffice to vote for a bill, with a positive or (often) negative effect, which the government itself is required to implement.

  2. 2.

    For the proposal on a “radical change” in the Constitution of 1952, which was submitted in 1963 by the ERE without being implemented, see Charalambis (1985).

  3. 3.

    See e.g., Venizelos (1980).

  4. 4.

    The law “on ministerial accountability” has often been the focus of such criticism, as have the salaries of MPs.

  5. 5.

    The internal criteria composing the two poles (ability to hold government positions and ideological-political character) are the basic patterns of different typologies that have so far been proposed on the character of the Greek party system. When emphasis is placed on the ideological and political character of parties, the domestic party system appears as a “polarized and asymmetrical tri-partisanship”. See Mavrogordatos (1984), vol. 7, issue 4, pp. 156–169 and Nikolakopoulos (1989). When emphasis is placed on this issue of the ability to hold government positions, it appears as typical bipartisanship. See Pappas (2001), issue 17, pp. 71–102. For related theoretical discussions, see Sartori (1976).

  6. 6.

    For the transformation of PASOK as a “state party”, see Vernardakis (2004), pp. 154–175. It is characteristic that, at least until recently, all key positions for the functioning of public administration, such as those of General Secretaries, complied patiently with the choices of the party nomination (appointment) without any claim of institutional transparency and meritocracy, with whatever it involves functionally for the state apparatus.

  7. 7.

    For the case of PASOK, see Givalos (2005), pp. 86–127.

  8. 8.

    See, for example, Lyrintzis (1984), pp. 99–118, and Sotiropoulos (1995).

  9. 9.

    Commission of the European Communities Staff working document (Brussels, 24/1/2007).

  10. 10.

    For related information see http://www.gspa.gr/(4512188387384214)/eCPortal.asp?id=1479&nt=19&lang=1&pID=235&p2ID=236.

  11. 11.

    Posted on the website www.in.gr on 26/5/2009.

  12. 12.

    According to data of what was then known as the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization (2000), the number of government employees rose from 106,000 in 1961 to 200,000 in 1981 and to 290,000 in 1999. See also OECD (2001), p. 42 (note 4). However, in the period 2000–2004, the number of government employees decreased by 9.5%. See Operational Program “Administrative Reform”, OECD (2001), p. 64.

  13. 13.

    The number of ministries rose from 32 in 1973 to 57 in 1988. See Makridimitris (1992), p. 105.

  14. 14.

    According to the OECD, the related expenditure rose from 21% in 1976 to 51% in 1988. See OECD, Economic Surveys. Portugal 1988–1989, Paris 1989, p. 45.

  15. 15.

    See Operational Program “Administrative Reform”, OECD, Economic Surveys. Portugal 1988–1989, Paris 1989, p. 36.

  16. 16.

    On this point, see also Kouzis (2007).

  17. 17.

    GSEE: General Confederation of Greek Workers.ADEDY: Senior Management of Unions of Public Servants.

  18. 18.

    On this point, see also Soumeli (http://www.inegsee.gr/enimerwsi-76-doc4.htm).

  19. 19.

    On this point, see also Tsakiris (2005).

  20. 20.

    For the difficulties of calculating the union density at local and European levels, see Paleologos (2006), issue 24.

  21. 21.

    See, indicatively, Ebbingbaus and Visser (1999), Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 135–158.

  22. 22.

    The index represents the percentage of total income attributable to a specific percentage of the population. The lower the value, the more equal the distribution of income. A key advantage of the Gini coefficient is that it estimates the equal distribution of income, taking into account not only the GDP but also the way in which this is distributed as a percentage to the population. The Gini coefficient is independent of personal characteristics, measurement units of the economy and population size and is based on the principle of transfer. The most important disadvantage is that it may not be calculated properly if the areas of values that it takes are taken into account without considering the overall figures, even if the calculation included all areas. Moreover, it may be proven to be a non-optimal way of measuring the uneven distribution of income because the Lorenz curve does not reflect the effectiveness of the use of income. Finally, it fails to take into account the age and stage of each individual in society.

  23. 23.

    http://hdr.undp.org/docs/statistics/understanding/resources/HDR_2003_2_2_global_income_ inequality.pdf.

  24. 24.

    United Nations Development Programme.

  25. 25.

    Source: Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, General Secretariat of the National Statistical Service, 2008.

  26. 26.

    All results relate to the sample survey on Household Income and Living Conditions conducted by the NSSG in 2008 (data 2007).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Stadiou 5, 10562, Athens, Greece

    Prof. Panagiotis Petrakis

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Petrakis, P. (2012). Political Institutions and the Distribution of Income. In: The Greek Economy and the Crisis. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21175-1_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21175-1_8

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