Abstract
The 1980s end with many scholars and practitioners of economic transition and development expressed real alarm about the failure of prescribed economic policies, e.g., structural adjustment, of so many economies to reap the fruits of a decade stringent reform.
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Notes
- 1.
For instance see G. Corina, R. Jolly and F. Stewart, eds, Adjustment with Human Face (2 Vols), Clarendon Press, 1987; Joan M. Nelson, ed, Economic crisis and policy choice: the politics of adjustment in the third world, Princeton University Press, 1990; and Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye. Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending (2 Vols), Routledge, 1991. However, the reader should note that if the 1980s programs and policies are examined in light of their “implicit objectives,” then they do illustrate tremendous success. For instance, adjustment programs facilitated opened up national economies, liberalized balance of payment system, which in turn facilitates capital in-flows and out-flows, and created middle class that did not existed prior to these programs, all of which indicates successful implementation. For more information see, for instance, Lynn Ilon, “Structural adjustment and education: Adapting to a growing global market”, International Journal of Educational Development, vol. 14, Issue 2, April 1994, pp. 95–108; Ibrahim Saif and Yasmeen Tabbaa, “Economic Growth, Income Distribution and the Middle Class in Jordan (2002–2006)”, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 2008; V. Eudine Barriteau, “Structural Adjustment Policies in the Caribbean: A Feminist Perspective”, NWSA Journal, Vol. 8, no. 1, Global Perspectives (Spring, 1996), pp. 142–156; and Martin Carnoy and Carlos Torres, “Educational Change and Structural Adjustment: A Case of Costa Rica”, UNESCO, Bureau for the Co-ordination of Operational Activities (BAO), Paris, September 1992.
- 2.
Loan. M Nelson, ed, Intricate Links: Democratiation and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe, Transaction, 1994.
- 3.
See World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth, World Bank, Washington, 1989, p 60. Many believed that this publication should be considered as the kick-off for the process of embracing governance issues in the development debate.
- 4.
Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanism of Governance, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 4.
- 5.
Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Robert Keohane, International institutions and state power, Westview University Press, 1989; John Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions”, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, 1994/5, pp. 5–49; Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Government: The Promise and Perils of Peace building,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 3, September 1995, pp. 387–418.
- 6.
Larry Diamond, Promoting democracy in the 1990s; actors, instruments, issues and imperative, Carnegie, 1995; Doll Chull Shin, “On the third wave of democratization: a synthesis and evaluation of recent theory and research”, World Politics, vol. 47, no, 1, 1994, pp. 135–170.
- 7.
As one would have thought, there is a significant cynicism in term of the compatibility between democracy and good governance, which surprisingly goes back to centuries ago. As an example, one can points to the passage “For forms of government let fools contest, That which is best administered is best,” which is a paraphrase of Alexander Pope’s An Essay On Man, which Alexander Hamilton (author of Federalist No. 68) uses to talk about the Presidential selection process as a model for producing good administration. In Pope, That which is replaced by Whatever. John Adams, also described Pope’s aphorism, “flattery for tyrants” and stated, “Nothing can be more fallacious than this: But poets read history to collect flowers not fruits – they attend to fanciful images, not the effects of social institutions. Nothing is more certain from the history of nations, and the nature of man, than that some forms of government are better fitted for being well administered than others.” (See John Adam, Thoughts on Government, Chap. 4, document 5. Available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s5.html).
- 8.
Stuart A. Umpleby, “Strategies for Regulating the Global Economy”, Future, December 1989, pp. 585.
- 9.
IMF, Good Governance: The IMF’s role, Washington, D.C., IMF, 1997; Edgardo Boeninger, “Governance and Development: issue and constraint”, Proceeding of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., World bank, 1991.
- 10.
The IMF and Good Governance, Address by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at Transparency International, Paris, France, January 21, 1998. Moreover, IMF studies have shown that where governance is poor, domestic investment and growth suffer. See, for example, Mauro, Paulo, “Why Worry About Corruption” Economic Issue No. 6, Washington, D.C., February 1997.
- 11.
P. Landell-Mills and I. Serageldin, “Governance and the External factors”, Proceeding of the World bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., World bank, 1991; A. Israel, “the Changing Role of the State: Institutional Dimensions”, PPR Working Paper WPS 495, Washington, D.C., World bank, 1990.
- 12.
Oran Young, International governance; protecting the environment in a stateless society, Cornel University Press, 1994, pp. 15.
- 13.
Leila Frischtak, “Governance capacity and economic reform in developing countries”, World bank Technical paper no. 254, Washington, D.C., World bank, 1994; Fernando Calderon, “Governance, competitiveness and social integration”, CEPAL Review, December 1995, pp. 45–6; G. Hyden, “Creating an enabling environment” and “The changing context of institutional development in Sub-Sahara Africa”, in the Long term perspective study of Sub-Sahara Africa: Institutional and Socio-Political Issues (Volume 3), Washington D. C., World bank, 1990.
- 14.
This kind of thinking were heavily influenced by the works of Amartya Sen, Paul Streeten, and Mahbubul Huq, which questions the sole focus on economic growth and instead proposes a broader concept of development that includes expanding choices in social, political, and economic realms. (See John Degnbol-Martinuissen, Policies, Institutions and Industrial Development: Coping with Liberalisation and International Competition in India, Sage Ltd, 2001.)
- 15.
UNDP, Governance for Sustainable Development, New York. UNDP Policy Document, 1997.
- 16.
World Bank, Governance and Development, Washington D. C., World bank, 1992; World Bank, Governance: The World Bank’s Experience Washington D. C., World Bank, 1994.
- 17.
The clearest attempt is probably Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- 18.
See, for instance, Kenneth W. Abbott, and Duncan Snidal Duncan, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 3, Summer 2000, pp. 421–56.
- 19.
For a detail examination of these model, see R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, Harper & Row, 1953.
- 20.
See, for instance, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, edit., “Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organization, and Principle Agent Theory”, in Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, edit., Delegation and Agency in International Organization, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 3–38.
- 21.
Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid, “Agencification and Regulatory Reforms” in Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid, eds, Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern States, 2006, pp. 16.
- 22.
See Nils Brunsson and Johan. P. Olson, The Reforming Organization, Handelshojskolens Forlag, 1997.
- 23.
See, for instance, David Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2005, vol. 598, pp. 12–32. In this paper, authors suggest that change in the governance of global economy is best captured by reference to (1) a new division of labor between state and society (e.g., privatization), (2) an increase in delegation, (3) proliferation of new technologies of regulation, (4) formalization of interinstitutional and intrainstitutional arrangements of regulation, and (5) growth in the influence of experts in general, and of international networks of experts in particular.
- 24.
See, for instance, C. Scott, “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A neglected Facet of Contemporary of Governance”, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 29, no. 1, 2002, pp. 56–76.
- 25.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks,” Government and Opposition. Vol. 39, no. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 160–90.
- 26.
Wendy Larne, Global Governmentality: governing international spaces, Routledge, 2004.
- 27.
Ibid, pp. 3 and 4, respectively.
- 28.
Paolo Mefalopulos, “A Major Challenge in Good Governance: The End of Communication as We Know It (Part I), World Bank, Oct 20, 2008, at http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/major-challenge-good-governance-end-communication-we-know-it-part-i.
- 29.
Tony Porter, “Global Governance Theories, Complexity, and the Post-Crisis International Financial Architecture”, Paper prepared for International Studies Association Annual Meeting, New York, February 16, 2009, pp. 5. For examples of these studies see: John S. Dryzek, “Transnational Democracy in an Insecure World”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 27, no.2, April 2006, pp. 101–119; Ruth W. Grant and Robert O Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”, American Political Science Review Vol. 99, no. 1, February 2005, pp. 29–43; David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Polity, 1995; and Tony Porter and Ronit Karsten, eds., The Challenges of Global Business Authority: Democratic Renewal, Stalemate, or Decay? State University of New York Press, 2010.
- 30.
Douglas North, “Institutions”, Journal of Economic Perspective, vol. 5, Winter 1991, p. 98.
- 31.
Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, “Agencification and Regulatory Reforms”, Paper prepared for the SCANCOR/SOG workshop on “Automization of the state: From integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations”. Stanford University, April 1–2 2005, pp. 12.
- 32.
Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanism of Governance, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 5.
- 33.
For an interested reading on this topic see also Oliver E. Williamson, “Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: [Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization], January 1991, pp. 159–187.
- 34.
Douglas North, “Institutions”, Journal of Economic Perspective, vol. 5, Winter 1991, p. 97.
- 35.
Douglas North, “transaction Cost, Institutions, and Economic History.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 140, March 1984, p. 8.
- 36.
Allan Schmid “Analytical Institutional Economics: Challenging Problems in the Economics of Resources for a New Environment”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, 1972, p. 893.
- 37.
Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- 38.
Ibid., pp. 9.
- 39.
Ibid.
- 40.
Daniel Bromley Economic Interests and Institutions; the conceptual foundations of public policy, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 41.
- 41.
It should be noted that by neglecting power, Bromley facilitates his argument in a sense that he can then retain the neoclassical assumption that the individual is the “raw datum” of economy and society, making free, informed choices and “voting” her preferences in markets and at the polls.
- 42.
For more information on DUPs see Jagdish N. Bhagwati “Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 5 (Oct., 1982), pp. 988–1002.
- 43.
Kaldor–Hicks assumed that an outcome is more efficient if a Pareto optimal outcome can be reached by arranging sufficient compensation from those that are made better off to those that are made worse off so that all would end up no worse off than before.
- 44.
Jon Elster, 1st edition, Explaining Social Behavior: Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 2007, ch. 15.
- 45.
Richard W. Scott, 3rd edition, Institutions and Organization: Ideas and Interest, Sage Publication, 2007, introduction.
- 46.
Ibid., pp. x.
- 47.
Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organization: A Comparative Approach, Stanford Business Books, 2003, p. 2.
- 48.
Ibid.
- 49.
According to Pettigrew, “Organizational culture consists of the behavior, actions and value that people in an enterprise are expected to follow” (see A. M. Pettigrew, “On Studying Organizational Cultures”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, no. 4, December 1979, pp. 570–581.
- 50.
Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott, 2003, p. 5. Interestingly, in 1907 Sumner made the distinction between social and formal organizations but he termed them “crescive” and “enacted” institutions, respectively (see William Graham Sumner, Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals, Boston, 1907, p. 54).
- 51.
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organization: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony” in Walter W. Powel and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University of Chicago Press, 1991. pp. 42.
- 52.
W. Richard Scott, “Institutional theory” in George Ritzer, ed. Encyclopedia of Social Theory, Sage, 2004, pp. 408–14.
- 53.
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, 1991, pp. 41.
- 54.
Ibid, pp. 42.
- 55.
Steve Weber, “Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development”, in Timothy J. Sinclair, ed., Global governance: critical concepts in political science, Routledge, 2004, pp. 74.
- 56.
John W. Meyer and Brain Rowan, “Institutionalized Organization: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 2, Sep., 1977, pp. 340.
- 57.
Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid, Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern World, Edward Elgar, 2006, pp. 20.
- 58.
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powel, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective rationality in Organizational Field”, American Sociological Review, 1983, Vol. 48, April 1983, pp. 147. On the notion of bureaucratization, it is also important to note Peter observation, which claimed, “Attempt at bureaucratic “empire building” may be closely related to the desire of the agency to survive and also to perform function that it considered essential to a high quality of life for the society…Or, as Cleaves once wrote of the Chilean bureaucracy: Derogatory comments on bureaucracy’s tendency to consolidate its power (e.g., empire building, prestige accrual) are value judgment to the extent that they are not examined in context of the agency’s need to increase its capacity for goal-oriented behavior”. In other word, Peters elaborates, “one person’s empire building is another person’s need for survival, or even public services.” (See Guy Peters, 6th edition, The Politics of Bureaucracy: An introduction, Routledge, 2009, pp 23–24. The source for Cleaves is; Peter S. Cleaves, Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile, University of California Press, 1974, pp. 310–11).
- 59.
Excluding the global aspect, a similar argument is presented by Scott (see W. Richard Scott, “Unpacking Institutional Argument” in Walter W. Powel and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University of Chicago Press, 1991. pp. 164–182).
- 60.
Indeed, they not only depart from the past but also create new and unanticipated consequences (see Wilks & Bartle, 2002, p. 148–72).
- 61.
See Scott, Jacobs, “The Second Generation of Regulatory Reforms,” Paper presented at IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, 8–9 November 1999, Washington, D.C. The paper can be found at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/jacobs.htm.
See also the series of OECD multidisciplinary reports on regulatory reform in Japan, USA, Netherlands, Mexico, Spain, Korea, Hungary, and Denmark, which can be ordered at:
- 62.
See OECD, Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World, OECD, Paris, 1994.
- 63.
Dieter, Kerwer, “Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation”, Governance, October 2005, vol. 18 (4) pp. 611–632.
- 64.
It is important to note that an instrument is a tool; it is the responsibility of policy-makers to assess the choice of instrument based on certain criteria. For example, efficiency versus equality or against potentially conflicting measures like cost and benefits.
- 65.
See Toye (2003).
- 66.
See Scott (2004) for a comparative analysis of regulation.
- 67.
See, for instance, Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund On the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries), Sixty-Fourth meeting, Ottawa, Ontario Canada, November 2001.
- 68.
Perhaps because of standards peculiarities as documents and the complex interactions between the various institutions or organizations involved at the international and the national levels.
- 69.
According to Wikipedia, financial reports, “…are formal records of a business” financial activities. These statements provide an overview of the profitability of a business and its financial condition in short term as well as long term. There are four basic financial statements: (1) Balance sheet – also referred to as statement of financial position or condition, reports on a company’s assets, liabilities and net equity as of a given point in time; (2) Income statement – also referred to as Profit or loss statement, reports on a company’s results of operations over a period of time; (3) Statement of retained earnings – explains the changes in a company’s retained earnings over the reporting period; and (4) Statement of cash flows – reports on a company’s cash flow activities, particularly its operating, investing, and financing activities. For detailed analysis of the subject see Fridson, Alvarez, and Fridson (2002).
- 70.
See “The Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements”, International Accounting Standards Board at: www.iasplus.com/standard/framewk.htm.
- 71.
See also Harlow (2002).
- 72.
This model is selected for two reasons. First, the growing importance of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on the world scene and the recognition that capital markets are increasingly dominated by companies who prepare their financial statements according to an Anglo-Saxon model of accounting. Second, the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is an important part in global governance and the global system, which this study intends to analyze. For a detailed analysis of this model, see Demski & Christensen (2002, p.2); Henrekson & Jakobsson (2003).
- 73.
For detailed analysis of this topic see Sowell (1974).
- 74.
Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Rewards, eds, J. and H. L. Hunt (1925) 6, 51–2: Jeremy Bentham, Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: Principle of Legislation: A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government, eds, J. H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (1977), p. 29.
- 75.
Ibid (1825), p. 52.
- 76.
N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998.
- 77.
See Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1995; and Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization 1996, 50 (3):379–406.
- 78.
See Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1965; Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Co-operation, London, Penguin, 1984; Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, in Cooperation Under Anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, 226–54. Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1986; Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1992. Cooperation and Governance in International Trade: The Strategic Organizational Approach, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992; Bayard, Thomas O., and Kimberly Elliott, Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; and Dorn, A. Walter, and Andrew Fulton, “Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, Sticks, and the Case of North Korea”, Global Governance, 1997, 3 (1):17–40.
- 79.
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d rev. ed., 2 vol, Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1990; Yaraslau Kryvoi, “Why European Union Trade Sanctions Do Not Work” Minnesota Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, 2008 and Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work”, International Security, 1998, 23 (1), pp. 66–77.
- 80.
Haas, Peter, “Compliance with EU Directives: Insights from International Relations and Comparative Politics”, Journal of European Public Policy, 1998, 5 (1), pp. 19. On the calculus of compliance, see Young, Oran R, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Implications, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979; Underdal, Arild, “Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models”, European Journal of International Relations, 1998 4 (1): 5–30.
- 81.
Jonas Tallberg, “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union”, International Organization 56, 3, Summer 2002, pp. 612.
- 82.
In order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding about terminologies, it is imperative to define them before going any further. In this respect, I assume that coordination begins with an assumption of differences, where different units cause overlap, redundancy, and/or separation without coordination. Coordination is a framework used to ensure that each unit informs others as to how and when it will act (Leo, 1999). Unlike coordination, collaboration, “…is the process of shared creation: two or more individuals with complementary skills interacting to create a shared understanding that none had previously possessed or could have come to on their own. Collaboration creates a shared meaning about a process, a product, or an event. In this sense, there is nothing routine about it. Something is there that wasn’t there before” (Schrage, 1990, p. 140). Collaboration is about sharing and using information to create new learning. Finally, cooperation is about how the parts of a whole work or act together to achieve a common goal.
- 83.
See Stein, Arthur A, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World”, in International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 115–40. Ithaca, N.J., Cornell University Press, 1983. For recent attempts to develop the notion of problem structure, see Mitchell, Ronald B, “Situation Structure and Regime Implementation Strategies”, unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif, 1999; Young, Oran R, Governance in World Affairs, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1999; Miles, Edward L., Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jørgen Wettestad, Jon Birger Skjærseth, and Elaine M. Carlin, Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002.
- 84.
Jonas Tallberg, 2002, pp. 612.
- 85.
Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965; Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, in Cooperation Under Anarchy, edited by Kenneth A. Oye, 226–54. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1986; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Dorn and Fulton1997; Underdal 1998.
- 86.
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996, pp. 385.
- 87.
See Young, Oran R, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables”, in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 160–94. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1992; Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1993; Mitchell, Ronald B, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1994; Chayes and Chayes 1995.
- 88.
For example, see Arora, Seema, and Timothy N. Cason, “An experiment in voluntary environmental regulation: Participation in EPA’s 33150 program”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1995, 28:271–86; Chayes, Abram, and Antonio Handler Chayes, “From law enforcement to dispute settlement”, International Security, 1990, 14:147–64; Chayes, Abram, and Antonio Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 1993a; Chayes, Abram, and Antonio Handler Chayes, “On compliance”, International Organization, 1993b, 47:175–205; Duffy, Gloria, “Conditions that affect arms control compliance”, in U.S. Soviet Security Cooperation, edited by Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988; Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds, Institutions for the earth: Sources of effective international environmental protection. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1993; Hawkins, Keith, Environment and enforcement: Regulation and the social definition of pollution, Oxford Socio-legal Studies. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984; Mitchell, Ronald, “Compliance theory: A synthesis”, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 1993, 2:327–34; Mitchell, Ronald, Intentional oil pollution at sea: Environmental policy and treaty compliance, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1994a; Mitchell, Ronald, “Regime design matters: Intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance”, International Organization 1994b, 48:425–58; Scholz, John T, “Voluntary compliance and regulatory enforcement”, Law and Policy, 1984, 6:385404; Sparrow, Malcolm, K, Imposing duties: Government’s changing approach to compliance, Westport, Conn, Praeger, 1994; Young 1994.
- 89.
Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Case and Critical Variables”, page 183, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, edt, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- 90.
For instance, resource scarcity may directly hamper compliance efforts. However, there may be other concerns such as macroeconomic factors that contribute to the settings of national economic and political framework within which public and private actors operate.
- 91.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Tess Cyrus, and Elizabeth Winston, “U.S. Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages”, Working Paper 97–01, Washington D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1997.
- 92.
Buck, Lori, Nicole Gallant, and Kim Richard Nossal, “Sanctions as a Gendered Instrument of Statecraft: The Case of Iraq”, Review ofInternationa1 Studies, 1998, 24 (1), pp. 69–84 and Garfield, Richard, Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 Through 1998: Assessing the Impact of the Gulf War and Economic Sanctions. Available at www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/garfield/dr-garfield.htm1.
- 93.
As Drezner observed, “Game-theoretic approaches to studying economic sanctions argue that because of strategic interaction, one should observe most of the failures but miss most of the successes. The imposition of sanctions represents a deadweight loss of utility for both the sender and target, in the form of disrupted economic exchange. Therefore, the actors have an incentive to reach an agreement before imposition. If the sender prefers the status quo to imposing sanctions, then there should be no coercion attempt. If the target prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions, it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions. The difficulty of observing threats that never need to be executed, particularly threats made behind closed doors, raises the possibility that selection bias has seriously affected empirical studies of economic statecraft. If this is true, then the sanctions literature has grossly underestimated the utility of economic diplomacy”, see Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion”, International Organization, Summer 2003, 57 (3), pp. 644.
- 94.
Mitchell, Ronald, “Compliance theory: A synthesis”, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 1993, vol.2, pp. 330.
- 95.
Young, Oran, International governance: Protecting the environment in a stateless society, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 74 and 134.
- 96.
Galtung, Johan, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: Examples from the Case of Rhodesia”, World Politics, 1967, 19 (3): 378–416; Knorr, Klaus, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations, New York: Basic Books, 1975; Bienen, Henry, and Robert Gilpin, “Economic Sanctions as a Response to Terrorism”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1980, 3 (1), pp. 89–98; von Amerongen, Otto Wolff, “Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool?”, International Security, 1980, 5 (2): pp. 159–67; Lindsay, James M, “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination”, International Studies Quarterly, 1986, 30 (2): pp. 153–73; Doxey, Margaret P, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987; Pape, Robert, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”, International Security, 1997, 22 (2): pp. 90–136; and Haass, Richard N, “Sanctioning Madness”, Foreign Affairs, 1997, 76 (6): pp. 74–85.
- 97.
Chayes, Abram, and Antonio Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 1993, pp. 29.
- 98.
Indeed, as a result of rising functional and operational linkages between national institutions and international regulatory bodies, a large portion of these guidelines require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement. For instance, unlike previous policy that required states to wholesale SOE under privatization program, the selected guidelines provide actionable information intended for coordinated function of state institutional policymakers with international norms and conduct.
- 99.
Chayes, Abram, and Antonio Handler Chayes, “From law enforcement to dispute settlement”, International Security, 1990, 14:147–64.
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Carayannis, E.G., Pirzadeh, A., Popescu, D. (2012). “Good Governance,” Institutions, and Global Rules. In: Institutional Learning and Knowledge Transfer Across Epistemic Communities. Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Management, vol 13. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1551-0_3
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