From Animal to Man: Thought and Language

Abstract

Musing upon the structural foundations of his biosemiotic worldview, biosemiotics founder Thomas A. Sebeok once remarked, more seriously than not, “I consider myself a Thomist – a René Thomist, that is” (1991: 157). Given that Sebeok – a self-described biologist manqué, a professional linguist, and a committed interdisciplinarian in many ways, but in no sense a mathematician – would claim such intellectual affinity with a man whose life’s work revolved around differential equations and topological geometry may seem to call out for explanation for some readers, as may the inclusion of mathematician René Thom in this book. Those with acquainted with Thom’s writings, or with the history of biosemiotics, however, will understand at once Thom’s place in this anthology of biosemiotic writings, and why Sebeok regarded “the semiotic intimations of the French polymath René Thom as nuggets of pure gold [and as] pointers towards the elevation of the doctrine of signs to the status of a theory or a science” (1979: viii).

René Thom (1923–2002)

Appendices

Appendix 1

A Model for Memory

Structure of memory.

We propose the following structure for memory:

• 1. A relatively slow dynamic (P,ψ) representing consciousness and mental activity.

• 2. A rapid auxiliary dynamic (M, X).

• 3. A weak coupling between these two dynamics by a third system (Q, X), of type a product of N linear oscillators, each with the same period.

The configuration space of Q is then an N-dimensional torus T ^N. The parallel constant field in Q is structurally unstable and evolves through resonance toward a structurally stable situation characterized by the presence of attracting cycles. There may be competition between several possible resonances corresponding to slightly different biochemical states of neurons. To fix the idea, suppose that the possible resonances are parameterized by the points of a set J of phase differences in the torus T ^N, varying, in principle, according to the past history of the individual. Suppose, for example, that J is a tree with successive bifurcations; then the terminal points of the tree will correspond to specifically catalogued memories. When Q is in a stable regime corresponding to such an external point s, the system Q will impose a certain weak coupling between (P, ψ) and (M, X) with the effect of producing a mean coupling field in P; the unique attractor of this mean field will then capture the dynamic ψ, recalling the memory belonging to s. The internal evolution of Q is itself governed by a secondary coupling with (P, ψ); when mental activity requires the recollection of a memory, Q will become unstable and the representative point in J will return to the origin of the treeJ and then move toward an external point.

Two factors come into play at each bifurcation of J.

• 1. The coupling with (P, ψ), which can direct the choice in one direction or another.

• 2. The local chemical memory affecting the probabilities of each of the branches of the tree at the corresponding vertex.

Very probably the structure of J is not absolutely determined but depends on the genetic information and the experience of the lifetime of the individual. On the other hand, the external points probably cover only a very small part of all the possible couplings leading to mean fields with stable attractors. In this sense it can be said that our brains contain not only our actual memories, but also all virtual memories that we could have but never shall have.

The Mechanism of Acquiring a Memory

Each branch point of the tree J can be represented by a partial oscillator D with three .states: two stable regimes a and b corresponding to the branches of J issuing from the point, and an indifferently excited state. Each stable state synthesizes substances (RNA?) m _a and m _b , respectively, in the affected neurons, and these substances catalyze the return to the corresponding state. However, active synthesis of these substances, and their deposit in the neurons, cannot start until the excitation of D has died down. The recollection of the memory s will usually lead to the excitation of a reflex r(s) by the organism. This reflex r(s) may have agreeable or painful effects on the organism. When the effect is painful, there will be a generalized excitation of the local oscillators D in Q and the substances giving rise to this choice will be suppressed; this will leave almost no trace of the chemical of the choice just made. On the other hand, if the effect is agreeable, the excitation of the local oscillators D will be reduced and material m _a or m _b , according to the choice just made, will be synthesized. It could also be that the pain wave in Q generates the synthesis of substances unfavorable to the return to the corresponding regime.

Temporary loss of memory is a well-known and curious phenomenon. There are two possible explanations: either the dynamic Q cannot reach the required terminal point s because the local chemical memory at one of the bifurcations of J prevents it (this is the Freudian interpretation, which we forget memories connected with disagreeable sensations): or Q does reach s, but this was actually not a point, so that Q ends up a little to one side and gives a coupling that recalls the general structure of the bifurcations of the mean field, but, because of an auxiliary perturbation, the horizontal component Y does not give rise to any attracting cycle. The memory is there, virtual, in the consciousness, and needs only the field that excited it. In this case the best way of recalling the memory is to start again from the beginning, if possible some time later.

Whatever else are the virtues of this model, it shows that there is little hope of localizing memories either spatially, in specific neurons, or chemically, in well-determined substances.

Appendix 2

Grammar, Languages, and Writing

Grammatical categories and the typology of languages.

We have seen that concepts have a regulation figure, a logos, analogous to that of living beings, We might regard a grammatical category (in the traditional sense) as a kind of abstract logos, purified to the point that only the rules of combination and interaction between such categories can be formalized. From this point of view, we say that a grammatical category C is semantically closer than a category C’ if the regulation of a concept of C involves mechanism intervening in the regulation of C’. For example, take a name of animate being, say a cat: this cat must make use of a spectrum of physiological activities for survival – eating, sleeping, breathing, and so forth; once these are satisfied, he can then indulge in less necessary but quite normal activities – playing, purring, and the like. Similarly each substantive has a spectrum of verbs describing the activities necessary for the stability and the manifestation of the meaning of the concept. Since the verb is indispensable for the stability of the substantive, it is less dense than the noun. The adjective shares in the stable character of the noun, but it is defined on a space of qualities, deeper than space-time, the support of the verb.

When a category C is denser than C’, there is, in general, a canonical transformation from C to C’. The inverse transformation, however, is generally not possible.

These rules lead to the following order, in decreasing semantic density, for the traditional grammatical categories: noun-adjective-verb-adverb affixes and various grammatical auxiliaries. In the emission of a sentence the meaning is analyzed and the elements are emitted in the order of increasing density. In the model of Section 13.4C the density of the concept is, in practice, the time required by the dummy actant to reduce the concept to the representative sign. It is much longer for a complex being like man than for an inanimate object, whose regulation is much simpler. As an example, the normal order of emission of a transitive phrase, subject-verb-object, would be verb-object-subject; the object is less stable than the subject, since in such a transitive process the subject survives the whole interaction whereas the object may perish. (The cat eats the mouse, the morphology.) The reception order, the one most favorable to the best reconstitution of the global meaning, is generally the opposite order: subject-object-verb. Now researches on the universals of language have shown that the pure emissive typology V-O-S is practically nonexistent (see Greenberg 1966), whereas the receptive typology S-O-V is well represented (e.g., Japanese, Turkish, and Basque). This reflects a fundamental fact in the dynamic of communication: the act of speaking is initiated by the speaker, and in general he has a greater interest in being understood than the listener has in understanding. Consequently the transposition of the emissive order into the receptive order is generally carried out by the speaker, and this gives predominance to the reception typology. However, the mixed emissive typology S-V-O is the most common.

An elementary sentence generally contains other ancillary elements that go to make up a nuclear phrase; these are the adjuncts. The principal kinds of adjuncts are the epithet adjectives (A-N or N-A) and genitives (G-N or N-G). The adjective is semantically less dense than the noun; therefore the receptive typology of the epithet is N-A, the emissive A-N; and similarly for the genitive: receptive N-G, emissive G-N. Since a preposition is less dense, an adjunct of type Pre-N is an emissive type, in harmony with the order V-O, while a postposition N-Post is in harmony with O-V.

The second principle governing the typology of languages is this: the free adjuncts (those not tied to the central verb, e.g., A and G) have an inverse typology to the verb-object nucleus. This leads to the two main types of languages:

Emissive	Receptive
V-O	O-V
Pre	Post
N-A	A-N
N-G	G-N

English is not typical, since it has preserved from an older receptive stage the typology A-N for the epithet adjective and the partial type G-N in the Saxon genitive (John’s house). For further details see my 1973 article on the subject.

The Origin of Writing

The mental reconstruction of the organizing centers of elementary fields spreads, by a very natural contagion, to the functional fields of the hand. The external variables of the elementary catastrophes will be realized as spatial variables. The stylization of an action is nothing more than a return to the organizing center of this action. To the extent that the Riemann-Hugoniot cusp is conceptually stabilized by the concept of division or separation, the catastrophe can be realized by writing in clay with a stick the symbol <. Similarly the sign ∧ is, like the previous one, an old Chinese ideogram meaning to enter or penetrate, and this could well be a stylization of the elliptic umbilic. In this way we cannot but admire the suitability of the Chinese system of writing; the dominant influence of the spoken word in the West has resulted in an alphabeticalor syllabic system of writing, and the expression (signifiant) has violently subjugated the meaning (signifié).

In conclusion, we have seen that an analysis of the grammatical structures of language requires a subtle mixture of algebra, dynamics, and biology. Without pretending to have a definitive answer to a problem whose difficulty can scarcely be measured, I venture to suggest that these ideas may contain something of interest for many specialists. ^{16 , 17}