Summary
An evolutionary variant of the Micro-Macro Link (MML) theory is proposed. According to the MML theory, behaviour at the individual level generates higher level structures (bottom-up process), which feed back to the lower level (topdown), reinforcing the producing behaviour either directly or indirectly, i.e. acting on the mind of the agent. Focusing on the evolution of pro-social behaviour, we explore these two types of link by means of simulation experiments. The experiments were aimed at studying the role of groups in the performances of populations of agents exchanging helping behaviour (simple loop) and the role of cognitive mediators (i.e. goals) and social norms in the spreading of altruism, described as a purposeful action (complex loop).
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Conte, R., Paolucci, M., Di Tosto, G. (2006). Vampire Bats & The Micro-Macro Link. In: Billari, F.C., Fent, T., Prskawetz, A., Scheffran, J. (eds) Agent-Based Computational Modelling. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1721-X_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-7908-1721-X_9
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
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