Abstract
One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.
I would like to thank Andreas Blank, Phil Dowe, Alan Hajek, James Joyce, Isaac Levi, Nicholas Rescher, Teddy Seidenfeld, Wolfgang Spohn, Howard Sobel, and especially two anonymous referees from the BJPS and two anonymous referees from KRA for very helpful comments and discussion. Errors remain my own. I also would like to thank Elias Quinn for correcting and improving my English. A part of this paper was given as a talk in the Fourth In-House Conference in October 2001 during my visit at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2001–2002 (cf. also Ledwig 2001).
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Ledwig, M. (2005). The No Probabilities for Acts-Principle. In: Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4631-6_1
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