The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, NATO’s focus has shifted from being solely prepared for Article V missions to being able to engage as well in crisis response operations in the event of out-of-area crises. At the same time, the Alliance has proceeded with internal military change and adaptation, the most important of which are the three interrelated elements of ESDI, the CJTF concept and the new military command structure.¹ The CJTF initiative is frequently seen as the key internal military innovation undertaken by NATO. The CJTF initiative was initially conceived as a means for NATO to generate an out-of-area military crisis response in circumstances of great uncertainty, but it was quickly recognized that it was also an instrumentality through which the Alliance could effectuate an ESDI. The centrality of the CJTF concept means that it has served as a symbol that NATO knows where it is going and why, that it really does know what it is doing, that it does have a purpose. As a symbol of NATO’s purpose and direction, the CJTF concept provided an answer to those who had questioned whether the Alliance did have a role in the post-Cold War era, or whether it was simply an anachronism whose day was done.²