Conclusion

Abstract

This book addresses political leadership behavior after the state is embroiled in war that has proven longer, costlier, and more difficult than expected at the outset. But it says nothing about why states have repeated ly found themselves in such circumstances. T he simplest answer may be, as Walt articulates, “Getting out of a quagmire is a whole lot harder than getting into one.”¹ But to some extent, the phenomenon also stems from an arrogance of power and faith in technology that is often disabused only to be reborn at another time and in another form. After the rapid collapse of the Afghani Taliban in 2002, leading defense analysts were quick to proclaim the “Afghan Model” as a revolutionary new form of warfare that would allow the external power to rapidly achieve extensive military and political objectives on the cheap, thus mitigating the pitfalls of protracted armed conflict.² Reflecting a hint of irony, the war in Afghanistan (2001-??) would become the longest in US history. Whatever the reason, states will likely continue to engage in the types of costly, protracted, and stalemated wars discussed throughout this book. And to the extent this occurs, political leaders will continue to struggle with the dilemma of “how to bring an end to the war without being blamed for how it ended.”³