Institutional Development in EU Security and Defense

Abstract

The previous chapter discussed delegation in the CSDP from a theoretical perspective. It argued that member states are likely to balance the efficiency gains from delegation with sovereignty costs. Given the uncertainty in the process of delegation and the problems of sanctioning resulting from multiple principals, member states may delegate fewer functions than is functionally optimal. The chapter also argued that delegation is not a one-off affair, but that it takes place during subsequent delegation rounds. Member states can use the feedback from previous rounds when making their decisions. With regard to the CSDP, the chapter identified several specific functional demands for delegation. These include the negotiation, information, and coordination costs involved in the planning of operations as well as implementation costs relating to command and control and collective external representation. Credible commitments, which are central in much of European integration, play a less important role. Finally, the chapter pointed at the importance of agent selection in light of anticipated goals conflicts.