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Formalizing Informal Cooperation?

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Effective Multilateralism

Part of the book series: St Antony’ Series ((STANTS))

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Abstract

It is difficult to resist the temptation of formal approaches to order in international politics. We are attracted to treaties, laws and organizations, like insects to incandescent light. But, it might be an interesting exercise to consider whether contemporary international political relationships would be in better shape had there been fewer formal arrangement in place. For example, might the world be a better place if we had been left with an informal council (or concert) of the victors after the World War II rather than a formally established United Nations? Would the management of relations between Asia’s major powers be more straightforward had the United States chosen not to erect a series of treaty-based alliances (the San Francisco system)? Would Asia be more secure over the longer term if Washington had instead established a series of informal arrangements; more along the lines of the relationship that Washington enjoys with Singapore rather than with formal ally Japan? Are we wise to pin any hope whatsoever on the quest for formal binding targets on carbon emissions as opposed to the possibility of informal, and even tacit or non-negotiated, understandings between at least some of the major emitters?

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Notes

  1. See especially, T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

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  2. For an analysis of Schelling’s approach here, see R. Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

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  3. T. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 87, note 5.

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  4. For the first edition, see H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1961).

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  5. For a comparison of their thinking, see R. Ayson, ‘A Common Interest In Common Interest: Hedley Bull, Thomas Schelling, and Collaboration in International Politics’, in C. Bell and M. Thatcher (eds.) Remembering Hedley (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2008), pp. 53–71.

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  6. H. Bull, ‘Disarmament and the International System’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5:1 (1959), 43.

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  7. H. Bull, ‘Arms Control’, Current Affairs Bulletin, 34:5 (1964), 76, italics in the original.

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  8. H. Bull, ‘Disarmament and Arms Control’, in Special Studies Prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence (Ottawa: Roger Duhamel, 1965), p. 139.

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  9. H. Bull, ‘The Classical Approach to Arms Control: Twenty Years After’, in U. Nerlich (ed.) Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, vol 2: The Western Panacea: Constraining Soviet Power though Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 27, 29.

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  10. H. Bull, ‘Cold War Diplomacy’, Current Affairs Bulletin, 28:12 (1961), 179.

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  11. Ibid., 181–2.

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  12. Ibid., ‘Cold War Diplomacy’, p. 182.

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  13. H. Bull, ‘Disarmament and Arms Control’, The British Survey, 190 (1965), 2.

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  14. H. Bull, review of Arms and Influence by Thomas C. ‘Schelling’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23:3 (1967), 26.

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  15. H. Bull, ‘Introduction’, The Control of the Arms Race, 2nd edition (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. xxxix.

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  16. Ibid., pp. xv, xxi. Elsewhere, he explains the views of those holding to a ‘modest approach’ to arms control, which in reality is a synopsis of his own world view: ‘They consider that a world in which states are determined to retain substantial military force in their own hands must be taken as a given in any approach to arms control at the present time. The problem of arms control, as they see it, is to achieve the maximum of international security in such a world as that, at the same time hoping that the cumulative effect of the measures that are undertaken will be gradually to produce changes of a fundamental character in the long run’. Bull, ‘Disarmament and Arms Control’, in Special Studies, p. 141.

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  17. H. Bull, ‘The Political and Strategic Background to Australian Defence’, in R.H. Scott (ed.), The Economics of Defence, Economic Papers no. 29, (Economics Society of Australia & New Zealand, NSW & Victorian Branches), 1968, p. 12.

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  18. A similar point was made by Gerald Segal over twenty years ago. See his introductory essay in G. Segal (ed.), Arms Control in Asia (London: Macmillan, 1987).

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© 2013 Robert Ayson

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Ayson, R. (2013). Formalizing Informal Cooperation?. In: Prantl, J. (eds) Effective Multilateralism. St Antony’ Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137312983_10

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