NATO and the Multilateral Nuclear Force

Abstract

If the Special Relationship existed anywhere, it was in the sphere of defence.¹ For John Dumbrell, nuclear co-operation (along with signals intelligence sharing under the UKUSA agreement) ‘formed the essence and beating heart of the Cold War “special relationship”’, allowing Britain to act as a great power by proxy.² Yet, in addition to Cuba and British Guiana, the proposal by the US to create a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) strained Anglo-American relations under Douglas-Home. Originally conceived during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61), the MLF was intended to facilitate shared control of nuclear weapons between NATO members.³ However, it did not gain momentum until a series of events in 1962, beginning with the cancellation in November of that year of the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile system, which had been earmarked as the delivery mechanism for the American nuclear deterrent. Skybolt had been promised to Britain by the Eisenhower administration, and its abandonment therefore precipitated a major diplomatic incident. After much discussion, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan successfully negotiated a favourable deal for the Polaris submarine-launched system as a replacement. The quid pro quo, enshrined in the resulting Nassau Agreement, was British acceptance of the MLF and agreement to allocate her newly acquired submarines to the force as part of NATO.