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Abstract

Rather than an engine of growth, or a force for political stability, the security sector in the UAE is a stage for domestic insecurities and a foreign policy that is tentative and reactionary in nature. This chapter addresses how the UAE military has developed along with the larger project of state building since the 1970s. It then argues that the intensification of military build-ups in equipment, troops and foreign advisers in the last decade is a direct result of local level federal competition and centralization of authority, as well as a regional recalibration of leadership within the GCC, along with an increase of American salesmanship and hegemony in the Arab Gulf. In the context of the argument of this book, the majilis in the security sector is under a major reconfiguration. The centralization of power in the federal government over military equipment and military strategy has created a new network that is more international in scope than in other areas of Emirati statecraft. The new majilis consists of transactional relationships in the security sector, as well as relationships that reward access and loyalty to regional elites. The tactics and rules are similar, but the players are shifting away from a domestic inter-royal dynamic to one of global military networks.

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Notes

  1. “Regional security complex” is a term used by international relations scholar Barry Buzan to characterize the mutuality of threat or fear felt among the members of a regional organization or group toward each other. See Barry Buzan (1991) People, State and Fear. Boulder: Lynne Reinner. F. Gregory Gause III, prominent scholar of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, also uses this concept as a means to explore security outcomes in the region as a result of (weak) formal alliances and the problems of consolidation of a centralized state.

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© 2014 Karen E. Young

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Young, K.E. (2014). An Emerging Interventionist: Political Economy of Security in the UAE. In: The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137021977_5

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