Abstract
The military institution is justified by the existence of independent political communities with sometimes competing interests. But while nation-states are justified in maintaining military forces to protect their interests, they do not have carte blanche in how they use those forces. The laws of war, as laid down in the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties, strictly limit when and how military force may be used. Furthermore, the military in most Western countries claims to be bound by high moral and legal professional standards.1 According to military rhetoric, military personnel are supposed to be people of courage, integrity, obedience, honour and discipline. They are bound to follow the laws of war and are obliged to disobey orders that violate the laws of war. According to the Australian Defence Force website, for example, the good officer ‘complies with directives, orders and policies in a positive and mature manner, but challenges and reports unethical/illegal orders or behaviour’.2 Similarly, the US West Point Military Academy Cadet Disciplinary Code states: ‘cadets are expected to exercise good judgment at all times. These include situations not covered by instructions or cases in which orders are obviously illegal or inappropriate’.3 Military law in most countries supports this view: ‘just following orders’ is no longer accepted as a legitimate defence in cases where illegal or immoral orders have been carried out.4
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Notes
Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, Melbourne: Allen Lane, 2004, pp. 28–30.
Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare, London: Granta Books, 1999, pp. 178–80.
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 103.
Richard Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays in Aristotle’s Ethics, London: University of California Press, 1980, p. 205.
Christine Korsgaard, ‘From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action’, in Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 215.
Karen Jones, ‘Second-hand Moral Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), pp. 65–6.
Randolph Clarke, ‘Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 66 (1992), p. 55.
Karen Jones, ‘Emotion, Weakness of Will, and Normative Conception of Agency’, in Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 190.
Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, London: Jonathan Cape, 1976, p. 82.
Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002, p. 315.
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© 2007 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Nature America Inc.
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Wolfendale, J. (2007). Military Obedience: Rhetoric and Reality. In: Primoratz, I. (eds) Politics and Morality. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625341_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625341_13
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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