Abstract
As noted earlier, the possibility of alternative hypotheses equally accounting for our sensory experiences is widely viewed as a source of skeptical doubt. In Chapter 5 we discussed one way of utilizing this insight drawing on the principle of closure to set up a (Cartesian) skeptical argument. In this chapter, I shall deal with another way of constructing such arguments that helps itself with, not the principle of closure but, the so-called underdetermination principles (Yalcin 1992; Brueckner 1994). To explain, I begin by distinguishing between knowledge and justification analogs of the principle of underdetermination. While acknowledging the plausibility of a restricted version of the knowledge version, it shall be argued that this has nothing to do with facts involving underdetermination.
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© 2005 Hamid Vahid
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Vahid, H. (2005). Skepticism and Underdetermination. In: Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230596214_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230596214_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-54409-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59621-4
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