Abstract
In this chapter, I discuss the limits of the accounts of moral imagination sketched in Chapter 1 by analysing constraints to imaginative moral reasoning. There are various limits to the role of imagination in moral reasoning and what an account of this role can do for moral theory. I distinguish three kinds of constraints to imaginative reasoning, each showing problems with pragmatist moral theory: social, moral, and epistemological constraints.
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© 2007 Mark Coeckelbergh
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Coeckelbergh, M. (2007). Limits. In: Imagination and Principles. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230589803_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230589803_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-55280-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-58980-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)