Abstract
In international tax policy, countries follow the twin goals of eliminating double taxation and double non-taxation. According to the first goal international transactions should not be disadvantaged in relation to purely national transactions so that states can realize the benefits of international economic liberalization.1 The problem in this case is an overlap of jurisdiction to tax: double taxation results from two or more jurisdictions exerting their power to tax to the full. The second goal is to ensure that international transactions do not remain tax-free or under-taxed in either jurisdiction. International transactions should not be advantaged in relation to purely national ones and tax revenue should not be eroded. Rather than a jurisdictional overlap, the problem consists in a ‘jurisdictional vacuum’ (UNCTAD 2000, 12).
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© 2008 Thomas Rixen
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Rixen, T. (2008). The Institutional Setup of International Taxation. In: The Political Economy of International Tax Governance. Transformations of the State. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582651_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582651_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35359-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-58265-1
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