Skip to main content
  • 167 Accesses

Abstract

One of the most seductive traps for the novice philosopher is to draw the following inference. She will note correctly that perennial philosophical questions, such as the concept of knowledge, may be usefully addressed by examining speech acts, such as claims to know. From that methodological insight, she may infer that there is a one-to-one relationship between having knowledge and being in a position to claim, ‘I know …’. She may assume that whenever one has knowledge, one may appropriately claim to know.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 2005 Thomas Morawetz

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Morawetz, T. (2005). The Contexts of Knowing. In: Moyal-Sharrock, D., Brenner, W.H. (eds) Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505346_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics