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Abstract

Despite the fact that the Spanish economy was making its contribution to Euro­pean recovery, there were many problems of a political nature in applying a strict economic or technical approach to the problem of relations with the Franco regime. Indeed, the alternatives to adopting sanctions against Spain were, in an ascending order of severity, the recall of ambassadors and the breaking of diplomatic relations, as demanded by several members of the United Nations, and economic sanctions. The French provisional govern­ment of the IV Republic and the British Labour government had to face polit­ical reality.

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Notes

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© 1998 Fernando Guirao Piñeyro

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Guirao, F. (1998). The Exigencies of French and British Economic Reconstruction. In: Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373914_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373914_3

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40270-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37391-4

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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