Abstract
Excessive liquidity has financed a series of bubbles in the last ten years. Central banks have not tried to prevent bubbles from ballooning but have raised interest rates once inflation exceeds the target or there is persistent overheating, thereby pricking the bubble. Moreover, central banks have added liquidity every time a bubble has burst and cut interest rates to offset the deflationary gap. By doing so, the central bank has prevented the necessary de-leveraging and has perpetuated the excessive liquidity thus sowing the seeds for the next bubble. This explains how successive bubbles have been created and subsequently pricked. The house bubble is a transformation of the internet bubble and the commodities bubble a transformation of the house bubble. The story keeps repeating but, in every cycle, liquidity increases.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Arestis, P. (2007), ‘What is the New Consensus in Macroeconomics?’, in P. Arestis (ed.), Is There a New Consensus in Macroeconomics?, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke.
Arestis, P. and Karakitsos, E. (2004), The Post-Bubble US Economy: Implications for Financial Markets, Palgrave Macmillan: London and New York.
Arestis, P. and Karakitsos, E. (2008) ‘Unemployment and the Natural Interest Rate in a Neo-Wicksellian Model’, in P. Arestis and J. McCombie (eds) Unemployment: Past and Present, Palgrave Macmillan: London and New York.
Arestis, P. and Karakitsos, E. (2009), ‘Subprime Mortgage Market and Current Financial Crisis’, in P. Arestis, P. Mooslechner and K. Wagner (eds), Housing Market Challenges in Europe and the United States: Any Solutions Available?, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke.
Fontana, G. (2006), ‘The ‘New Consensus’ View of Monetary Policy: A New Wickselian Connection?’, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 476, New York: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
Goodhart, C.A.E. (2004), ‘Review of Interest and Prices by M. Woodford’, Journal of Economics, 82(2), 195–200.
Karakitsos, E. (2009), ‘The “New Consensus Macroeconomics” in the Light of the Current Crisis’, Economia, forthcoming.
Leamer, E. (2007), ‘Housing Is the Business Cycle’, Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Aug 30 — Sep 1, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 1–74.
Rottemberg, J.J. and Woodford, M. (1995), ‘Dynamic General Equilibrium Models with Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets’, in T.J. Cooley (ed.) Frontiers of Business Cycle Research , 243–93, Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Rotemberg, J.J. and Woodford, M. (1997), ‘An Optimization-Based Econometric framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, 297–346, National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA.
Wicksell, K. (1898), Geldzins und Güterpreise, Verlag Gustav Fischer: Frankfurt.
English translation in R.F. Kahn (1965), Interest and Prices, Kelley: New York.
Woodford, M. (2003), Interest and Prices, Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Editor information
Copyright information
© 2010 Elias Karakitsos
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Karakitsos, E. (2010). Bubbles Lead to Long-term Instability. In: Fontana, G., McCombie, J., Sawyer, M. (eds) Macroeconomics, Finance and Money. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285583_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285583_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-31043-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28558-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)