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Referring When Push-Comes-to-Shove

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New Waves in Philosophy of Language

Part of the book series: New Waves in Philosophy ((NWIP))

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Abstract

The anchoring focus of this chapter is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems undercut the motivations for a reference-based semantics.

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Authors
  1. Kevan Edwards
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Sussex, UK

    Sarah Sawyer (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy) (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy)

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© 2010 Kevan Edwards

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Edwards, K. (2010). Referring When Push-Comes-to-Shove. In: Sawyer, S. (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Language. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248588_5

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