Abstract
In his 1956 correspondence with Roderick Chisholm, Wilfrid Sellars held the view that ‘the metalinguistic vocabulary in which we talk about linguistic episodes can be analyzed in terms which do not presuppose the framework of mental acts’, in part because ‘the categories of intentionality are nothing more nor less than the metalinguistic categories in terms of which we talk epistemically about overt speech as they appear in the framework of thoughts’.1
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© 2010 Jeff Speaks
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Speaks, J. (2010). Introduction, Transmission, and the Foundations of Meaning. In: Sawyer, S. (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Language. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248588_12
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