Abstract
The chapter introduces the epistemic conciliation of conflicting judgments as the guiding ideal of democracy. Two examples explore and elucidate the application of the ideal to political issues. On the one hand, controversies about abortion seemingly offer little room for epistemic conciliation as they address an “either/or” conflict about its permissibility. A more detailed look at the issues involved, however, lays bare a number of dimensions along which the ideal can gain traction. This proves that it applies to more cases that meet the eye at first sight. Conflicts between different conceptions of justice, on the other hand, are more straightforward and indeed paradigmatic cases of political disagreement. After thus extricating the consequences of the ideal of epistemic conciliation for politics, the chapter argues that democratic decision-making of a certain form exhibits a tendency toward epistemic conciliation. The argument relies on Duncan Black’s Median Voter Theorem which states that in majoritarian voting procedures the position closest to the ideal point of the median voter will be able to defeat any alternative. This is a first explanation of the tendency of democratic decision-making to engender conciliatory outcomes.
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Notes
- 1.
Feldman (2006): p. 414.
- 2.
See Feldman (2006): p. 433 for the original version of this example.
- 3.
Cabuela May (2005): p. 347.
- 4.
Possible answers include, of course, “not at all” and “all the way.” More nuanced positions are available, however. Gutman and Thompson, for instance, argue that only pro-choice advocates should pay a tax used to subsidize abortions; cf. Gutman and Thompson (1996): p. 88ff.
- 5.
From which he considers that it follows that the state should not subsidize abortion; cf. Sher (1981).
- 6.
For this reason talk of a translation of arguments drawing on religious beliefs into a public justification makes the issue seem easier than it is. How do you translate the normative force of foundational religious premises?
- 7.
- 8.
Rawls (1996): p. 63; Rawls agrees with this conclusion.
- 9.
These are two of the ways in which the debate has and continues to be framed. Cf. Ferree et al. (2002): pp. 105ff.
- 10.
Cf. Fuchs and Klingemann (1989).
- 11.
Indeed, Cabuela May insists that these moral pragmatic reasons are the only reasons we have for accepting compromises between our own moral convictions and those of others. Cf. Cabuela May (2005).
- 12.
One philosopher explains: “Political compromise occurs when a political agent invokes the fact of disagreement as a reason to accept an alternative that she perceives to be worse on its own merits than her initial position” (Cabuela May (2005): p. 318). This also holds for what Henry Richardson calls “deep compromises,” a term which he uses to denote a compromise that affects the ends of the compromising actors; cf. Richardson (2002): pp. 147ff.
- 13.
Hirschman (1994): p. 216.
- 14.
Przeworski (1991): p. 10.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
Cf. Riker (1982) who formulates the threat he takes public choice theory to pose for mandate theories of democracy.
- 18.
For an illustration of this points, see, for example, Shepsle and Bonchek (1997): pp. 83ff.
- 19.
See also McGann (2004).
- 20.
However, the theorem was originally formulated by Condorcet and rediscovered by Charles Dodgson in 1884 only to be forgotten again. Eventually, it was Duncan Black (and not Kenneth Arrow!) who was the first to rediscover it and the writings of Condorcet, Borda, and Dodgson in the twentieth century; cf. Rowley (2004): p. 203f.
- 21.
Another way of phrasing this problem in the public choice lingo is to say that no alternative is the Condorcet winner. All these formulations express the simple idea that for each policy adopted there exists a majority that prefers a different policy.
- 22.
Hence, Riker’s rejection of “populism,” the idea that the people articulate their “will” through elections, in favor of a brand of liberalism which views elections simply as a device to get rid of political elites; cf. Riker (1982).
- 23.
Cf. Niemi and Weisberg (1968).
- 24.
Cf. Mackie (2003).
- 25.
- 26.
Goodin (2007): p. 194.
- 27.
- 28.
A troubling example is the effect of racism on redistributive policies; cf. Lee and Roemer (2006).
- 29.
Cf. Poole and Romer (1985).
- 30.
Cf. Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
- 31.
Cf. Roemer (2001). Roemer develops a sophisticated model of electoral competition which takes intra-party competition between various factions into account. It should be noted, however, that his model is committed to multidimensionality. See also Roemer (2006) for a broader perspective on multiparty electoral competition.
- 32.
Cf. Siaroff (2000): p. 21f.
- 33.
Riker (1982): p. 128.
- 34.
- 35.
Cf. Gabel and Huber (2000) who check the self-placements of party supporters against the placements of parties by experts.
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Ebeling, M. (2017). Conciliatory Democracy. In: Conciliatory Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57743-6_5
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