Abstract
This chapter describes and criticizes five styles of moral deliberation in current use, the applied philosophical, the empirical, the instrumental, the mythic, and the aesthetic intuitive, and notes the intense disagreements between and within the practice of each style not only about what proper moral conclusions are, but about why there is disagreement. The central problem behind contemporary moral deliberation is identified as an inadequate model of human cognition.
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Notes
- 1.
Seven out of ten Americans claim that the nation is sharply divided on moral issues. See L. Saad (14 December 2012) ‘Most in U.S. Say Americans are Divided on Important Values’, www.gallup.com, date accessed 15 July 2015. This perception appears to be in contrast with evidence of increasing tolerance in regard to some moral issues such as premarital sex, euthanasia, and gay lifestyles. See F. Newport (26 May 2015) ‘Americans Continue to Shift Left on Key Moral Issues’, www.gallup.com, date accessed 15 September 2015. Likewise, the notion of a ‘culture war’ ongoing in the USA has received a lot of attention, but generally sociological research has not revealed a clear and widespread alignment of one block of the society against the other. The well-documented rift between Democrats and Republicans appears primarily to be an increasing polarization of political activists that does not necessarily translate into a pervasive rift among common voters. See Pew Research Center (12 June 2014) ‘Political Polarization in the American Public’, http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/, date accessed 20 September 2015. However, these findings likely overlook important dimensions of moral disagreement that do exist. The Gallup report noting a movement toward moral tolerance plays down the fact that between 30 % to over 40 % of the society continues to find these practices morally unacceptable, and the poll does not attempt to measure the intensity of opposition involved. See Newport, ‘Americans Continue to Shift Left’. Moreover, the sociological studies discounting a ‘culture war’ are generally looking for a singular split within the society and have overlooked the extent to which serious polarization exists between various racial, gender, and religious groups. See G. C. Layman, T. M. Carsey, and J. M. Horowitz (2006) ‘Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences’, Annual Review of Political Science, 93–5. Increasing religious polarization is also observed in the UK and Canada, see S. Wilkins-Laflamme (2014) ‘Toward Religious Polarization? Time Effects on Religious Commitment in U.S., UK, and Canadian Regions’, Sociology of Religion, 75, 284–308, and surveys of international opinion on morality display large blocks of disagreement on many moral issues within nations and even larger ones between nations. See Pew Research Center (4 October 2007) ‘Global Attitudes and Trends: Chap. 3. Views of Religion and Morality’, http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/10/04/chapter-3-views-of-religion-and-morality/, date accessed 15 September 2015.
- 2.
M. Shaw, S. A. Quezada, and M. A. Zárate (2011) ‘Violence with a Conscience: Religiosity and Moral Certainty as Predictors of Support for Violent Warfare’, Psychology of Violence, 1, 275–86.
- 3.
Steven Pinker and Michael Shermer both support a type of scientific certainty, which is rooted in their confidence in the ability of human reason progressively and ultimately to find the best way to live. S. Pinker (2011) The Better Angles of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined (New York: Viking), 448, and M. Shermer (2015) The Moral Arc: How Science and Reason Lead Humanity Toward Truth, Justice, and Freedom (New York: Henry Holt and Company). Peter Berger makes a similar observation to mine in his assertion that fundamentalism can be both religious and secular. By fundamentalism, Berger means ‘an attempt to restore or create anew a taken-for-granted body of beliefs and values’. P. Berger (2006) ‘Between Relativism and Fundamentalism’, The American Interest, 2 (1), 12.
- 4.
L. J. Skitka (2010) ‘The Psychology of Moral Conviction’, Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 267–81.
- 5.
T. L. Beauchamp (2003) ‘The Nature of Applied Ethics’ in R. G. Frey and C. H. Vellman (eds) A Companion to Applied Ethics (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.), 1–2.
- 6.
Beauchamp, Jonsen, and Toulmin argue that this is an inappropriate and inadequate depiction of the character or actual practice of applied ethics. See Beauchamp (2003) ‘The Nature of Applied Ethics’, 1–2; and A. R. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 23–4. However, their assessment may have as much to do with their commitments to principlism and casuistry, respectively, as with what other practitioners in applied ethics actually believe. That many ethicists adopt this orientation will be obvious in Chap. 5.
- 7.
M. Altman (2011) Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Maldin, MA: Wiley-Blackwell).
- 8.
Perhaps the most influential current version is the preference utilitarianism of Peter Singer, which focuses on the utility of preferences of those affected in a case rather than the utility of happiness or pleasure. P. Singer (2011) Practical Ethics, 3rd edn (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 13.
- 9.
A. R. Jonsen (1995) ‘Casuistry: An Alternative or Complement to Principles?’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 5, 242–5.
- 10.
T. L. Beauchamp (1995) ‘Principlism and its Alleged Competitors’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 5, 182–4.
- 11.
J. Habermas (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, translated by C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 65, 66, 93.
- 12.
T. L. Beauchamp (2004) ‘Does Ethical Theory Have a Future in Bioethics?’ Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 32, 209–17.
- 13.
J. D. Arras (1991) ‘Getting Down to Cases: the Revival of Casuistry’, Bioethics, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 16, 47–8.
- 14.
K. D. Clouser and B. Gert (1990) ‘A Critique of Principlism’, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 15, 219–36.
- 15.
See, for example, D. GarcÃa-Marzá (2012) ‘Business Ethics as Applied Ethics: A Discourse Ethics Approach’, Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics, 3, 99–114, and D. Garcia (2001) ‘Moral Deliberation: The Role of Methodologies in Clinical Ethics’, Medicine, Healthcare, and Philosophy, 4, 223–32.
- 16.
M. J. Goldenberg (2005) ‘Evidence-based Ethics? On Evidence-based Practice and the ‘Empirical Turn’ from Normative Ethics’, BMC Medical Ethics, 6, 1–9, and M. Dunn, M. Sheehan, T. Hope, and M. Parker (2012) ‘Toward Methodological Innovation in Empirical Ethics Research’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 21, 466–80.
- 17.
Stephen Hawking displays this optimism, ‘In my opinion, there is no aspect of reality beyond the reach of the human mind’. Quoted in A. Boyle (23 September 2014) ‘‘‘I’m an Atheist’’: Stephen Hawking on God and Space Travel’, http://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/im-atheist-stephen-hawking-god-space-travel-n210076, date accessed 20 July 2015.
- 18.
See, for example, the PLUS Decision Making Model at Ethics Research Center (29 May 2009) ‘The PLUS Decision Making Model’, http://www.ethics.org/resource/plus-decision-making-model, accessed 20 July 2015, and D. Gracia (2003) ‘Ethical Case Deliberation and Decision-making’, Medicine, Healthcare, and Philosophy, 6, 231–3.
- 19.
S. D. Simpson (2012) ‘The Uneven Consequences of Corporate Misbehavior’, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/12/governments-care-corporate-misbehavior.asp, date accessed 20 July 2015.
- 20.
See, for example, M. L. A. Hayward and W. Boeker (1998) ‘Power and Conflicts of Interest in Professional Firms: Evidence from Banking’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 1–22 and R. A. Prentice (2000) ‘The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing’, Ohio State Law Journal, 61, 1597–670, and M. David (1991) ‘The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral Confusion’ in D. G. Johnson (ed.) Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 130–7.
- 21.
See, for example, M. Eliade (1963) Myth and Reality (New York: Harper & Row), 6.
- 22.
See, for example, the various essays in S. K. George (2005) Ethics, Literature, & Theory: An Introductory Reader, 2nd edn (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.).
- 23.
J. M. Gustafson (1975) The Contributions of Theology to Medical Ethics (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press), 93–4.
- 24.
G. A. Lindbeck (1984) The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press), 134–5.
- 25.
M. Nussbaum (2008) ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ in the President’s Council on Bioethics (ed) Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington, D.C.: The President’s Council on Bioethics) https://repository.library.georgetown.edu, date accessed 20 July 2015.
- 26.
R. Charon (2001) ‘Narrative Medicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection, Profession, and Trust’, JAMA, 286, 1897–902.
- 27.
H. Sidgwick (1907) Methods of Ethics (London: MacMillan and Co.), 100.
- 28.
For example, see T. L. Beauchamp (2004) ‘Does Ethical Theory Have a Future in Bioethics?’ Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 32, 209–17, for an assertion that applying moral theories to practical ethical issues is not the proper method.
- 29.
S. Toulmin (1981) ‘The Tyranny of Principles’, The Hastings Center Report, 11, 31–2.
- 30.
Toulmin, ‘Tyranny of Principles’, 32.
- 31.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1958) ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33, 1.
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Tillman, J.J. (2016). The Problems of Contemporary Moral Deliberation. In: An Integrative Model of Moral Deliberation. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-49022-3_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-49022-3_1
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