Abstract
In this chapter, Andina discusses some of the most relevant theories of contemporary social ontology with the aim of outlining the status quo of the discipline while isolating the theoretical elements from which she develops her own research. Contemporary social ontologies are divided into three main groups: P-ontologies (based on the person), I-ontologies (based on institutions) and O-ontologies (based on objects). They are exemplified, respectively, by the theories of Margaret Gilbert, John Searle and Herbert Lionel Hart, and Maurizio Ferraris. The analysis of these views leads Andina to identify the most important theoretical achievements of all while highlighting issues in need of further examination. In particular, applying Foucault’s notion of governmentality to the European Union, Andina shows that all the above theories should further investigate the metaphysical–political sphere.
Abstract
The mainstream theories of contemporary social ontology share a realist perspective, obviously modulated in different ways, and identify three starting points on the basis of which to develop an explanation of social reality. The ontologies of Aristotelian inspiration (which I will call “P-ontologies”) focus on the concept of person (or agent) as well as the relationships between people. A paradigmatic example of this position is the work of the American philosopher Margaret Gilbert. There is a second group, exemplified by the position of the American philosopher John Searle and the British jurist and philosopher Herbert Lionel Hart, which regards the institutions and the rules as the center of social reality (I shall call them “I-ontologies”). Finally there is a third group, exemplified by the position of the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris, which instead concentrates on the role and function of social objects (“O-ontology”).
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Notes
- 1.
Barnes (1988).
- 2.
- 3.
For an extensive discussion, see O’Connor and Sandis (ed. by), (2010): 69–70.
- 4.
O’Connor and Sandis (ed. by) (2010): 71.
- 5.
- 6.
For a specific analysis of individual intentionality, see. Searle (1983).
- 7.
Gilbert discusses Searle’s thesis by treating collective intentionality—which, in Tuomela’s jargon, would be “we-intentions”—as a belief. (Gilbert 2007: 31 ff.).
- 8.
See also Searle (2002: 91 ff).
- 9.
See Andina (2012: Eng. Trans. 51 ff.).
- 10.
See Andina (2012).
- 11.
Cf. Ferraris (2012).
- 12.
Ferraris (2012: 316 ff).
- 13.
Ferraris (2009: 100 ff).
- 14.
Ferraris (2004).
- 15.
Cf. Ferraris (2011).
- 16.
Treaty of Lisbon/Article 1—Treaty on European Union/Preamble (2007/C).
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Andina, T. (2016). Theories. In: An Ontology for Social Reality. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-47244-1_2
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