Armchair Safeguards: The Role of Open Source Intelligence in Nuclear Proliferation Analysis

Abstract

Since the late 1960s, interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has taken shape in ‘an international regime based on commitment to the presumption of non-proliferation’.¹ Underpinned by the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), this collection of prin. ciples, norms, rules and processes has framed international action in the nuclear arena and nuclear proliferation has been characterised as ‘deviant behaviour’.² Consequently, determining whether a state has engaged in pro. liferation in the past, is currently engaged in proliferation or has a propensity to proliferate in the future is intrinsically challenging due to a multitude of factors. These include the high levels of secrecy and compartmentali. sation that surround nuclear weapons programmes and the difficulty in gauging the veracity of political statements regarding nuclear intentions. The ‘dual-use’ nature of much sensitive nuclear technology is also prob. lematic, providing aspiring proliférants with a means of cloaking a weapons programme with a credible civil rationale, for a time at least.³