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Rational control of reasoning in artificial intelligence

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The Logic of Theory Change

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 465))

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Abstract

In contrast to the idealized rationality formalized in decision theory, artificial intelligence studies agents of limited cognitive resources and abilities. These limitations require the agent to economize on its memory usage and reasoning effort, and to be able to deliberate and act in spite of incomplete and inconsistent beliefs and preferences. We discuss some of the means by which artificial reasoners tolerate and even exploit these limitations in carrying out basic cognitive tasks, focusing on the underlying notions of progressive and conservative reasoning and constitutional and constructive representation. We show how these means may all be viewed as species of rationally guided or controlled reasoning, or more generally, as forms of rational self-government.

This paper is based on a talk presented at the Conference on the Dynamics of Belief, held in Lund, Sweden in August 1989. A shorter, earlier version of this paper appeared under the title “Reasoning, Representation, and Rational Self-Government” in Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, 4, (Z. W. Ras, editor), Amsterdam: North-Holland 1989, pp. 367–380. Copyright © 1990 by Jon Doyle.

Jon Doyle is supported by National Institutes of Health Grant No. R01 LM04493 from the National Library of Medicine.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Computer Science, 545 Technology Square, 02139, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

    Jon Doyle

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  1. Jon Doyle
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André Fuhrmann Michael Morreau

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Doyle, J. (1991). Rational control of reasoning in artificial intelligence. In: Fuhrmann, A., Morreau, M. (eds) The Logic of Theory Change. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 465. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018415

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018415

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53567-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46817-2

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