Abstract
This thesis demonstrates on the basis of two physical attacks against cryptographic systems that the complexity of physical attacks should not be overestimated. Overestimating the physical attack complexity leads to unprotected devices once the estimation of the complexity proves wrong and the attack can be realized.
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© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore
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Krämer, J. (2015). Conclusion. In: Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity. T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1_7
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Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-287-786-4
Online ISBN: 978-981-287-787-1
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