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Horizontal Restrictions

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Abstract

Monopolistic agreements in Chap. 2 of the AML are divided into horizontal and vertical agreements. Article 13 of Chap. 2 prohibits horizontal monopoly agreement and Article 14 prohibits vertical restrictions. By summarizing the openly published administrative decisions on horizontal agreements by SAIC, NDRC, SAMR and their local branches in China from 2010 till 2018, the average number of participating firms is 12.65. Among the total of 91 cartel cases, 31 of them were led by industrial associations. The most represented industries of cartels include auto dealing, insurance, concrete and bricks, pharmaceutical, food industry, tourism and transportation. Cartel fines in China range from 1 up to 10% of the sales revenue in the previous year. In accordance with the leniency guidelines, the first operator who actively reports evidence and fully cooperates with investigation may receive exemption from punishment, while others may receive a reduced penalty in appropriate circumstances.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    ICN Report (2005, pp. 9–10).

  2. 2.

    Motta (2004, p. 138).

  3. 3.

    Aubert et al. (2006, p. 1245).

  4. 4.

    Monti (2001, p. 15).

  5. 5.

    Fan Jiage Longduan Guiding (反价格垄断规定) [Provisions against Price Fixing] (issued by the State Development and Reform Commission on December 29, 2010 and effective on February 1, 2011, now expired).

  6. 6.

    Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Jiguan Jinzhi Longduan Xieyi Xingwei de Guiding (工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定) [Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements] (issued by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on December 31, 2010 and effective on February 1, 2011, now expired).

  7. 7.

    Jinzhi Longduan Xieyi Zanxing Guiding (禁止垄断协议暂行规定) [Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements] (issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation on June 26, 2019 and effective on September 1, 2019).

  8. 8.

    Zhan et al. (2018).

  9. 9.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p. 44).

  10. 10.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2011, pp. 462–463).

  11. 11.

    Combe and Monnier (2011).

  12. 12.

    Smuda (2014).

  13. 13.

    Posner (1970).

  14. 14.

    Gallo et al. (2000).

  15. 15.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2011, p. 464).

  16. 16.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2011, p. 466).

  17. 17.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2012, p. 4).

  18. 18.

    Hay and Kelley (1974).

  19. 19.

    Feinberg et al. (2016).

  20. 20.

    Harrington and Chang (2009).

  21. 21.

    Miller (2009).

  22. 22.

    Velijanovski (2007).

  23. 23.

    Ivaldi et al. (2015, p. 20).

  24. 24.

    Hüschelrath et al. (2012).

  25. 25.

    Monti (2001, p. 15).

  26. 26.

    Monnier and Combe (2011, p. 243).

  27. 27.

    Hüschelrath et al. (2012).

  28. 28.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p. 57).

  29. 29.

    Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p. 60).

  30. 30.

    Monti (2001, p. 16).

  31. 31.

    Smuda (2014).

  32. 32.

    In 1986, according to the estimation by Douglas Ginsburg, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, the probability of cartels being detected was only around 10%. See Sentencing Options Hearing before the United States Sentencing Commission, in United States Sentencing Commission: Unpublished Public Hearings, 15 July 1986. There are concerns about whether this estimation is valid. See Connor and Lande (2005, p. 519). Bryant and Eckard estimated that in the sample period from January 1961 to December 1987, this probability in the US in a given year was around 13–17%. Bryant and Eckhard (1991, p. 531).

  33. 33.

    Monnier and Combe (2011, p. 239).

  34. 34.

    Combe et al. (2008). In 2010, Connor concluded that “most scholars believe that it (the probability of being apprehended) averages <30%”. Connor (2010, p. 3).

  35. 35.

    Ivaldi et al. (2015, p. 20).

  36. 36.

    Harrington and Chang (2009), Miller (2009), Brenner (2006, p. 639).

  37. 37.

    Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), Connor (2010); Note that Werden, Hammond and Barnett responded Connor’s empirical research by using their data from 1999 to 2012: Werden et al. (2011).

  38. 38.

    In Europe: see Combe and Monnier (2011) (“Fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission are overall sub-optimal.”) Allain et al.’s research shows that although recent EC-imposed cartel fines are close to meeting the deterrence goal, some fines seem to be too high, and some are too low (Allain et al. 2015).

  39. 39.

    Connor and Lande (2012). For similar results in Europe, see Connor and Miller (2009). Their research is consistent with the commonly accepted view by empirical economists that the worldwide cartel sanctions today are sub-optimal.

  40. 40.

    Bolotova and Connor (2008).

  41. 41.

    Ivaldi et al. (2015).

  42. 42.

    Bageri et al. (2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013).

  43. 43.

    Harrington (2004, 2005), Houba et al. (2010, 2012).

  44. 44.

    Katsoulacos et al. (2015).

  45. 45.

    Normann and Tan (2013), Smuda (2014), Connor and Lande (2012); Comparing another survey conducted among representatives of the general population by Andreas Stephan in 2014: when the US citizens were asked “Is price fixing illegal in your country?”, 43% replied “Don’t know”. See Stephan (2014, p. 13).

  46. 46.

    Connor and Lande (2005), Connor (2006, p. 207, 208).

  47. 47.

    Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2879 (Codified at 15 U.S.C. section 1, 2000). See Ginsburg and Wright (2010, p. 4).

  48. 48.

    Clarke (2012, p. 82), Hammond (2005, p. 1).

  49. 49.

    Connor (2008, p. 104).

  50. 50.

    Connor (2008, p. 106).

  51. 51.

    Smuda et al. (2015, p. 1352).

  52. 52.

    Anderson and Cuff (2011, p. 402), Commission Decision Summary No. COMP/39125 (Car Glass), 2009 O.J. C 173/13.

  53. 53.

    Anderson and Cuff (2011, p. 402).

  54. 54.

    The sales are counted as the sales of products covered by the infringement during the previous year. The assessment of fines depends on the factors including the nature of the infringement, the geographic scope, and whether the infringement has been implemented. The fines on cartels are in the range of 15–20%. See European Commission Factsheet “Fines for breaking EU Competition Law”, available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/factsheet_fines_en.pdf.

  55. 55.

    Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines, Official Journal C 210, 1 September 2006. See Ginsburg and Wright (2010, p. 4).

  56. 56.

    Note that the fines imposed by the European Commission have increased dramatically during the last fifteen years, see European Commission, Cartels: Overview, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html.

  57. 57.

    Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005, p. 10).

  58. 58.

    Bageri et al. (2013, p. 545).

  59. 59.

    Combe and Monnier (2011, p. 239).

  60. 60.

    Bageri et al. (2013, p. 547).

  61. 61.

    U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 2R1.1(d)(1) (2006).

  62. 62.

    Connor and Lande (2012, p. 478).

  63. 63.

    Aubert et al. (2006).

  64. 64.

    Sokol (2011, p. 5).

  65. 65.

    Article 13, AML.

  66. 66.

    Jinzhi Longduan Xieyi Zanxing Guiding (禁止垄断协议暂行规定) [Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements], issued by the SAMR on June 26, 2019 and effective on September 1, 2019.

  67. 67.

    Article 13, AML.

  68. 68.

    Article 7, Provisions against Price Fixing.

  69. 69.

    Article 7, SAMR Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements.

  70. 70.

    Article 4, the Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements.

  71. 71.

    Article 5, Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements.

  72. 72.

    Article 6, Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements.

  73. 73.

    Article 7, Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements.

  74. 74.

    Article 15, the AML.

  75. 75.

    Guanyu Longduan Xieyi Huomian Yibanxing Tiaojian He Chengxu de Zhinan (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (关于垄断协议豁免一般性条件和程序的指南(征求意见稿)) [Guideline on the General Conditions and Procedures for Exemption of Monopolistic Agreements (draft version)] issued by the NDRC on May 12, 2016.

  76. 76.

    Article 53 of the 2020 draft revision of the AML: If a business operator violates the provisions of this law and implements a monopoly agreement, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency shall order it to stop the illegal behaviour, confiscate the illegal income, and impose 1–10% of its sales in the previous year. For those who did not have sales in the previous year or have not implemented the monopoly agreement reached, they may be fined <50 million yuan. In the case of organizing and helping the operator to reach a monopoly agreement, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply. Where an operator actively reports to the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency about the conclusion of a monopoly agreement and provides important evidence, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency may reduce or exempt the operator's punishment as appropriate. If an industry association violates the provisions of this law and organizes an operator to reach a monopoly agreement, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency will be ordered to stop the illegal act and a fine of <5 million yuan may be imposed; if the circumstances are serious, the registration organization of the social organization may cancel the registration according to law.

  77. 77.

    First Price Cartel Cases under the Chinese AML, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP Alert Memo, May 21 2010, available at https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/first-price-cartel-cases-under-the-chinese-aml.pdf.

  78. 78.

    According to Article 46 of the AML “where any business operator voluntarily reports the conditions on reading the monopoly agreement and provides important evidence to the anti-monopoly authority, it may impose a mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment as the case may be […]”. However, at that time, leniency policy had not been officially proposed by the NDRC. This decision may be issued according to the Article 15 of the Regulations on Administrative Sanctions for Price-related Illegal Conduct and the Law of Administrative Sanctions. See First Price Cartel Cases Under the Chinese AML, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP Alert Memo, May 21, 2010, available at https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/first-price-cartel-cases-under-the-chinese-aml.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020).

  79. 79.

    According to Article 39 of the Price Law, if there are illegal gains, the violator might be fined up to 5 times the value of the illegal gains.

  80. 80.

    See China Fines Agricultural Companies for Agreeing to Raise the Price of Their Products, Eversheds, LLP. July 16 2010.

  81. 81.

    This NDRC decision was issued according to the Price Law, and the Provisions on Administrative Penalty against Unlawful Price-Related Practices. See China Fines Agricultural Companies for Agreeing to Raise the Price of Their Products, Eversheds, LLP.

  82. 82.

    It is not clear whether the NDRC has applied the leniency policies in this case. In addition to the decision from the NDRC, there was another distributor that was fined RMB 20,000 by the Guangdong Provincial Price Bureau.

  83. 83.

    See First Cartel Fines in China Following New Regulations, McDermott Will & Emery, 25 February, 2011.

  84. 84.

    McDermott Will & Emery, 25 February 2011, id.

  85. 85.

    Liu et al. (2020).

  86. 86.

    Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Jiguan Xingzheng Chufa Anjian Weifa Suode Rending Banfa (工商行政管理机关行政处罚案件违法所得认定办法) [Measures for the Administrative Authorities for Industry and Commerce to Determine Illegal Proceeds in Administrative Punishment Cases] Order No. 37 of the SAIC, issued on November 21, 2008 and effective on January 1, 2009.

  87. 87.

    Wang and Fang (2018).

  88. 88.

    Aubert et al. (2006).

  89. 89.

    Wils (2016, p. 12).

  90. 90.

    Miller (2009).

  91. 91.

    Cartel leniency program in Korea was adopted in 1997 and revised in 2004. The leniency program increased total cartel fines USD 215 million, and average cartel fines per discovery USD 8 million (Han 2015).

  92. 92.

    Koh and Jeong (2013).

  93. 93.

    Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, [2006] OJ C 298/17.

  94. 94.

    Wils (2016, p. 9).

  95. 95.

    Article 12 stipluates that the first operator who actively reports the relevant situation, provides important evidence of the monopoly agreement and fully cooperate with the investigation, shall be exempted from punishment. For other operators who proactively report to the industry and commerce administrative authorities on the relevant situation and provide important evidence of the monopoly agreement, receive a reduced penalty according to circumstances. Translation adopted from en.pkulaw.cn.

  96. 96.

    Fan Jiage Longduan Xingzheng Zhifa Chengxu Guiding (反价格垄断行政执法程序规定) [Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing] issued on December 29 2010, effective on February 1 2011.

  97. 97.

    Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Jiguan Jinzhi Longduan Xieyi Xingwei de Guiding (工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定) [Provisions for the Industry and Commerce Administrations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements] issued on December 31, 2010 and effective on February 1, 2011.

  98. 98.

    Guojia Fazhan He Gaige Weiyuanhui Gonggao 2017 Nian Di Liu Hao (国家发展和改革委员会公告2017年第6号—行业协会价格行为指南) [NDRC Announcement No. 6 of 2017—Guidance for Price Behavior of Industry Associations] issued by NDRC on July 20, 2017, available at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbgg/201707/W020170725555925290946.pdf.

  99. 99.

    Article 46 of the AML: Where a trade association organizes the business operators in its own industry to reach a monopoly agreement in violation of this Law, the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency may impose a fine of <500,000 yuan; where the circumstances are serious, the authority in charge of social group registration may deregister the trade association. Translation adopted from en.pkulaw.cn.

  100. 100.

    Fels et al. (2014a, p. 2).

  101. 101.

    Fels et al. (2016a, p. 7).

  102. 102.

    Fels et al. (2016a, p. 10).

  103. 103.

    Fels et al. (2016c, p. 4).

  104. 104.

    Fels et al. (2017b, p. 4).

  105. 105.

    Fels et al. (2016b, p. 3).

  106. 106.

    Fels et al. (2016a, p. 11).

  107. 107.

    Fels et al. (2014b, p. 3).

  108. 108.

    Fels et al. (2017a, p. 4).

  109. 109.

    Fels et al. (2016a, p. 9).

  110. 110.

    Fels et al. (2016a, p. 9).

  111. 111.

    Fels et al. (2016a, p. 9).

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  1. School of Law, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China

    Jingyuan Ma

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Ma, J. (2020). Horizontal Restrictions. In: Competition Law in China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5105-5_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5105-5_4

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