Abstract
The class of strict majority rules consists of all p-strict majority rules, where p is greater than or equal to half and less than one. p-strict majority rule, p greater than or equal to half and less than one, is defined by: Under p-strict majority rule, an alternative x is considered to be socially at least as good as some other alternative y iff more than p fraction of total number of individuals do not prefer y to x. This chapter provides a characterization of the class of strict majority rules and derives Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the rules belonging to the class.
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References
Jain, Satish K. 1994. Characterization of non-minority rules. DSA working paper 12/94. Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Jain, Satish K. 1984. Non-minority rules: Characterization of configurations with rational social preferences. Keio Economic Studies 21: 45–54.
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Jain, S.K. (2019). The Class of Strict Majority Rules. In: Domain Conditions and Social Rationality. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_7
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