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Contending Sacrifices: Discontent of Military Veterans of the Kurdish Conflict for Civilian Veterans of 15 July

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The Dubious Case of a Failed Coup

Abstract

This chapter explores the re-articulation of Turkish militarism in the aftermath of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt by focusing on the experiences of the disabled veterans of the Kurdish conflict—subjects of the pre-15 July militarism. Drawing on ethnographic observations and semi-structured in-depth interviews with the disabled veterans of the Kurdish conflict, this chapter aims to demonstrate a contention along the lines of merit, sacrifice, and entitlement to representation between the two veteran groups—ex-soldiers of the Turkish Armed Forces who participated in the armed conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the “civilian veterans” who were harmed in some way during the coup attempt. This chapter concentrates on two moments—the 2016 Veterans’ Day commemoration and the first anniversary of the 15 July coup attempt—to demonstrate the shift in the disabled veterans’ boundary-drawing efforts with particular reference to rightfulness, combat experience, masculinity, and morality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The analysis in this chapter derives from an empirical study consisting of interviews and ethnographic observations in 2016–2017. I was a participant observer in the Veterans’ Day commemorations in September 2016 and 2017. I had a series of conversations with the disabled veterans of the Kurdish conflict right after these events. I also conducted individual semi-structured in-depth interviews with eight veterans in 2017 right after the first-year commemoration of the 15 July coup attempt.

  2. 2.

    For such an example of an ex-soldier not officially recognised as a gazi, see the news report in Turkish at http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/781556-yarali-askerin-gazilik-mucadelesi (accessed 23.08.2017).

  3. 3.

    For a detailed analysis of this period, see Marlies Casier, Joost Jongerden, and Nic Walker “Turkey’s Kurdish Movement and the AKP’s Kurdish Opening: A Kurdish Spring or Fall” (2013), Cengiz Güneş “Unblocking the Impasse in Turkey’s Kurdish Question” (2012), and Cuma Çiçek “Elimination or Integration of Pro-Kurdish Politics: The Limits of the AKP’s Democratic Initiative” (2011).

  4. 4.

    In fact, although the law specifically refers to civilian martyrs, it does not use a corresponding term for the injured civilians. They are instead referred as the disabled (those who became disabled in terror attacks) without the honorific gazi title. However, civilian gazi has been a term used by the media especially around the time when the by-law was introduced and gained wide currency in the popular discourse with the 15 July coup attempt.

  5. 5.

    It should be noted that the title was never limited to the soldiers of Turkish origin. Kurdish men are also conscripted as the citizens of Turkey. During my research I encountered a few disabled veterans of Kurdish origin. However, they become gazis not as Kurds but as members of the Turkish Armed Forces, thus in a Turkish nationalist context. It should also be highlighted that the state discourse has avoided branding the conflict as an ethnic one and professing the Kurds, an entire ethnic group, as the adversary, relying on a distinction between the Kurdish citizens of Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Yet in practice it has been almost impossible to maintain this distinction and the Kurds have been criminalised in so many cases for their political and cultural activities.

  6. 6.

    In my interviews with the veterans during research, I encountered some views sympathetic with some of the Kurdish demands, acknowledging particularly the economic deprivation of the Kurdish regions. However, even those holding such lenient views did not consider disadvantaged living conditions as a rightful justification for resorting to violence. There was an agreement among the veterans on considering the Kurds as first and foremost the culprits of the armed conflict rather than victims.

  7. 7.

    All the names used in this chapter are anonymised to protect the privacy of my research participants.

  8. 8.

    These include the War of Independence (1919–1923), the Korean War (1950–1953), the military intervention in Cyprus (1974), and finally the Kurdish armed conflict (1984 onwards).

  9. 9.

    Almost a year after the 15 July coup attempt, the veterans of the Kurdish conflict were promised by the Armed Forces a short video about the Veterans’ Day which would be broadcasted on television prior to the 2017 commemoration. Some veterans were invited for the shooting of the video that took place in the military museum in İstanbul. This was probably an effort to appease the veterans’ long-standing complaints about the lack of publicity for their event as well as overrepresentation of the 15 July veterans in the public space. However, the video was not broadcasted, nor were the veterans informed as to why.

  10. 10.

    The resolution for this conflict over representation came a year later in the 2017 commemoration, where the number of speeches was limited to one, which was given by a veteran of the Cyprus conflict as “a neutral party” and the content of the speech was quite generic.

  11. 11.

    At the end of the commemoration, this was extended to two women participants of the ceremony who were both wrapped in nationalist symbols—the Turkish flag worn as a cloak on their shoulders, the military calpac hat on the head, newspaper clippings of national ceremonies on a piece of cardboard in their hands… The head of the veterans’ association turned down the request of these two women, relatives of deceased soldiers, to get on the shuttle bus hired for this occasion. He later explained that “They are here to cause a scene. We don’t want to be associated with those women”. This actually happened after the ceremony when the audience for a potential scene by those women had already left. Therefore, what mattered in this case seemed to show their domination over their space and the subjects that can be in that space, especially after the state and military officials had left the site.

  12. 12.

    For an example of a veteran’s view on this point, see http://www.gazihaber.com/kose-yazisi/975/sehit-ve-gazilere-esitlik.html (accessed 27.08.2017).

  13. 13.

    For an analysis that links such dichotomies in the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) and its supporters’ discourse to a strong sense of victimhood and social suffering as constitutive elements of Turkish-Islamist subjects, see Zafer Yılmaz (2017).

  14. 14.

    Similar stories of soldiers risking their lives to prevent the coup attempt have appeared in the media. In one such example, a tank commander committed suicide once he realised that they were in a coup plot so that he would not be a part of the plot, http://arsiv.dha.com.tr/15-temmuz-gecesi-sabiha-gokcende-yasananlar_1292854.html (accessed 24.11.2017).

  15. 15.

    The posters can be seen at http://www.15temmuzetkinlikleri.com/acikhavaafisleri (accessed 20.07.2017).

  16. 16.

    Ergenekon Trials were a series of trials of military personnel, journalists, lawyers, NGO activists, and so forth that took place between 2008 and 2016. The defendants were mainly accused of being members of Ergenekon, a clandestine organisation, and of plotting against the government.

  17. 17.

    This is an area that still needs to be explored even though it is difficult to convince the veterans to consider some of their actions in the conflict zone in the context of extra-legality. Salim’s brief and indeed rare remark gives a glimpse of some awareness of the possible legal consequences of their involvement in the conflict.

  18. 18.

    The limitations of this disruption should be noted, though. It applies only to the actions against the government rather than serving a more general purpose for a more accountable military. This can be observed in a recent change in the law (No. 6722) regarding the Turkish Armed Forces personnel, making more difficult to put on trial the personnel for violations during military operations (http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160714-1.htm).

  19. 19.

    Utku also recounts those who came to console them, assuring them that they knew Utku’s unit did not participate in the coup attempt, so they should not feel upset. This is a good example of the general population’s endeavour to continue cherishing the conscripts and the Turkish military, while at the same time condemning the coup plot.

  20. 20.

    A detailed analysis of the AKP’s policy change can be found in Ömer Turan’s chapter in this volume.

  21. 21.

    The original verse is as follows: “Kürt’ü, Türk’ü ve Çerkes’i, hep Adem’in oğlu kızı, beraberce şehit gazi, yanlış var mı ve neresi” (http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/egitim/789367/MEB_birlestireyim_derken_ayristirdi.html) (accessed 07.10.2017). Interestingly enough, the same verse was tweeted by the then Minister of European Union Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış to celebrate the Newroz, an event with symbolic significance for the Kurds, in 2013, during the peace process (https://www.haberler.com/ab-bakani-bagis-in-nevruz-mesaji-4445415-haberi/) (accessed 07.10.2017).

  22. 22.

    Women’s active participation in large numbers in the meetings following the coup attempt has been noted by scholars such as Sevinç Doğan (2016) and Aksu Bora (2016). Both Doğan and Aksu point to the diversity of women who were on the streets during the Democracy Watch, and they suggest that the AKP’s homogenising grand narrative of the nation’s will does not do justice to women’s diverse existence and motivations.

  23. 23.

    To view the poster in question, please see the link on footnote 12.

  24. 24.

    http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/4.5.675.pdf.

  25. 25.

    An important aspect of this relationship is that a great majority of the disabled veterans are conscripted rather than professional soldiers. This greatly enhances the role and responsibility of the state in the veterans’ disability.

  26. 26.

    These sermons are called “khutbah” and they are prepared by the Directorate of Religious Affairs to be delivered in the mosques all over the country. As such, they represent the government’s religious discourse.

  27. 27.

    Çanakkale Muhaberesi, that is, the Gallipoli Campaign (1915), is considered as an initial stage of the War of Independence (1919–1923) in nationalist historiography.

  28. 28.

    It should be noted that there is a view that experiencing an armed clash should be regarded sufficient to become a gazi: “I was in Çengelköy in the middle of the clashes for an hour and a half on the night of 15 July. People were shot in front of me and I saw their bowels bulge out of their bodies. I nearly lost my mind when I saw an ambulance raked by gunfire. I never told these details to anyone before. That’s why some people thought I wasn’t on the streets. But I am a 15 July veteran, too. You don’t have to be injured to become a gazi. A gazi is someone who participated in gaza [Islamic holy war against the infidels]” (Alparslan Cambaz, the son of a journalist killed in the 15 July clashes, http://t24.com.tr/haber/biktik-su-surekli-bir-seyler-isteyen-gazilerden,414274) (accessed 29.10.2017). In this account, the significance of participation in a combat-like situation becomes more evident. Indeed, its significance overrides the requirement of injury to become a gazi and thus implicitly calls for a “war veteran” status to be in effect.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

    Nurseli Yeşim Sünbüloğlu

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  1. Nurseli Yeşim Sünbüloğlu
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  1. Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

    Feride Çiçekoğlu

  2. Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

    Ömer Turan

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Sünbüloğlu, N.Y. (2019). Contending Sacrifices: Discontent of Military Veterans of the Kurdish Conflict for Civilian Veterans of 15 July. In: Çiçekoğlu, F., Turan, Ö. (eds) The Dubious Case of a Failed Coup. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1141-3_3

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