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Pulling and Gouging: The Sadrist Line’s Adaptable and Evolving Repertoire of Contention

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New Opposition in the Middle East

Abstract

The symbolic infiltration of Baghdad’s Green Zone by thousands of protesters in April 2016 was a peak moment in Iraq’s contentious politics and demonstrated the mobilising capacity of the Sadrist Line, the civil society constituency of the Sadrist network. The protesters’ grievances—poor government service delivery, corruption, insecurity, and the ethnosectarian quota system that is criticised for entrenching these problems—had been expressed through contentious action since 2003, yet the events in April 2016 were unprecedented. The Sadrist Line is the largest and most powerful participant in an instrumental coalition that includes diverse civil society groups. This chapter conceptualises the Sadrist Line as a tolerated opposition group, which, in collaboration with its coalition, deploys an adaptable and evolving repertoire of contention to test the boundaries of toleration, make claims on the state, and portray the Sadrist Line as a credible, nonviolent participant in Iraqi civil society.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Illustrative examples include Jeffrey Bartholet, ‘Moqtada al-Sadr and U.S.’s fate in Iraq.’ Newsweek, 12 March 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/moqtada-al-sadr-and-uss-fate-iraq-105197; Dan Murphy, ‘Sadr the agitator: like father, like son.’ Christian Science Monitor, 27 April 2004, https://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0427/p01s03-woiq.html; ‘Who is Moqtada Sadr?’ Washington Post, 16 August 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57949-2004Apr7.html

  2. 2.

    The social movement is also referred to as the Sadrist Movement, Current, or Trend. Activists inform me that their preferred name is al-Khatt al-Sadri, the Sadrist Line. In contrast to a current or a trend, a line is infinite and stable. This self-definition is consistent with the movement’s collective action frame which seeks to establish its enduring relevance to Iraqi politics and society. Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 22 September 2016).

  3. 3.

    Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Introduction: Islamic activism and social movement theory’, in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 2.

  4. 4.

    Aqeel Abood, ‘The Sadrist Movement: Success in mobilizing people in Iraq’, Kufa Review 2, no. 2 (2013): 77–104; Timothy Haugh, ‘The Sadr II Movement: An organizational fight for legitimacy within the Iraqi Shi’a community’, Strategic Insights 6, no. 5 (2005); Ches Thurber, ‘Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq’s armed Shia groups’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 5–6 (2014): 900–923.

  5. 5.

    Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory’, Third World Quarterly 26, no. 6 (2005): 897.

  6. 6.

    Mario Diani, ‘The concept of social movement’, The Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (1992).

  7. 7.

    Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, ‘Contentious politics and social movements’, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 438.

  8. 8.

    The explanatory power of discursive opportunity structures in the study of social movements is demonstrated in Timothy Peace, European Social Movements and Muslim Activism: Another World but with Whom? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

  9. 9.

    Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (2000): 611–639.

  10. 10.

    Examples include الشمس وهج المقتدى, Twitter post, 29 September 2016, 6:39 am, https://twitter.com/AlnjfiA/status/781231997775740928, which was posted in the context of strike and petition actions and depicts Imam Hussein and Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr under a reform slogan; يكفيني لقائدي عشقي, Twitter post, 30 September 2016, 8:17 pm, https://twitter.com/R__H__R__H/status/781800160972120064, which includes images of Imam Hussein and Muqtada al-Sadr with a reform hashtag; حسين, Twitter post, 1 October 2016, 5:32 am, https://twitter.com/shamstahrer/status/781939863243350016, which included a popular image of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala under a reform slogan.

  11. 11.

    الطائيجواد, Twitter post, 17 October 2016, 12:48 pm, https://twitter.com/jawadaltaai1985/status/787832520406597632 shares the image of a protester who died from injuries sustained when he was struck in the head by a tear gas cylinder. The message states that the bombs that penetrated the bodies of protesters are akin to the arrows that pierced the body of Imam Hussein.

  12. 12.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 17 November 2016).

  13. 13.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, interview by Damian Doyle (online, 21 February 2017).

  14. 14.

    Renad Mansour and Michael Clark, ‘Rethinking Sadr: From firebrand to Iraqi statesman?’ Carnegie Middle East Center, 20 November 2014, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/57279

  15. 15.

    Matthew Duss, ‘Misunderstanding Muqtada al-Sadr.’ Foreign Policy in Focus, 26 July 2007, http://fpif.org/misunderstanding_muqtada_al-sadr/; Reidar Visser, ‘Iraq’, in Militancy and Political Violence in Shiism, ed. Assaf Moghadam, 95–111 (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).

  16. 16.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 28 September 2016).

  17. 17.

    Jane Arraf, ‘Iraq: Muqtada al-Sadr’s Green Zone demonstration.’ Al Jazeera English, 30 March 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/iraq-muqtada-al-sadr-green-zone-demonstration-160329190153511.html

  18. 18.

    Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative. ‘Tahrir Square Martyrs: The Martyrs of Continuous Nonviolent Iraqi Struggle’, Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, 20 February 2017, http://www.iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/6610

  19. 19.

    Tim Craig and Asaad Majeed, ‘In Iraq, Sadr’s militia set for big protest.’ Washington Post, 25 May 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-iraq-sadrs-militia-set-for-big-protest/2011/05/25/AG05TOBH_story.html

  20. 20.

    Liz Sly, ‘Arab Spring-style protests take hold in Iraq.’ Washington Post, 8 February 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/arab-spring-style-protests-take-hold-in-iraq/2013/02/08/f875ef7e-715f-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.html

  21. 21.

    Michael Lipin, ‘Iraq’s Sadr demands ‘fair implementation’ of national security laws.’ Voice of America, 13 January 2013, http://www.voanews.com/a/iraq-sadr-demands-fair-implementation-of-national-security-laws/1583045.html

  22. 22.

    Critiques of these latter elements of the broader Sadrist political program suggest they are a rhetorical means of targeting al-Sadr’s political rivals, such as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his allies. See Ali Abel Sadad, ‘Sadr Attacks Iraq’s Integrity Committee.’ Al-Monitor, 5 March 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2013/03/iraq-sadr-maliki-integrity.html

  23. 23.

    Anders C. Hardig, ‘Beyond the Arab revolts: conceptualizing civil society in the Middle East and North Africa’, Democratization 22, no. 6 (2015): 1131–1153.

  24. 24.

    Zack Beauchamp, ‘Why protesters overran Iraq’s parliament.’ Vox, 2 May 2016, http://www.vox.com/2016/5/2/11565346/iraq-parliament-protest; Adnan Abu Zeed, ‘How religious movements gained the upper hand in Iraqi protests.’ Al-Monitor, 6 April 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/iraq-secular-protests-muqtada-al-sadr-reform-sit-ins.html

  25. 25.

    The pro-reform protest movement’s critique of Iraq’s political system is clearly articulated by Jassim al-Helfi, a key figure within the movement and a member of the central committee. The protesters demand the replacement of the ‘current system based on sectarianism and ethnic quotas’ with a ‘political system based on equal citizenship’. Jassim al-Helfi, ‘The Iraqi protest movement explained, at World Social Forum 2016.’ Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, 7 October 2016, http://www.iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/5955

  26. 26.

    Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, ‘Social movements’, in The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, ed. Michael Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 69–79.

  27. 27.

    Jonathan Steele, ‘Sectarian militias have no place in Iraq, says Muqtada al-Sadr.’ Middle East Eye, 20 March 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/muqtada-al-sadr-iraq-1637609574

  28. 28.

    ‘Iraqi Social Forum.’ Facebook. Accessed 18 September 2017, https://www.facebook.com/iraqisocialforum/

  29. 29.

    Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, ‘The Protest in Iraq: a National, Popular and Nonviolent Movement.’ Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, 24 May 2016, http://www.iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/5476

  30. 30.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 18 August 2016); Information Center for Research and Development, ‘Friedrich Ebert Foundation Center: Political reforms in Iraq.’ Information Center for Research and Development, 17 September 2016, http://www.infocenteriq.com/News_Details.php?ID=104

  31. 31.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 29 September 2016).

  32. 32.

    Omar Al-Jaffal, ‘Will political party emerge out of Iraqi popular protests?’ Al-Monitor, 15 July 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/baghdad-protests-sadrists-civil-movement.html

  33. 33.

    See, for example, ‘The leader Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr meets with the coordinating committee supervising the reform demonstrations in his home.’ The Private Office of His Eminence Sayyid Mutqada al-Sadr, accessed 14 March 2017. http://jawabna.com/en/index.php/news/3311-the-leader-sayyid-muqtada-al-sadr-meets-with-the-coordinating-committee-supervising-the-reform-demonstrations-in-his-home.html

  34. 34.

    Benjamin Isakhan, ‘The streets of Iraq: Protest and democracy after Saddam’, in The Secret History of Democracy, ed. Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 191–203.

  35. 35.

    Muqtada Lovers, Twitter post, 4 September 2016, 3:12 am, https://twitter.com/muqtadalovers/status/772119968267763712

  36. 36.

    Ahmad al-Rubaye, ‘A supporter of Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr holds a banner…’ Getty Images, 22 July 2016, http://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/supporter-of-iraqi-shiite-cleric-moqtada-al-sadr-holds-a-news-photo/578779974

  37. 37.

    ‘Pictures: Opponents of corruption strike and raise the slogan, “the corrupt government does not represent me”.’ Media al-Sadr Office, accessed 5 September 2016, http://www.mediaalsadroffice.com/2016/09/blog-post_65.html

  38. 38.

    This message was displayed at a June 2016 protest following terrorist bombings in Baghdad that demanded accountability for inadequate security provision. An activist provided a photo of the banner to the author via WhatsApp. It is published online at https://damiandoyle.wordpress.com/2016/12/11/speicher-man/

  39. 39.

    ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Accessed 18 September 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/

  40. 40.

    For example, ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Updated 24 March 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/photos/a.1040208219366693.1073741829.1039355736118608/1253436584710521/?type=3&theater

  41. 41.

    For example, ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Updated 24 June 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/photos/a.1039384449449070.1073741828.1039355736118608/1343947205659458/?type=3&theater. Image of a man holding a banner that commemorates the ‘martyrs of reform’, protesters killed during repression of past protests.

  42. 42.

    For example, ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Updated 10 June 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/photos/a.1039384449449070.1073741828.1039355736118608/1330561790331333/?type=3&theater

  43. 43.

    For example, ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Updated 5 August 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/photos/a.1039384449449070.1073741828.1039355736118608/1385511774836334/?type=3&theater. Aerial photograph shows scale of crowd gathering in Tahrir Square, Baghdad.

  44. 44.

    For example, ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Updated 18 February 2017. https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/photos/a.1040208219366693.1073741829.1039355736118608/1222669447787235/?type=3&theater

  45. 45.

    Hurriyet Daily News, ‘Iraqi Shiite cleric al-Sadr calls for protests in front of Turkish Embassy.’ Hurriyet Daily News, 18 October 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-shiite-cleric-al-sadr-calls-for-protests-in-front-of-turkish-embassy.aspx?pageID=238&nid=105085&NewsCatID=352

  46. 46.

    Loaa Adel, ‘Sadr followers go on strike in Najaf, Wasit and Babel.’ Iraqi News, 4 September 2016, http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/sadr-followers-go-strike-najaf-wasit-babel/

  47. 47.

    Loaa Adel, ‘Sadr launches new campaign against Iraqi government corruption.’ Iraqi News, 10 September 2016, http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/sadr-launches-new-campaign-corruption/; Isakhan, ‘The streets of Iraq: Protest and democracy after Saddam.’

  48. 48.

    Ali Jawad and Ali H.M. Abo Rege, ‘Iraq’s Sadrists stage funeral for slain demonstrators.’ Anadolou Agency, 14 February 2017, http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iraq-s-sadrists-stage-funeral-for-slain-demonstrators/750404

  49. 49.

    Loveday Morris and Mustafa Salim, ‘Protesters hack Iraqi parliament website: “Idiots are leading the country”.’ Washington Post, 8 June 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/08/protesters-hack-iraqi-parliament-website-idiots-are-leading-the-country/

  50. 50.

    Saif Hameed and Aref Mohammed, ‘Iraqi cleric Sadr asks followers to stop attacks on rivals’ offices.’ Reuters, 11 June 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-sadr-idUSKCN0YX0DX

  51. 51.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 13 May 2016).

  52. 52.

    Mawazin News Agency, ‘‘Shala Qala’ tops the slogans of the Sadrists in the Tahrir Square demonstration.’ Mawazin News Agency, 11 March 2016, http://www.mawazin.net/التحرير-ساحة-تظاهرة-في-الصدريين-شعارات-يتصدر-قلع-شلع

  53. 53.

    Stephen Kalin and Ahmed Rasheed, ‘Iraqi protesters end Green Zone sit-in for now after issuing demands.’ Reuters, 2 May 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-politics/iraqi-protesters-end-green-zone-sit-in-for-now-after-issuing-demands-idUSKCN0XS1BA

  54. 54.

    Patrick Cockburn, ‘The protesters in Iraq’s Green Zone show the vulnerability of the country’s ruling elite.’ Independent, 3 May 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/protest-iraq-green-zone-baghdad-muqtada-al-sadr-ruling-elite-government-a7010396.html

  55. 55.

    BBC, ‘Iraq reforms: Parliament backs PM Haider al-Abadi’s plan.’ BBC News, 11 August 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33861080

  56. 56.

    Middle East Eye, ‘Mass protests continue in Iraq despite partial progress on new cabinet.’ Middle East Eye, 26 April 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/mass-protests-continue-iraq-despite-slight-progress-new-cabinet-234007353

  57. 57.

    New Arab, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr threatens to storm Baghdad’s Green Zone.’ New Arab, 8 March 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/3/8/muqtada-sadr-threatens-to-storm-baghdads-green-zone

  58. 58.

    Liz Sly and Mustafa Salim, ‘Moqtada al-Sadr is back, proving that he’s still a force in Iraqi politics.’ Washington Post, 31 March 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/moqtada-al-sadr-is-back-proving-that-hes-still-a-force-in-iraqi-politics/2016/03/31/b26918d4-f6af-11e5-958d-d038dac6e718_story.html

  59. 59.

    Martin Chulov, ‘Protesters in Iraq’s green zone begin to withdraw.’ Guardian, 2 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/01/protesters-in-iraqs-green-zone-begin-to-withdraw

  60. 60.

    Hassan Mneimneh, ‘Iraq’s struggle for reform.’ Middle East Institute, 10 May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/iraq%E2%80%99s-struggle-reform

  61. 61.

    Economist, ‘Fallujah, again.’ Economist, 28 May 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21699461-why-retaking-jihadist-stronghold-has-become-priority-fallujah-again; Kirk H. Sowell, ‘Iraq’s fake populism and anti-sectarianism.’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 June 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/63777

  62. 62.

    Ihsan Al-Shimari quoted in Martin Chulov, ‘Protesters in Iraq’s green zone begin to withdraw.’

  63. 63.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 22 May 2016).

  64. 64.

    Amnesty International, ‘Iraq: Government should investigate violence at Baghdad protest.’ Amnesty International, 24 May 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/4093/2016/en/

  65. 65.

    Sotal Iraq, ‘A group of youth wearing ‘protective masks’ in preparation for the upcoming demonstration.’ Sotal Iraq, 22 May 2016, http://www.sotaliraq.com/newsitem.php?id=333377.#axzz4szHBevP8

  66. 66.

    Adel, ‘Sadr followers go on strike in Najaf, Wasit and Babel.’

  67. 67.

    Adel, ‘Sadr launches new campaign against Iraqi government corruption.’

  68. 68.

    Al Jazeera English, ‘Violence grips protest rally in Baghdad.’ Al Jazeera English, 12 February 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/protesters-killed-violence-grips-baghdad-rally-170211140644671.html; Hassan Al-Shanoun, ‘Who is involved in killing of Baghdad demonstrators?’ Al-Monitor, 20 February 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/muqtada-sadr-iraq-reform-baghdad-electoral-commission.html

  69. 69.

    Jawad and Abo Rege, ‘Iraq’s Sadrists stage funeral for slain demonstrators’; Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, ‘Tahrir Square Martyrs: The Martyrs of Continuous Nonviolent Iraqi Struggle.’

  70. 70.

    The guidance was posted on ‘Central committee supervising the popular protests.’ Facebook. Accessed 14 February 2017, https://www.facebook.com/Central.Revolution.Committee/

  71. 71.

    New Arab, ‘Thousands in Baghdad ‘silent protest’ after violent demonstrations.’ New Arab, 17 February 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/2/17/thousands-in-baghdad-silent-protest-after-violent-demonstrations

  72. 72.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, personal communication with the author (online, 12 February 2017). Several competing narratives developed in the period following the 11 February 2017 protest. The official narrative suggested that the protesters provoked violence by forcing their way onto streets that were cordoned off by the security forces while protesters claimed that the security forces were responsible. On social media and in personal correspondence, Sadrist activists discussed a widely held view among the protesters that members of an armed group had provoked the violence by attacking both the security forces and the protesters and then withdrawing from the scene.

  73. 73.

    Rudaw, ‘Sadr: I may be assassinated, but reform revolution must continue.’ Rudaw English, 24 March 2017, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/24032017

  74. 74.

    Sadrist Line participant in Baghdad, interview by Damian Doyle (online, 2 May 2017).

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  1. Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia

    Damian Doyle

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  1. Middle East Studies Forum, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia

    Dara Conduit

  2. Middle East Studies Forum, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia

    Shahram Akbarzadeh

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Doyle, D. (2018). Pulling and Gouging: The Sadrist Line’s Adaptable and Evolving Repertoire of Contention. In: Conduit, D., Akbarzadeh, S. (eds) New Opposition in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8821-6_3

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