Abstract
This chapter attempts to make a research on the institutional environment of collusion so that we have an insight into and a solution to the problems arising from collusion.
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Nie, H. (2017). Institutional Environment of Collusion. In: Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_9
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