Abstract
This chapter is mainly concerned about the impact of collusion on social development. Our major findings are: collusion does harm to supervision by public opinion, immobilizes residential income distribution pattern, hinders the development of social organizations, and increases aggregate cost of reform. Section 8.1 analyzes the relationship between collusion and public supervision; Sect. 8.2 discusses the impact of collusion on residential income distribution; Sect. 8.3 attempts to delve into the relationship between collusion and the development of social organizations; Sect. 8.4 discusses the impact of collusion on the costs of reform; Sect. 8.5 is a summary.
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Nie, H. (2017). The Impact of Collusion on Social Development. In: Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_8
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