Skip to main content

The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China
  • 289 Accesses

Abstract

In this chapter and Chaps. 7 and 8, we will discuss various types of social cost (expressed as \( {\text{C}} \), see the discussion of collusion model in Chap. 2) as a result of collusion . It is not that we deny possible gains, but that we feel it necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of negative costs of various forms of collusion. Undeniably, an analysis of collusion on corporate and governmental behaviors and on social development is conducive to helping the central government make an objective comparison between gains and costs.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Aghion, Philippe, Nicolas Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith and Peter Howitt. “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2005, 20 (2): 701–728.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alfaro, Laura. Andrew Charlton: Fabio Kanczuk. “Plant-Size Distribution and Cross-Country Income Differences”. NBER Working Paper No. 14 060, 2008.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, Kenneth. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation on Resources for Invention”. In Nelson, R. R. eds. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton: NBER, 1962.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banerjee, Abhijit V., Esther Duflo. “Growth Theory through the Lens of Development Economics”. In Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. eds. Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, 1 (1). Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2005.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caselli, Francesco. “Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences”, in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf eds. Handbook of Economic Growth. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005, volume 1, pp. 679–741.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheng, Dongsheng and Lili Liu. A True Story of Huawei. Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House. 2004. 程东升, 刘丽丽. 华为真相. 北京: 当代中国出版社. 2004.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Xinyuan, et al. “Judiciary Independence and the Enforcement of Investor Protection Laws: Market Responses to the ‘1/15’ Notice of the Supreme People’s Court”. China Economic Quarterly. 2010 (1): 1–28.

    Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, Stijin, Eric Feijen and Luc Laeven. “Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions”. Journal of Financial Economics. 2008, 88: 554–580.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dai, Mi, Maitra, Madhura and Yu, Miaojie. “Unexceptional Exporter Performance in China: The Role of Processing Trade”. Peking University working paper. 2011.

    Google Scholar 

  • Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-DeSilanes, and Andrei Shleifer. “The Regulation of Entry”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117 (1): 1–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faccio, Mara. “Politically Connected Firms”. American Economic Review. 2006, 96 (1): 369–386.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fan, Joseph, T. J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang. “Politically connected CEOs, corporate governances, and post-IPO performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms”. Journal of Financial Economics. 2007, 2: 330–357.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fisman, Raymond. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections”. American Economic Review. 2001, 91: 1095–1102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999, 114: 83–116.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter J. Klenow. “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, 124 (4): 1 403–1 448.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hu, Albert G. Z. “Ownership, Government R&D, Private R&D, and Productivity in Chinese Industry”. Journal of Comparative Economics. 2001, 29 (1): 136–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jefferson, G.H., Huamao Bai, Xiaojing Guan, and Xiaoyun Yu. “R and D Performance in Chinese Industry”. Economics of Innovation and New Technology. 2006, 15 (4/5): 345–366.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keller, Wolfgang and Stephen R. Yeaple. “Multinational Enterprises, International Trade, and Productivity Growth: Firm-Level Evidence from the United States”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2009, 91 (4): 821–831.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kornai, Janos, Eric Maskin and Gerard Roland. “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint”. Journal of Economic Literature. 2003, 41 (4): 1 095–1 136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, Anne. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”. American Economic Review. 1974, 64 (3): 291–303.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krugman, Paul. The Age of Diminished Expectations: U.S. Economic Policy in the 1990s. 3rd edition. Cambridge: MIT press, 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luo, Danglun and Qingquan Tang. “The Performance of Institutional Environment Evidence from China’s Private Listed Companies”. Economic Research Journal. 2009, (2): 106–118. 罗党论, 唐清泉. 市场环境、中国民营上市公司制度环境与绩效问题研究. 经济研究. 2009 (2): 106–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • Melitz, Marc. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity”. Econometrica. 2003, 71 (6): 1 695–1 725.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, Kevin, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1991, 106 (2): 503–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nie, Huihua, Ting Jiang, and Rudai Yang. A Review and Reflection on the Use and Abuse of Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database. The Journal of World Economy. 2012(5): 142–158. 聂辉华, 江艇和杨汝岱,《中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题》,《世界经济》, 2012(5): 142–158.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nie, Huihua and Ruixue Jia. “China’s Manufacturing TFP and Misallocation of Resources”. The Journal of World Economy. 2011, (7): 27–42. 聂辉华, 贾瑞雪. 中国制造业企业生产率与资源误置. 世界经济, 2011, 34 (7): 27–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nie, Huihua, Songtao Tan and Yufeng Wang. “Innovation, Firm Size and Market Competition: An Analysis Based on Panel Data of Chinese Enterprises”. The Journal of World Economy. 2008, 31 (7): 57–66. 聂辉华, 谭松涛, 王宇锋. 创新、企业规模和市场竞争―基于中国企业层面面板数据的分析. 世界经济, 2008, 31 (7): 57-66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olley, G. Stevan and A. Pakes. “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry”. Econometrica, 1996, 64 (6): 1 263–1 297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Restuccia, Diego, Richard Rogerson. “Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with Heterogeneous Establishments”. Review of Economic Dynamics. 2008, 11 (4): 707–720.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brother, 1942.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, George. “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 1971, 3: 3–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Subodh, Kandamuthan. “Market Concentration, Firm Size, Innovative Activity: A Firm-level EconomSic Analysis of Selected Indian Industries under Economic Liberalization”. WIDER, Discussion Paper, No. 108, 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  • Symeonidis, George. “Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Shumpeterian Hypotheses and Some New Themes”. OECD working paper no. 32643, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  • Syverson, Chad. “What Determines Productivity?” NBER working paper No. 15712, 2010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, Gordon. “The Welfare of Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft”. Western Economic Journal. 1967, 5 (3): 224–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNCTAD. “World Investment Report 2010”. 2011, http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=753 (Re-accessed by the translator October 6, 2016).

  • Wu, Wenfeng, Wu Chongfeng and Liu Xiaowei. “The Governmental Backgrounds of Top Executives in Chinese Private Listed Companies and the Value of Companies.” The Research of Economics. 2008 (7): 130–141.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yang, Qijing. “The Growth of Enterprises: To Build Political Connections or Capability?” Economical Research Journal. 2011, (10): 54–66. 杨其静. 企业成长: 政治关联还是能力建设? 经济研究, 2011 (10): 54-66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yu, Ming Gui and Hongbo Pan. “Political Connections, Institutional Environment and Bank Loans of Private Enterprises”. Management World. 2008, (8): 9–21. 余明桂, 潘红波. 政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款. 管理世界, 2008, (8): 9-21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang, Haiyang. “R&D Duality, FDI Activities, and the Productivity Growth of Chinese Enterprises”. Economic Research Journal. 2005, (6): 107–117. 张海洋. R&D两面性、外资活动与中国工业生产率增长. 经济研究. 2005, (6): 107–117.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Huihua Nie .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nie, H. (2017). The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment. In: Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-5058-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-5059-6

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics