Abstract
This chapter attempts to give an interpretation of pollution and illegal use of land and other major social problems within the principal-supervisor -agent analytical framework devised in Chap. 2. Section 5.1 explains environmental pollution from the perspective of collusion. Sections from 5.2 to 5.6, respectively, analyze the impact of collusion on illegal use of land, local negative externalities , smuggling , food safety , jerry-built projects , and adulteration. Section 5.7 is a summary.
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Nie, H. (2017). Pollution, Illegal Land Use, and Other Major Social Problems. In: Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_5
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