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Government–Firm Collusion: A New Analytical Framework

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Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China

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Abstract

This chapter is to explain the China Model characterized with “high economic growth rate concomitant with high frequency of vicious accidents” by constructing a formal model of the local government–firm collusion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Renmin University of China, Beijing, China

    Huihua Nie

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  1. Huihua Nie
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Nie, H. (2017). Government–Firm Collusion: A New Analytical Framework. In: Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5059-6_2

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-5058-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-5059-6

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

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