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Legal Status of the United Kingdom as a Third State: Strange Déjá Vu

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The Evolving Nature of EU External Relations Law

Abstract

The UK government envisaged a clean break from the Union but, under the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK’s legal position as a “third state” is ambiguous. Throughout the transition period, the UK is in many respects hardly distinguishable from an EU member state. After the transition period, the UK remains outside Union institutions, but applies core EU rules in respect of specific persons (EU citizens settled in the UK) or areas (Northern Ireland). Furthermore, UK authorities must apply these EU rules in light of EU principles and are, by and large, subject to the control of EU institutions, particularly the Court of Justice. Several aspects of the new legal status of the UK are a déjà vu, since the Withdrawal Agreement is relatively similar to “integration-oriented agreements”, such as Association Agreements. To be sure, this similitude is imperfect, as the degree of integration of the United Kingdom varies considerably, depending on the subject matter, the persons and regions concerned, and/or the moment when the law is applied. The UK’s legal position, therefore, remains complex and contradictory: as it was the least integrated member of the Union, it is now a very integrated third state.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the meaning of the expression “third state”, see Bosse Platière and Rapoport 2014, pp. 17–18.

  2. 2.

    On the notion of legal status, see inter alia Trisciuoglio 2019, p. 11.

  3. 3.

    See e.g. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, 2012, OJ C326 (TEU) articles 21(1) and 43(1).

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012, OJ C 326 (TFEU) articles 216 and 218.

  5. 5.

    See, in this sense Abderamane 2018, p. 217.

  6. 6.

    On the relationship between the status of EU member states and the principles enucleated in the case law of the Court of justice, see Potvin-Solis 2018, pp. 17–18.

  7. 7.

    Court of Justice, Van Gend en Loos, Judgment, 5 February 1963, Case 26-62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 12, emphasis added.

  8. 8.

    Court of Justice, Wightman, Judgment, 10 December 2018, Case C‑621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paras 44–45; Court of Justice, Achmea, Judgment of 6 March 2018, Case C-284/16, EU:C:2018:158, para 33; Court of Justice, Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 165–166 (emphases added).

  9. 9.

    Court of Justice, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (CETA), Opinion of the Court of 30 April 2019, Opinion 1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, paras 110–111; Court of Justice, Les Verts, Judgment, 23 April 1986, Case 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para 23; Van Gend en Loos, above n. 7, p. 12 (emphasis added).

  10. 10.

    Court of Justice, Popławski II, Judgment, 24 June 2019, Case C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, para 52; Achmea, above n. 8, para 35; Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), above n. 8, para 174; there are, of course, other elements that might possibly characterise EU member states, such as common values, see Article 2 TEU; Court of Justice, Commission v. Poland, Judgment, 24 June 2019, Case C‑619/18, EU:C:2019:531, paras 42, 43, and 58; Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), above n. 8, paras 168 and 173. The EU purportedly shares “values” with several third countries, too, see e.g. Agreement on the European Economic Area, opened for signature 02 May 1992, OJ L 1/3–522, (entered into force 1 January 1994) (EEA Agreement), preamble (referring to “common values”); Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, opened for signature 17 July 1995, OJ L329/8 (entered into force 1 June 1996) preamble (referring to “shared values”).

  11. 11.

    Łazowski 2008; see also Ott 2015 and Maresceau 2013.

  12. 12.

    EEA Agreement, above n. 10.

  13. 13.

    Cf. EEA Agreement, above n. 10, article 2(b).

  14. 14.

    Baur et al. 2018, p. 64; Van Elsuwege and Chamon 2019, p. 28.

  15. 15.

    See below, Sects. 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Rapoport 2017, p. 104; see also Ott 2015, p. 10; Maresceau 2012, p. 319; Maresceau 2013, p. 153.

  17. 17.

    Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, opened for signature 24 January 2020, OJ C 384I (entered into force 1 February 2020) (UK WA).

  18. 18.

    European Commission 2019.

  19. 19.

    Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/266 of 25 February 2020 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement, OJ 2020 L58/53.

  20. 20.

    UK WA, above n. 17, articles 126 and 132.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., article 127; see also articles 7, 128 and 129.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., article 129(3), which enables the UK to conclude international agreements with third countries in areas subject to the EU’s exclusive competence, such as trade, provided such agreements do not apply during the transition period. See further Neframi 2019, pp. 220–221.

  23. 23.

    Cf. Constantinesco 2001.

  24. 24.

    See Achmea, above n. 8, para 34. See also Court of Justice, Costa v Enel, Judgment, 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, EU:C:1964:66: “the executive force of community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the treaty set out in article 5(2)” (providing for the obligation of sincere cooperation). See further Casolari 2019b, pp. 50–51.

  25. 25.

    On the characterisation of uniform interpretation and application of EU law as a principle, see inter alia Court of Justice, Océ van der Grinten, Judgment, 25 September 2003, Case C-58/01, EU:C:2003:495, para 53; Court of Justice, Soledad Duarte Hueros, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 28 February 2013, Case C‑32/12, EU:C:2013:128, para 20; Constantinesco 2001; Burchardt 2019.

  26. 26.

    Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), above n. 8, para 174; see also Court of Justice, Draft Agreement on the Creation of a Unified Patent Litigation System, Opinion of 8 March 2011, Opinion 1/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, paras 67 and 83.

  27. 27.

    See, inter alia, Opinion 1/17 (CETA), above n.9, paras 110–111; Court of Justice, Rosneft, Judgment, 28 March 2017, Case C-71/15, EU:C:2017:236, para 80.

  28. 28.

    The EEA Agreement does not extend the legal order of the Union to EFTA countries, because it pursues specific objectives in a specific context (Neframi and Lacchi 2018, p. 240) but makes applicable principles modelled on EU law, as shown below.

  29. 29.

    EFTA Court, Sveinbjörnsdóttir, Advisory Opinion of 10 December 1998, E-9/97, E1997J0009 para 6; EFTA Court, Kolbeinsson, Judgment, 10 December 2010, E-2/10, para 85. On the relationship between state liability and sincere cooperation, see Neframi 2018, p. 355.

  30. 30.

    EFTA Court, Criminal proceedings against A, Judgment of 3 October 2007, E-1/07, para 39; EFTA Court, L’Oréal, Judgment, 8 July 2008, Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, para 22. See further Hreinsson 2016, pp. 357–359; Lourenço 2019, p. 541; Neframi and Lacchi 2018, pp. 245–246. On the link between consistent interpretation and sincere cooperation, see Court of Justice, Von Colson, Judgment, 10 April 1984, Case 14/83, EU:C:1984:153, para 26.

  31. 31.

    On the difference between good faith and sincere cooperation, see Constantinesco 1987 and Klamert 2014, pp. 42–46.

  32. 32.

    Emphasis added.

  33. 33.

    Differently from TEU, above n. 3, article 4(3), Article 5 WA, above n. 17, stipulates that the parties assist in each other “in good faith” and does not require them to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks. See further Casolari 2019a, pp. 1027–1028; Casolari 2019b, pp. 72–73.

  34. 34.

    Court of Justice, European Agreement on Road Transport, Judgment, 31 March 1971, Case 22-70, EU:C:1971:32, paras 21–22.

  35. 35.

    See Protocol 35 (On the Implementation of EEA Rules) to the EEA Agreement.

  36. 36.

    EFTA Court, Karlsson, Judgment, 30 May 2002, E-4/01, para 28; Criminal Proceedings against A, above n. 30, para 40.

  37. 37.

    Hreinsson 2016, pp. 384–385.

  38. 38.

    See further Hreinsson 2016, pp. 384–386.

  39. 39.

    Emphasis added.

  40. 40.

    UK WA, above n. 17, articles 4(1) and (2). There may, in any event, be some issues with the application of the WA’s primacy under UK law, see UK’s European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, section 38; Dougan 2020, p. 21.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Court of Justice, Ruska Federacija, Judgment, 2 April 2020, Case C-897/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:262, para 50; for a broader comparison of homogeneity clauses in integration-oriented agreements, see Ott 2015, pp. 18–23.

  42. 42.

    EEA Agreement, above n. 10, Recitals 4, 6 and 15 and article 1(1); EFTA Court, L’Oréal, above n. 30, para 27; see further Neframi and Lacchi 2018, pp. 240–241; Hreinsson 2016, pp. 350.

  43. 43.

    EEA Agreement, above n. 10, article 102; see further Sif Tynes 2018, pp. 25–26.

  44. 44.

    EEA Agreement, above n. 10, articles 6 and 119; see further Court of First Instance, Opel Austria, Judgment, 22 January 1997, Case T-115/94, EU:T:1997:3, para 110; Court of Justice, A, Judgment, 19 July 2012, Case C‑48/11, EU:C:2012:485, para 22; Court of Justice, Fonnship A/S, Judgment, 8 July 2014, Case C-83/13, EU:C:2014:2053, para 41.

  45. 45.

    Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, opened for signature 02 May 1992, OJ L 344 (entered into force 1 January 1993), article 3(2).

  46. 46.

    Baudenbacher 2016, p. 181.

  47. 47.

    EFTA Court, L’Oréal, above n. 30, paras 31, 37; see also Baur et al. 2018, pp. 76–77; Baudenbacher 2016, p. 183; Tatham 2016, p. 115–116.

  48. 48.

    Cf. Neframi and Lacchi 2018, pp. 242–243.

  49. 49.

    For instance, Article 5(5) NI Protocol stipulates that (i) “Articles 30 and 110 TFEU” apply to and in the UK in respect of Northern Ireland and (ii) “quantitative restrictions on exports and imports” are prohibited. See Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland to the UK WA (NI Protocol).

  50. 50.

    UK WA, above n. 17, preamble, recitals 5 and 7.

  51. 51.

    To be sure, in the case of the UK WA, this interpretation is performed by national (UK) courts, not by an international tribunal (such as the EFTA Court).

  52. 52.

    An exception concerns the coordination of social security systems; see UK WA, above n. 17, article 36; another exception is provided in NI Protocol, above n. 49, article 13(3); see further below, Sect. 11.4.

  53. 53.

    The NI Protocol makes exception to the “due regard” rule, see below, Sect. 11.5.

  54. 54.

    European Court of Human Rights, Üner v. the Netherlands, Judgment, 18 October 2006, App. 46410/99, para 54; see also Mariani 2019, p. 669.

  55. 55.

    See in particular TFEU, above n. 4, article 20; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2002, OJ C364/1, article 45.

  56. 56.

    See EEA Agreement, above n. 10, articles 28–39; see also Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 158/2007 of 7 December 2007, OJ 2008 L 124/20; EFTA Court, Jabbi, Judgment of the Court of 26 July 2016, E-28/15, para 71; see further Björgvinsson 2016, pp. 473–500.

  57. 57.

    For instance, Farage’s campaign included a poster showing “a queue of migrants, mostly men and brown-skinned”, with the slogan “Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all”, Evolvi 2018, p. 4; see also Pitcher 2019, pp. 2491–2492.

  58. 58.

    See, in particular, UK WA, above n. 17, articles 10(1)(a), (c) and (e). On the notion of EU citizens and their family members, see Article 2 of Directive 2004/38, OJ 2004 L 158/77.

  59. 59.

    Under the UK WA, the right of permanent residence is lost only through absence from the host State for a period exceeding 5 consecutive years (whereas under EU law the period is 2 years), see UK WA, above n. 17, article 15(3); see further Dougan 2020, pp. 32–33.

  60. 60.

    This list of rights of EU citizens in the UK after Brexit is non-exhaustive; see, for instance, the right to equal treatment in the UK WA, above n. 17, article 23; see further Mariani 2019, p. 664; Piernas López 2019, pp. 287–289; Dougan 2020, pp. 30–31.

  61. 61.

    Cf. Article 4 and 5 of Directive 2004/38/EC, cit. It is worth noting that the UK may decide no longer to accept identity cards five years after the end of the transition period, but only if they do not include a chip complying with the applicable International Civil Aviation Organisation standards, see UK WA, above n. 17, article 14(1).

  62. 62.

    Cf. Article 4(2) and 5(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC, cit.

  63. 63.

    UK WA, above n. 17, article 13.

  64. 64.

    See, however, n. 59.

  65. 65.

    The list of limitations is not exhaustive. For instance, the range of family members entitled to rights by association with a protected EU citizen is reduced, see Dougan 2020, p. 33. Moreover, procedural safeguards in case of removal seem reduced, see UK WA, above n. 17, article 20(4) and Peers 2019.

  66. 66.

    Court of Justice, G.S. and V.G., Judgment, 12 December 2019, Joined Cases C-381/18 and C-382/18, EU:C:2019:1072, para 53; Court of Justice, Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, Judgments, 29 April 2004, Joined cases C‑482/01 and C‑493/01, EU:C:2004:262, paras 66 and 67; Court of Justice, Coman and Others, Judgement, 05 June 2018C‑673/16, EU:C:2018:385, para 44; see also Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, cit.

  67. 67.

    UK WA, above n. 17, article 20(2).

  68. 68.

    See also Piernas López 2019, p. 284.

  69. 69.

    The UK might also require EU citizens to comply with the conditions for enjoying the right to residence under EU law, e.g. being workers or having sufficient resources and sickness insurance, see Article 7(1)(a) and (b) of directive 2004/38; see further Smismans 2018, p. 448; Dougan 2020, p. 31.

  70. 70.

    See also, in particular, UK WA, above n. 17, articles 18(1)(f), (j), (k) and (l).

  71. 71.

    Ibid., article 18(1).

  72. 72.

    Smismans 2018, p. 449; Benson et al. 2019.

  73. 73.

    See however UK WA, above n. 17, article 18(1).

  74. 74.

    Smismans 2018, pp. 444–445, 450; Benson et al. 2019; Dougan 2020, pp. 29–30.

  75. 75.

    The Joint Committee may abolish the authority eight years after the end of the transition period, see UK WA, above n. 17, article 159.

  76. 76.

    Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, OJ 1996 L35/1.

  77. 77.

    See further Harvey and Kramer 2018, pp. 68–69.

  78. 78.

    See further on the “backstop” Ares et al. 2019, pp. 105–114.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., pp. 108–111, 116–122.

  80. 80.

    See above, n. 21.

  81. 81.

    See NI Protocol, above n. 49, articles 4 and 5.

  82. 82.

    The only reference to this concept is found in the Political Declaration, which is a political commitment that does not significantly affect the UK’s legal position, see Political Declaration, cit., para 77.

  83. 83.

    The UK, therefore, can include Northern Ireland in the territorial scope of trade agreements with other countries (provided that those agreements do not prejudice the application of the NI Protocol); see NI Protocol, above n. 49, articles 4(2)(3) and (4).

  84. 84.

    Ibid., Annex 5 to the NI Protocol.

  85. 85.

    UK WA, above n. 17, article 6(1), see above, Sect. 11.2.

  86. 86.

    Ibid., article 4(5); see above, Sect. 11.2.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., article 66.

  88. 88.

    See, to this effect, Ott 2015, p. 22.

  89. 89.

    Rectius, EU organs exercise their powers in respect of article 5, articles 7–10 and article 12(2)(2) NI Protocol.

  90. 90.

    UK WA, above n. 17, article 166(3).

  91. 91.

    As this question deals with the interpretation of EU law, it should be settled after a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice (see below, Sect. 11.5).

  92. 92.

    European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 28 February 2018, TF50 (2018) 33, article 4(4).

  93. 93.

    See e.g. Court of Justice, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eGmbH, Judgment, 8 July 1975, Case 4-75, EU:C:1975:98.

  94. 94.

    See e.g. Court of Justice, Commission v Ireland, Judgment, 24 November 1982, Case 249/81, EU:C:1982:402.

  95. 95.

    It cannot be excluded that the UK intended to be set free, in particular, from the (wavering) case law of the CJEU on selling arrangements, see e.g. Keck, Judgment, 24 November 1993, Case C-267/91, EU:C:1993:905; Commission v. Italy, Judgment, 10 February 2009, Case C-110/05, EU:C:2009:66; Scotch Whisky Association, Judgment, 23 December 2015, Case C-333/14, EU:C:2015:845. I thank Giacomo Di Federico for pointing this out.

  96. 96.

    Emphasis added.

  97. 97.

    The Joint Committee and the UK government may, to a certain extent, ease the burden for exporters, see NI Protocol, above n. 49, articles 5(6) and 10, as well as Annex 5.

  98. 98.

    O’Carroll 2019.

  99. 99.

    See further Neframi 2019, pp. 226–227.

  100. 100.

    Cf. UK House of Lords, EU Committee 2020, para 168.

  101. 101.

    Achmea, above n. 8, para 35; Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), above n. 8, para 174; see also TEU, above n. 3, article 19.

  102. 102.

    Achmea, above n. 8, para 36, emphasis added; Opinion 1/09 (Patent Court), above n. 26, paras 68–69; Court of Justice, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Judgment, 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para 33.

  103. 103.

    Achmea, above n. 8, para 37; see also, inter alia, Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), above n. 8, para 176.

  104. 104.

    UK Government 2017b, paras 2.2–2.3.

  105. 105.

    Moreover, the Court will maintain its jurisdiction, after the transition period, on proceedings brought by or against the United Kingdom and requests from UK tribunals made before the end of the transition period, see UK WA, above n. 17, article 86.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., article 158(2), which provides for a partial exception to this rule in case of residence applications made during the transition period.

  107. 107.

    Ibid., articles 108(1)(a) and (f).

  108. 108.

    Ibid., article 13(4).

  109. 109.

    See Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus of 23 September 2003, OJ L236, article 12(1).

  110. 110.

    UK WA, above n. 17, article 160.

  111. 111.

    To be sure, the starting positions of the Contracting parties diverged considerably on a number of key points, see Odermatt 2018, p. 300.

  112. 112.

    Cf. Court of Justice, Draft Agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), Opinion of 18 April 2002, Opinion 1/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:231, para 13; Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), above n. 8, para 184.

  113. 113.

    Opinion 1/17 (CETA), above n. 9, para 120; Achmea, above n. 8, para 39.

  114. 114.

    E.g. Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, opened for signature 16 June 2008, OJ L164/2 (entered into force 1 June 2015), Protocol 7, article 13.

  115. 115.

    E.g. Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, opened for signature 21 March 2014, OJ L 161/3–2137 (entered into force 1 September 2017) (EU-Ukraine AA), article 322; see further Van Elsuwege and Chamon 2019, p. 46. The EEA Agreement contains a comparable, but not identical, mechanism, see EEA Agreement, above n. 10, article 111(3); see further Baur et al. 2018, pp. 168–169.

  116. 116.

    See further Van der Loo 2016, pp. 296–300.

  117. 117.

    See also UK WA, above n. 17, article 182. One may note that, since the arbitrators cannot be “members, officials or other servants of the Union institutions”, the members of the Court of Justice cannot be part of the panel (article 171(2)).

  118. 118.

    Cf. Court of Justice, Draft Agreement relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion of 14 December 1991, Opinion 1/91, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, para 61.

  119. 119.

    German Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, para 118.

  120. 120.

    Van Gend en Loos, above n. 7; see also Costa v Enel, above n. 24. More generally, participation in the institutional structure of international organisations is one of the constant elements of the status of member states, see Pustorino 2012, p. 176.

  121. 121.

    See further Dony 2018, pp. 299–313.

  122. 122.

    One may note that non-EU EEA member states are consulted during the EU decision-making process relating to acts relevant for the EEA, but their opinion is not binding on the Union, Lourenço 2019, p. 535.

  123. 123.

    Schermers and Blokker 2011, para 173ff.

  124. 124.

    Opinion 1/00 (ECAA), above n. 112, para 12; see also Opinion 1/91 (EEA), above n. 118, paras 61–65; Court of Justice, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, Opinion of 10 April 1992, Opinion 1/92, ECLI:EU:C:1992:189 paras 32 and 41. See also Guillard 2014, p. 458.

  125. 125.

    Opinion 1/17 (CETA), above n. 9, para 150.

  126. 126.

    EEA Agreement, above n. 10, articles 99(1) and 100. See further Baur et al. 2018, pp. 119–124; Lourenco 2019, p. 535.

  127. 127.

    Tovo 2016, pp. 72–83; Chamon 2019, pp. 1517 and 1522; Bekkedal 2019.

  128. 128.

    Opinion 1/00 (ECAA), above n. 112, paras 6–22.

  129. 129.

    Baur et al. 2018, pp. 94–95; see also, e.g., the Association Council established by the EU-Ukraine AA, above n. 115, articles 460–463.

  130. 130.

    UK WA, above n. 17, articles 164–166. See, to that effect, EU Law Analysis 2019, para 127. See also the Specialised Committee overseeing the implementation of the Protocol on Northern Ireland, Protocol on NI, above n. 49, article 14.

  131. 131.

    European Council (Article 50) Meeting, 15 December 2017, Guidelines, EUCO XT 20011/17.

  132. 132.

    See EC Europa 2019.

  133. 133.

    UK WA, above n. 17, articles 128(2) and (3); see also articles 128 (4) and 129(7).

  134. 134.

    Ibid., article 128(2).

  135. 135.

    Ibid., article 128(2)(b) and 129(2); see also article 129(5).

  136. 136.

    Political Declaration, paras 40 and 66.

  137. 137.

    Ibid., paras 23, 40, and 66. See also paras 45, 49, 63, 65, 83, 86, 88.

  138. 138.

    Ibid., para 93.

  139. 139.

    UK Government 2017a.

  140. 140.

    See above, n. 16.

  141. 141.

    Poinsignon 2018, pp. 580–583.

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Acknowledgements

I thank the editors who assisted me with my contribution, Marco Borraccetti, Federico Casolari, Giacomo Di Federico, Giulia Evolvi, Eleftheria Neframi, Pietro Manzini, and Carlo Tovo for their comments. All errors remain mine.

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  1. University of Bologna, Via Zamboni 27/29, 40126, Bologna, Italy

    M. Gatti

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. EU Legal—Centre for European and International Law, The Hague, The Netherlands

    W. Th. Douma

  2. Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    C. Eckes

  3. Ghent European Law Institute (GELI), Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

    P. Van Elsuwege

  4. T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, The Netherlands

    E. Kassoti

  5. Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    A. Ott

  6. Faculty of Law, Groningen University, Groningen, The Netherlands

    R. A. Wessel

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Gatti, M. (2021). Legal Status of the United Kingdom as a Third State: Strange Déjá Vu. In: Douma, W.T., Eckes, C., Van Elsuwege, P., Kassoti, E., Ott, A., Wessel, R.A. (eds) The Evolving Nature of EU External Relations Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-423-5_11

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