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Compensation for Responders to a Nuclear Accident: Where Should the Law Go?

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume IV
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Abstract

Employees and other responders to a nuclear accident play a critical role in limiting the resulting devastation, and are often exposed to serious harms in the process. These harms include mental health problems and increased susceptibility to certain cancers. While international and national legislators have provided extensive regulation of the health and safety of employees’ exposure to radiation, surprisingly the compensation regimes at both the national and international levels for harms suffered by responders to a nuclear accident have not been developed. Generally, compensation for responders in past nuclear disasters has been determined after-the-fact, and has been subsumed under a broader regime of compensating all victims of the disaster. In this chapter, I argue that responders deserve a special position among victims in receiving compensation and accessing certain government services. This special position can be justified on desert-based grounds. This chapter uses the two most serious nuclear accidents, at Chernobyl and Fukushima, as case studies to illustrate shortcomings in compensating responders, and develops a series of recommendations to avoid these shortcomings in the future. The shortcomings include hurdles that responders experience in establishing causation; and the statutory limitations on the available compensation, both in time and amount. These case studies suggest that the law should be improved in the following ways: creating a special class of individuals who are eligible for compensation based on involvement in the response effort; creating a system for tracking the responders and monitoring their health; providing specific health services to responders on an on-going basis; integrating the patchwork of existing sources of compensation; relaxing rules for establishing causation; and ensuring that the responders actually receive the compensation for which they are eligible.

Ph.D., Associate Dean and Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lerner and Tansman (2014, 547) emphasize the need to incorporate government services and humanitarian aid into any analysis of compensation for victims of a nuclear incidents.

  2. 2.

    Bernstein 1979.

  3. 3.

    Dworkin 1987.

  4. 4.

    Miller 1976; Miller 1989; Riley 1989.

  5. 5.

    Dick 1975; Lamont 1997.

  6. 6.

    Pelzer 2016, 361.

  7. 7.

    1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, as amended (Convention on Assistance).

  8. 8.

    1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as amended (Paris Convention).

  9. 9.

    1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, as amended (Vienna Convention).

  10. 10.

    1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Convention on Supplementary Compensation).

  11. 11.

    For a detailed discussion of these and other international treaties, see Pelzer 2016.

  12. 12.

    Pelzer 2016, 361.

  13. 13.

    Pelzer 2016, 369–370; Article 3 1960 Paris Convention; Article II, IV 1963 Vienna Convention.

  14. 14.

    Lerner and Tansman 2014, 555.

  15. 15.

    Pelzer 2016, 372–378; Article 8 1960 Paris Convention; Article VI 1963 Vienna Convention.

  16. 16.

    Pelzer 2016, 372; Article 7 1960 Paris Convention; Article V 1963 Vienna Convention.

  17. 17.

    Pelzer 2016, 375; Article 10 1960 Paris Convention; Article VII 1963 Vienna Convention.

  18. 18.

    Pelzer 2016, 379–380. For a detailed discussion of the ‘Equal Treatment’ principle, see Pelzer 2016, 379–381.

  19. 19.

    Pelzer 2016, 363; Article 3 2004 Brussels Supplementary Convention.

  20. 20.

    Article 1 Convention on Assistance.

  21. 21.

    Article 10(2) Convention on Assistance.

  22. 22.

    Pelzer 2016, 368.

  23. 23.

    Pelzer 2016, 368–369.

  24. 24.

    Hood et al. 2017.

  25. 25.

    See for example, the UK Compensation Scheme for Radiation-Linked Diseases, outlined in Lewis 2015.

  26. 26.

    See e.g., the United States’ Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act (EEOICPA), discussed in Thomas 2015.

  27. 27.

    Sun and Liu (2016, pp. 126–132) found this to be the case in China.

  28. 28.

    Tromans 2010, 78.

  29. 29.

    Tromans 2010, 34–35.

  30. 30.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 265–276; Tromans 2010, 34–35.

  31. 31.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 267–268.

  32. 32.

    Tromans 2010, 35.

  33. 33.

    Tromans 2010, 35; Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, p. 265.

  34. 34.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 3.

  35. 35.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 3.

  36. 36.

    Tromans 2010, 35.

  37. 37.

    Tromans 2010, 35.

  38. 38.

    Loganovsky et al. 2008, 481.

  39. 39.

    This name comes from the direct translation from liquidator in the Slavic phrase used to describe the responders.

  40. 40.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 268.

  41. 41.

    See http://chernobylgallery.com/chernobyl-disaster/liquidators/.

  42. 42.

    Tromans 2010, 35.

  43. 43.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 269.

  44. 44.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 268.

  45. 45.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 268; Lucchini et al. 2017, 3.

  46. 46.

    Loganovsky et al. 2008, 481.

  47. 47.

    Pelzer 2016, 390; Tromans 2010, 35.

  48. 48.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 274.

  49. 49.

    See e.g., the Law of the Russian Federation, 15 May 1991, No. 1244-1, On Social Protection of Citizens Exposed to Radiation as a Result of the Chernobyl Disaster (with modifications of editions from Federal Laws from 18.06.1992 No. 3061-1, 24.11.1995 No. 179-FZ, 11.12.1996 No. 149-FZ, 16.11.1997 No. 144-FZ, 17.04.1999 No. 79-FZ, 05.07.1999 No. 127-FZ, 07.08.2000 No. 122-FZ, 12.02.2001 No. 5-FZ, 06.08.2001 No. 110-FZ, and 29.12.2001 No. 189-FZ).

  50. 50.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 274–276; IAEA et al. 2010, 48.

  51. 51.

    For example, there were numerous failures in the medical care programs for liquidators: grossly inadequate medical facilities; limited supply of drugs; and late diagnosis of diseases, leading to premature deaths. As another example, as of 2016, the waiting list for housing for disabled liquidators and their families numbered several thousand. For a case where Russian liquidators took their housing case to the ECtHR, see Butenko and Others v. the Russian Federation (Application numbers 2109/07, 2112/07, 2113/07, 2116/07)) (20 May 2010).

  52. 52.

    See e.g., Naumenko v. Ukraine (Application no 41984/98) (ECtHR).

  53. 53.

    For the best known example of this, see Burdov v. Russia (Application no 59498/00) (ECtHR) (May 7, 2002). See also the case of Khaynatskyy and Others v. Ukraine (Application no 12895/08) (9 January 2014), where the ECtHR ordered Ukraine to pay damages to 250 citizens affected by the Chernobyl accident.

  54. 54.

    Anisimov and Ryzhenkov 2016, 274–276.

  55. 55.

    The resolution of ECtHR from 1/15/2009, Burdov v. the Russian Federation (No 2) (Complaint No. 33509/04)

  56. 56.

    Federal Law of 30 April 2010, No 68-FZ, On the Compensation for Violation of the Right to Trial within a Reasonable Term or the Right to Implementation of a Judicial Act within a Reasonable Term.

  57. 57.

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Labour Organization (ILO), and World Health Organization (WHO) 2010, 43.

  58. 58.

    IAEA et al. 2010, 43–44.

  59. 59.

    IAEA et al. 2010, 45.

  60. 60.

    IAEA et al. 2010, 48.

  61. 61.

    Osaka 2012, 433; Lerner and Tansman 2014, 548–555.

  62. 62.

    Osaka 2012, 433.

  63. 63.

    Osaka 2012, 433; Lerner and Tansman 2014, 548–555.

  64. 64.

    The responders were dubbed the ‘Fukushima 50’ by the media, due to the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the accident, only about 50 of the 800 workers at the plant remained after the site was generally evacuated. But this is a misleading label, as many more responders, both TEPCO employees and others, eventually became involved in the response.

  65. 65.

    Lochbaum et al. 2014, pp. 22, 85, 93–94, 106, 158, 181, 243.

  66. 66.

    Hetkämper 2011.

  67. 67.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 6.

  68. 68.

    Although it is difficult to separate the foreign relief effort related to the earthquakes and tsunami from international assistance for the nuclear accident, of the approximately 1400 official foreign nationals helping in Japan, at least 250 were directly involved with the response to the nuclear disaster; See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Great East Japan Earthquake (Details). https://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/index2.html#assistance and https://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/pdfs/map_operations.pdf.

  69. 69.

    Shigemura et al. 2012, 667–669; 2014, 1–8.

  70. 70.

    World Health Organization 2013, 93–94.

  71. 71.

    Liu and Faure 2016, 166. Since the accident, Japan has signed the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

  72. 72.

    Liu and Faure 2016, 172.

  73. 73.

    Japan has enacted four major legislative instruments (all of which were most recently amended in 2009): the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (enacted in 1961); the Order for the Execution of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (passed in 1962), the Act on Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (enacted in 1961) and the Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (passed in 1962). For a discussion of this legislation, see Pelzer 2016, 373 and 390; Liu and Faure 2016, 166, 172–174.

  74. 74.

    Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sections 2–4.

  75. 75.

    For more details, see Osaka 2012, 449.

  76. 76.

    Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sections 6–7.1. The Japanese legislation is discussed in greater detail by Liu and Faure 2016, 173–174.

  77. 77.

    Feldman 2013, 341.

  78. 78.

    Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Section 16. See also Liu and Faure 2016, p. 174; Osaka 2012, p. 437.

  79. 79.

    Lerner and Tansman 2014, 556.

  80. 80.

    Lerner and Tansman 2014, 557.

  81. 81.

    Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Section 18; Osaka 2012, 439.

  82. 82.

    The amount for mental distress was originally capped at 100,000 yen per person per month for the first six months, dropping to 50,000 yen per month thereafter. The amount for voluntary evacuees was capped at 200,000 yen per person: Feldman 2013, 346–347.

  83. 83.

    Osaka 2012, 439–441; Lerner and Tansman 2014, 557–560.

  84. 84.

    Osaka 2012, 440.

  85. 85.

    Feldman 2013, 355.

  86. 86.

    Osaka 2012, 440.

  87. 87.

    Liu and Faure 2016, 175.

  88. 88.

    Vásquez-Maignan 2012, 12.

  89. 89.

    Lerner and Tansman 2014, 557–560.

  90. 90.

    Feldman 2013, 344.

  91. 91.

    Osaka 2012, 448.

  92. 92.

    Osaka 2012, 448.

  93. 93.

    Act for Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund; See Lerner and Tansman 2014, 556.

  94. 94.

    Osaka 2012, 442–443.

  95. 95.

    Lerner and Tansman 2014, 560.

  96. 96.

    See table at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf.

  97. 97.

    Osaka 2012, 443–444; Feldman 2013, 351–352.

  98. 98.

    Feldman 2013, 352.

  99. 99.

    Vásquez-Maignan 2012, 14; Nomura et al. 2012, 24.

  100. 100.

    Feldman 2013, 353.

  101. 101.

    Feldman 2013, 354.

  102. 102.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 6.

  103. 103.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 6.

  104. 104.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 6.

  105. 105.

    Glionna 2011; Krolicki and Fujioka 2011.

  106. 106.

    Soble 2015; Obe 2015.

  107. 107.

    BBC News 2017.

  108. 108.

    Id.

  109. 109.

    Vásquez-Maignan 2012, 10.

  110. 110.

    Lerner and Tansman 2014, 547.

  111. 111.

    Favish 1981, 964.

  112. 112.

    IAEA et al. 2010, 41–49.

  113. 113.

    IAEA et al. 2010.

  114. 114.

    World Health Organization, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/.

  115. 115.

    Lewis 2015.

  116. 116.

    Pelzer 2016, 384; Knutsen 2010, 173–4.

  117. 117.

    Yasui 2014.

  118. 118.

    Lucchini et al. 2017, 6–7.

  119. 119.

    Lewis 2015.

  120. 120.

    See §504.055.

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Curran, B. (2019). Compensation for Responders to a Nuclear Accident: Where Should the Law Go?. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume IV. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-267-5_6

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