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Towards a Counter-Hegemonic Law of Occupation: On the Regulation of Predatory Interstate Acts in Contemporary International Law

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Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 20, 2017

Part of the book series: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law ((YIHL,volume 20))

Abstract

This chapter examines the regulation in international law of situations of foreign territorial control that breach peremptory norms on interstate force and self-determination of peoples, which it designates as unlawfully prolonged occupations. In the practice of international lawyers, such situations are regulated by the international humanitarian law rules on belligerent occupation, or conflict management law. This practice apparently derives from the distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello and the dichotomy in the application of the two bodies of law. But this seemingly outdated logic of international legal practitioners is under pressure, as it also amounts to a silencing and failure to address the legality of the occupying state’s pursuits and that of the continued denial of the right to self-determination of people to the local population. Applying only the specialized law on occupation, in isolation from other applicable law, overlooks the consequences of unlawfully prolonged occupations on the protection of individual rights and the systemic integrity of international law. This chapter re-situates occupation law within its broader normative environment and proposes a regulatory approach to predatory acts that would better support the unity, systemic integrity, and value system of contemporary international law.

This requirement of proportionality […] means that it is not enough for a state to show that its initial recourse to force was a justifiable act of self-defence and that its subsequent acts have complied with the ius in bello. It must also show that all its measures involving the use of force, throughout the conflict, are reasonable, proportionate acts of self-defence. […] To hold otherwise would be to allow a state to avoid the application of some of the most fundamental rules contained in the Charter by the unilateral act of characterising its relations with another state as war (Greenwood 1983, p 228).

[A] logically open legal system does not “move in the logical dimension of derivation.” It is ‘rhetorically oriented’ to particular problems and moves in the historical dimension by linking the cases to be decided with precedents and resorts to rhetorical principles in elaborating anew just solutions in every single case. Hence in an open system principles are not claimed to be mechanical keys to determinate solution (Tammelo 1959, p 187).

This article is based on a long-term research project that started in 2011 as part of my doctoral studies at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, NUI Galway, and draws on over a decade of research and practice on occupation and international law, including research and practice in Palestine between 2007–2015 and ongoing work on Western Sahara. It draws on a forthcoming contribution to an edited collection: Illegal Territorial Regimes: On the Operation of International Law in Crimea, in: Sayapin S (ed) The Use of Force against Ukraine and International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, Chapter 3; and a draft research article: Mending the Gaps: Morocco and Western Sahara in International Law and Practice. A policy brief version of this paper with special reference to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory was published by the European Council on Foreign Relations: Israel’s Unlawfully Prolonged Occupation: Consequences Under an Integrated Legal Framework (June 2017). The research for and the writing of this chapter was done during my time at Koç University's Center for Global Public Law. For insights and comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Charles Shamas, Bill van Esveld, and Helena van Roosbroeck. All errors are my own.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., Gross 2017; Sayed 2013.

  2. 2.

    Under the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, 187 CTS 227 (entered into force 26 January 1910) (Hague Regulations 1907); the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (Geneva Convention IV); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1979) (AP I), and their particularisation by the authoritative relevant rules of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s Customary IHL Study.

  3. 3.

    See, generally, Megret 2015.

  4. 4.

    Arai-Takahashi 2012, pp 74–77. See also Megret 2006.

  5. 5.

    See, generally, Gross 2017; Ben-Naftali et al. 2005; Lynk 2017.

  6. 6.

    RULAC belligerent occupation entries, with reference to relevant determinations by international courts and organisations, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and individual states: RULAC (date unknown) Countries. http://www.rulac.org/browse/countries. Accessed 20 November 2017.

  7. 7.

    IHRL is part of conflict prevention law when it is applied within the state to govern relations between its authorities and citizens, and ensure their participation in the political processes. In armed conflict or an extraterritorial situation, IHRL is part of the “humanitarian” provisions of IHL tasked with the protection of civilians.

  8. 8.

    On the function of change in theorising: Horkheimer 1972, p 215. See, on “incommensurability”, Kuhn 1962. Since the view predatory interstate acts are a collective harm is an “object of agreement” amongst international lawyers, it should not be difficult to get them to agree that predatory occupations ought to be eradicated: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p 66.

  9. 9.

    Benvenisti 2012; Dinstein 2009; Arai-Takahashi 2009.

  10. 10.

    Azarova 2017b.

  11. 11.

    An occupying power that rejects the ousted sovereign’s rights necessarily also rejects the normative underpinnings of occupation law (Ben-Naftali et al. 2005, pp 551–614). Meron 2017, pp 4–5.

  12. 12.

    Sayed 2013.

  13. 13.

    Gross 2017.

  14. 14.

    Lauterpacht 1952, p 202.

  15. 15.

    A similar argument is made by United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) Lynk 2017.

  16. 16.

    Notably, in peacetime IHRL is primarily a law of conflict prevention, whereas in time of occupation it is primarily that of conflict management through constraint and de-escalation.

  17. 17.

    Wright 1961.

  18. 18.

    Pulkowski 2011.

  19. 19.

    Hague Regulations 1907, above n 4, Article 42; Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 2(2); Pictet 1958, p 115, para 324.

  20. 20.

    ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136 (Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion), para 78.

  21. 21.

    On the use of force in occupied territory under IHL and IHRL: Ferraro 2009.

  22. 22.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 41.

  23. 23.

    AP I, above n 4, Article 1(4). See on “calm” occupation, Doswald-Beck 2006, pp 892–893.

  24. 24.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Articles 27 and 47. See also Benvenisti 2012, pp 89–103; Nicolosi 2011, pp 165–187.

  25. 25.

    Doswald-Beck 2006; Koutroulis 2012; Ronen 2013.

  26. 26.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4. Article 49(6).

  27. 27.

    Ibid., Article 49(1).

  28. 28.

    Greenwood 1999; Roberts 1985.

  29. 29.

    Hague Regulations 1907, above n 4, Article 43; Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 64.

  30. 30.

    In Iraq, the proceeds of export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas were deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq until such time as an internationally recognised, representative government of Iraq was to be properly constituted. Benvenisti 2003, p 864.

  31. 31.

    Greenwood 1999.

  32. 32.

    Hague Regulations Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, above n 4, Article 55; Arai-Takahashi 2009, p 198; Clagett and Johnson 1978; Steward 2011. This rule is complemented by the law of the sea in relation to seabed petroleum exploitation: UN General Assembly (1962) Resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc. A/5344/Add.1; UN General Assembly (2007) Resolution 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295. Under Article 246 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an interested party must obtain the coastal state’s consent for the conduct of research and petroleum exploration (Smith 2017). See UN Human Rights Committee (Human Rights Watch 2015) Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Morocco, UN Doc. A/72/40, para 6. According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Morocco should ensure that the Sahrawi people are informed and provide prior consent to the exploitation of their resources.

  33. 33.

    Quigley 2013.

  34. 34.

    Arai-Takahashi 2012.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., pp 51–80; Megret 2006.

  36. 36.

    At least in theory, contemporary recognition of belligerency is different to its traditional use to denote the political status of the non-state actor (Azarova and Blum 2015).

  37. 37.

    Hague Regulations 1907, above n 4, Article 43.

  38. 38.

    Koutroulis 2012.

  39. 39.

    Scobbie 2015. For divisive use of this logic: Israeli High Court of Justice, Yesh Din v The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, Judgement, 26 December 2011, 2164/09 (Yesh Din).

  40. 40.

    Benvenisti 2012, pp 76–87.

  41. 41.

    Israeli authorities have used this as a catch-all phrase to justify excessive exploitation of non-renewable resources and to build roads for the benefit of illegal settlements: Yesh Din, above n 41; Israeli High Court of Justice, Head of Beit Iksa Village Council v Minister of Defense et al., Judgment, 6 September 2011, 281/11. See for a survey of relevant case law, Kretzmer 2012, pp 207–236.

  42. 42.

    Occupation law assumes and mandates that the occupying state permits the operation of local authorities, courts and laws, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Articles 56 and 64, see Dinstein 2009, Chapter 5. On the effects of Russia’s annexation qua occupation of Crimea, see Human Rights Watch 2015. Milano 2014.

  43. 43.

    Pictet 1958, p 274.

  44. 44.

    Boutruche and Sassoli 2017.

  45. 45.

    On the interests that occupation law is intended to protect in line with other international law, Giladi 2008.

  46. 46.

    On the criticism of the application of Article 6(3) of Geneva Convention IV by the International Court of Justice, Ben-Naftali 2005. Dinstein 2009, pp 282–283.

  47. 47.

    Darcy and Reynolds 2010, pp 211–243.

  48. 48.

    Arai-Takahashi 2009.

  49. 49.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Articles 64 and 47; Sassòli 2005.

  50. 50.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 29. See, e.g., the practice of the ECtHR who considers the likes of the TRNC as “subordinate authorities”; ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey, Preliminary Objections, 23 March 1995, Application No. 15318/89, para 62; ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, Award Judgment, May 2014, Application No. 25781/94, paras 75–80; ECtHR, Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, Judgment, 8 July 2004, Application No. 48787/99, paras 314–316; ECtHR, Chiragov v Armenia, Judgment, 16 June 2015, Application No. 13216/05 (Chiragov); ECtHR, Mozer v Moldova and Russia, Judgment, 23 February 2016, Application No. 11138/10; ECtHR, Khlebik v Ukraine, Judgment, 25 July 2017, Application No. 2945/16.

  51. 51.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 27.

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., the rigidity of the Moroccan government’s positions: Government of the Saharawi Republic (2017) Saharawi government responds to the proposed listing of Kosmos Energy Ltd. on the London Stock Exchange, Media release. http://oginsights.blogspot.co.uk/2017/08/kosmos-london-listing-at-risk-as.html. Accessed 20 November 2017.

  53. 53.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 29; Dinstein 2009, para 134; Ivanel 2015.

  54. 54.

    On support to secessionist movements in contravention of international law: Borgen 2007, pp 477–534.

  55. 55.

    Charter of the United Nations, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter), Article 2(4).

  56. 56.

    See, e.g., Morocco’s claims that Western Sahara is terra nullius, i.e. a territory without a sovereign, and that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is only applicable amongst states. Cf. Saul 2015.

  57. 57.

    The law of self-determination of peoples equally protects the territorial integrity and prohibits the acquisition of decolonized and non-self-governing territories as that of States (Weller 2015, p 19). See also UN General Assembly 1952; UN General Assembly 1960; UN General Assembly 1962; UN General Assembly 1970; and UN General Assembly 1996.

  58. 58.

    See, e.g., the very continued presence and control of Morocco over Western Sahara (Saul 2015).

  59. 59.

    Under Morocco’s domestic law, Western Sahara is defined as one of the provinces of Morocco subject to Moroccan domestic executive, judicial, and administrative jurisdiction (Décret n° 2-97-246 du 12 rabii II 1418 (17 août 1997) fixant le nombre des régions, leur nom, leur chef-lieu, leur ressort territorial et le nombre de conseillers à élire dans chaque région [unofficial translation: Decree 2-97-246 of 17 August 1997 establishing the number of regions, their name, their chief-locale, their territorial contours, and the number of counsellors to be elected in each region]. http://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/html/Fr/liens/..%5C82111.htm. Accessed 12 September 2016). Korman 1996; Zacher 2001.

  60. 60.

    UN General Assembly (1960) Resolution 1514(XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; UN General Assembly (1970) Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; UN General Assembly (1952) Resolution 637 (VII), The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination; UN General Assembly (1962) Resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.

  61. 61.

    Smith 2015; Western Sahara Resource Watch 2016; Kohelet Policy Forum 2017.

  62. 62.

    Human Rights Watch 2012.

  63. 63.

    Wrange 2015.

  64. 64.

    UN General Assembly 1960, above n 63; Korman 1996.

  65. 65.

    Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, above n 22, pp 187–189, paras 127–131 and pp 191–192, para 134. See also ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey, Judgment, 23 February 1995, Application No. 15318/89, paras 54, 57; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v United Kingdom, Judgment, 7 July 2011, Case No. 55721/07 (Al-Skeini), paras 138–142; Chiragov, above n 52. See on human rights in prolonged occupation, Koutroulis 2012, pp 165–205. See on the particularities of the interaction and the shortcomings of the application of IHRL in occupied territory, Gross 2016.

  66. 66.

    Wright 1961; Geiss 2015, pp 425–449.

  67. 67.

    Del Mar and Twining 2017, pp ix–xi. The extension of a legal framework to aggressor powers “echoes colonial-era arguments about placing colonial administration under a structure of accountability” (Wilde 2005, 2008).

  68. 68.

    AP I, above n 4, Article 1(4).

  69. 69.

    Chinkin and Kaldor on the political element of the definition of war and the delegitimising effect of the non-international armed conflict (NIAC) framework: Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, Chapter 2.

  70. 70.

    Carcano 2015.

  71. 71.

    It bears noting that the use of the term “unlawful occupation” is misleading insofar as there is no difference between lawful and unlawful occupation in dealing with the respective duties of the occupier (Dinstein 2009, p 3).

  72. 72.

    Dinstein 2009, p 58.

  73. 73.

    US Tribunal of Nuremberg, Hostages trial (List et al.), 1948, 8 Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals 34, p 59. See also Gerson 19761977, pp 15–16. It bears noting that the discussion of the illegality discussion of occupation in this proceedings pertained to the legality of the invasion, as opposed to attempts to acquire the territory that manifest in time of occupation.

  74. 74.

    UN Charter, above n 57, Article 2(4); Giladi 2008.

  75. 75.

    Dinstein 2009, para 676; Benvenisti 2012, p 56.

  76. 76.

    Gerson 19761977, p 543.

  77. 77.

    Dinstein 2011.

  78. 78.

    Cf. Ben-Naftali et al. 2005; Ben-Naftali 2011, p 129; Ronen 2008, pp 201–245.

  79. 79.

    On the status of the prohibition on the use of force as peremptory norms (jus cogens): Dinstein 2011, p 104; Adams 2005, pp 439–495.

  80. 80.

    Giladi 2008, p 246.

  81. 81.

    A similar set of criteria was enumerated by Justice Blake in relation to administrators of non-self-governing territory (UK High Court, Western Sahara Campaign v HMRC & SSEFRA, Judgment, 19 October 2015, para 15).

  82. 82.

    See, e.g., the UN’s termination of South Africa’s mandate as administrator of Namibia and placed it under UN administration (UN General Assembly (1966) Resolution 2145 (XXI), Question of Namibia, UN Doc. A/RES/32/9).

  83. 83.

    Greenwood 1983; Greenwood 1999; Bugnion 2003.

  84. 84.

    This construct assumes a position of neutrality concerning the righteousness of the belligerent parties. Bothe et al. 1982, p 33; Sandoz et al. 1987, pp 28–29.

  85. 85.

    Greenwood 1999, pp 223–224. Referring to the UK’s use of arguments recognising the continued application of the jus ad bellum in time of conflict to justify the sinking of the General Belgrano. Cf. This is less relevant in cases of total war: Dinstein 2011, para 543.

  86. 86.

    Teitel 2011, Chapter 5.

  87. 87.

    Benvenisti 2009, p 548. Though the “individualisation of war” is no doubt a significant part of these effects (European University Institute date unknown).

  88. 88.

    Benvenisti 2009; Giladi 2008, p 250.

  89. 89.

    “A belligerent occupant is precluded from relying on self-defence as a justification for measures taken against the occupied territory” (Scobbie 2005, p 83).

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Greenwood 1983, p 224.

  92. 92.

    Sloane 2009, p 107. Sloane notes that “transformative occupation” is an example of a tension in the dualistic axiom (p 108). Hurka 2005, pp 52–53.

  93. 93.

    Kolb 2013.

  94. 94.

    Azarova 2017b.

  95. 95.

    AP I, above n 4, Preamble, para 5; Giladi 2008, pp 249–250; Chinkin and Kaldor 2017.

  96. 96.

    Dinstein 2009, para 648. On the principle of concurrent application of the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello: Okimoto 2012.

  97. 97.

    Giladi 2008, p 249.

  98. 98.

    Graber 1949, p 29.

  99. 99.

    See, e.g., Hayashi 2010.

  100. 100.

    ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Merits, 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14, p 94; Dinstein 2011, para 607.

  101. 101.

    Greenwood 1983, p 223.

  102. 102.

    Lauterpacht 1948, p 432.

  103. 103.

    UN Charter, above n 57, Article 2(4) and (7); Jennings 1963; Drew 2001; Okimoto 2012; Sloane 2009.

  104. 104.

    Ben-Naftali et al. 2005; Gross 2017.

  105. 105.

    Nicolosi 2011.

  106. 106.

    Boutruche and Sassòli 2017.

  107. 107.

    Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1920, p 502; Eyffinger 2012, p 26.

  108. 108.

    Eyffinger 2012, p 297.

  109. 109.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, open for signature since 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, UNTS 1155 (VCLT), Article 31(1)(c).

  110. 110.

    Drew 2001.

  111. 111.

    It is a collective human right to “determine its own political economic and social order, according to its own practices and procedures of governance, rather than having these kinds of decisions determined by a foreign power in the course of an occupation” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), Article 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Article 1).

  112. 112.

    UN Charter 1945, above n 57, Article 55; Crawford 2012, p 595.

  113. 113.

    See above n 63.

  114. 114.

    Hague Regulations 1907, above n 4, Article 43; Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 64; Sassòli 2005, p 662; Roberts 2005; Fox 2008.

  115. 115.

    Giladi 2008.

  116. 116.

    The November 2017 report of the Special Rapporteur on Palestine puts forward a four-point test for the legality of (the continuation of) occupation including non-annexation, temporariness, the occupier’s good faith, and its willingness and ability to act for the benefit of the civilian population (Lynk 2017, paras 27–37).

  117. 117.

    This was the case with the occupation Iraq since 2003 (Carcano 2015).

  118. 118.

    Meron 2017, p 10.

  119. 119.

    On the consequences of such violations: Scobbie 2002, pp 1201–1220. Orakhelashvili 2008.

  120. 120.

    Benvenisti 2012, p 349.

  121. 121.

    See also, on other reparations, Satkauskas 2003.

  122. 122.

    Ben-Naftali 2011, pp 129–200.

  123. 123.

    On the divisive practice of the Israeli Supreme Court, which has legitimised the devastating effects of unlawful activities in the occupied territories on the individual and collective rights and legitimised the presence of settlers and settlements: Kretzmer 2012.

  124. 124.

    As evidenced in the case of Israel’s occupation unclassified official Israeli government documents unearthed by Akevot: Akevot (date unknown) Paperwork. http://akevot.org.il/en/paperwork/. Accessed 20 November 2017. Gross 2017, Chapter 3.

  125. 125.

    McMahan 2011.

  126. 126.

    Crawford 2012, p 595, n 37.

  127. 127.

    On the processes of status demotion: Gross 2017, Chapter 5. Shapovalova 2016.

  128. 128.

    Greenwood 1983, p 226.

  129. 129.

    Gerson 19761977, p 539.

  130. 130.

    Kretzmer 2017.

  131. 131.

    Israel has referred to the situation in the West Bank, which unlike Gaza it does not deny occupying militarily as “an armed conflict short of war”, but has continued to use lethal force in the administration of daily affairs in the territory (Sharm El Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee 2000).

  132. 132.

    Wilde 2008; Ratner 2005.

  133. 133.

    Ronen 2011.

  134. 134.

    Milano 2006, Chapter 2.

  135. 135.

    Morgenstern 1951.

  136. 136.

    Arai-Takahashi 2009, Chapter 11; OHCHR 2012; B’Tselem 2012a.

  137. 137.

    Such conditions may amount to the grave breach of forcible transfer of the population in the occupied territory (Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 49), see, e.g., OCHA 2016.

  138. 138.

    World Bank 2013.

  139. 139.

    Bhuta 2005.

  140. 140.

    Gross 2017, p 130.

  141. 141.

    Guilfoyle 2011.

  142. 142.

    Geneva Convention IV, above n 4, Article 29; Ivanel 2015.

  143. 143.

    Gross 2017, p 133.

  144. 144.

    Gross 2016.

  145. 145.

    Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, above n 22, pp 187–189, paras 127–131 and pp 191–192, para 134; UN Human Rights Committee (2014) Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para 5. Israel is one of two states that has historically rejected the extraterritorial application of IHRL including to its administration of the occupied Palestinian territory.

  146. 146.

    B’Tselem 2012b.

  147. 147.

    See, e.g., Israeli High Court of Justice, Gaza Coast Regional Council v Knesset, Judgment, 9 June 2005, PD 59(2) 481, p 524; Meron 2017, p 17.

  148. 148.

    International Covenant on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969), Article 2; Gross 2017, Chapter 5. The first measure to be considered is their removal from that place, and the only measures to protect them in the interim should be temporary (Kretzmer 2017, p 44). Human Rights Watch 2010; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2012) Concluding Observations on Israel, UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para 24.

  149. 149.

    Frowein 2013; Fraleigh 1949.

  150. 150.

    E.g. Transnistria, Crimea, and Nagorno Karabakh. See also ICJ, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, [2010] ICJ Rep 403, para 84. See on illegal economic activity in Nagorno Karabakh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan 2016.

  151. 151.

    Roberts 2006; Dinstein 2009, pp 55–60; Jennings 1963, pp 74–76.

  152. 152.

    Hathaway and Shapiro 2017.

  153. 153.

    Shany 2017.

  154. 154.

    See above n 44.

  155. 155.

    The European Court of Human Rights has far more experience than the UN treaty bodies in handling such cases. In theory, individual communications could be brought before UN treaty bodies by persons in occupied territory against either the occupying or occupied state.

  156. 156.

    ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, Award Judgment, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, 14 May 2014, Application No. 25781/94.

  157. 157.

    These decisions affirm the importance of offering reparations, including monetary compensation, to victims of the serious human rights violations they cause. UN General Assembly (2005) Resolution 60/147 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147.

  158. 158.

    Cyprus v Turkey, above n 52, para 24.

  159. 159.

    The Ukrainian Justice Ministry has filed several claims against Russia with the ECtHR over large-scale violations of human rights in Crimea and Donbas: ECtHR, Ukraine v Russia, Inter-state Complaint, 13 March 2014, Application No. 20958/14; and ECtHR, Ukraine v Russia II, Inter-state Complaint, 13 June 2014, Application No. 43800/14.

  160. 160.

    In Georgia v Russia it upheld allegations of widespread and systemic violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) by the separatist Abkhaz and South Ossetia authorities: ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 15 October 2008, [2008] ICJ Rep 353. See also the Court’s decision about Russia’s discriminatory practice against the Tatar community in Crimea: ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v Russian Federation) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, 19 April 2017, [2017] ICJ Rep 104.

  161. 161.

    Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Security Council, Letter dated 6 November 1975, UN Doc. S/11867.

  162. 162.

    ICJ, Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep 16 (ICJ Namibia), pp 12–14; Koury 2010.

  163. 163.

    Under UN General Assembly (1974) Resolution 3314 Definition of Aggression, UN Doc. A/RES/36/103, Article 3, the definition of aggression includes acts of “military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof”. Dinstein 2015; Koskenniemi 1995.

  164. 164.

    A common rare example of such measure in a par excellence situation of contemporary occupation upheld Iraq’s “liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait” (Security Council (1991) Resolution 686 on the end of hostilities in the Gulf region, UN Doc. S/RES/686).

  165. 165.

    In relation to Israel, UN Security Council (1967) Resolution 242, UN Doc. S/RES/242; and to Western Sahara, UN Security Council (1975) Resolution 380, UN Doc. S/RES/379; Cf. a missed opportunity: UN Security Council (2016) Resolution 2334, UN Doc. S/RES/2334.

  166. 166.

    UN Human Rights Council (2016) Resolution 31/36, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/31/36, Preamble, para 15, held that all businesses in Israeli settlements to contribute to abuses of “de facto annexation”.

  167. 167.

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) can investigate and prosecute the “crime against humanity” of persecution, and perhaps soon also the “war crime” of aggression.

  168. 168.

    Council of the European Union (2012) Guidelines on the implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 11205/1. EU restrictive measures in response to Russia’s aggression against Crimea: Council of the European Union (2014) Council Regulation (EU) No. 692/2014 of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, OJ 2014R0692. See also European Commission (2015) Information Note to EU business operating and/or investing in Crimea/Sevastopol, SWD (2014) 300 final/3.

  169. 169.

    It has been invoked in relation to judgments delivered by its courts in relation to the occupied territory, or licenses issues to its or foreign companies to operate in the occupied territory: Morgenstern 1951.

  170. 170.

    According to Rozakis, “objective illegality means the objective recognition of an illegality, as such, which can, therefore, be invoked with a view of its extinction by all members of the international community regardless of whether there is a particular damage sustained by the invoking state” (Rozakis 1976, p 24). Rozakis 1974, pp 150–193; Orakhelashvili 2003, p 26.

  171. 171.

    International Law Commission (2001) ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/56/10, Article 43.

  172. 172.

    Crawford 2012, p 594; Lagerwall 2016.

  173. 173.

    Measures that are likely to be invalidated by international law include: those excluding the indigenous population and other members of the protected population (e.g. foreign spouses of Palestinians) from the territory; those assigning different residency status and rights of movement to individuals from different part of the occupied territory; and those appropriating private or public land and allocating property rights for its use and control to private and public domestic entities of the occupying state.

  174. 174.

    International Law Commission (ILC) Special Rapporteur, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz cited in Talmon 2005; International Law Commission 2001, above n 175, Articles 40–41; Talmon 2005.

  175. 175.

    See, e.g., EU and United States measures against Russia’s activities in Crimea in March 2014. Tancredi 2014.

  176. 176.

    Chen 1951, p 424.

  177. 177.

    The principle of invalidity is a customary rule applicable to violations of jus cogens and codified in relation in VCLT, above n 113, Article 53. Rozakis 1974; Orakhelashvili 2003.

  178. 178.

    Orakhelashvili 2003, p 29.

  179. 179.

    See on the “humanitarian exception”, ICJ Namibia, above n 166, para 56. Crawford 2012, paras 48 et seq.

  180. 180.

    Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, pp 105–106.

  181. 181.

    See on the use of this category of states that embed this commitment in their domestic law and public policy by Koh’s work on transnational legal process, Koh 1996.

  182. 182.

    Müller and Slominski 2016; Azarova 2018.

  183. 183.

    As seen from a recent wave of divestments from activities in occupied territories under Morocco, Israel and Russia’s (in Crimea) administrations, see, e.g., KLP 2015.

  184. 184.

    Due to the third party consent rule (VCLT, above n 113, Article 29). Chen 1951, at 431; Costelloe 2017. Cf. Ronen argues that cases of transition from illegal regimes have accommodated and maintained a wider range of changes than required by law (Ronen 2011).

  185. 185.

    CJEU, Council v Front Polisario, Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber Judgment, 21 December 2016, C-104/16 P.

  186. 186.

    ICJ Namibia, above n 166, p 16; Crawford 2012, p 591.

  187. 187.

    South Africa’s trusteeship mandate was repudiated as part of the determination by international bodies that the continued presence of South Africa in the territory maintained an “illegal situation”. UN General Assembly (1986) Question of Namibia, UN Doc. A/RES/S-14/1.

  188. 188.

    Schoiswohl 2001; Ronen 2013; Cullen and Wheatley 2013; Frowein 2013.

  189. 189.

    For coining the term “limbo world” in his reporting on illegal and other unrecognised entities (Wood 2009).

  190. 190.

    Crawford 2012, p 603.

  191. 191.

    See review of relevant case law in Gross 2017, Chapter 5.

  192. 192.

    See, e.g., the UN Envoy on the human rights situation in Transnistria, Hammarberg 2013.

  193. 193.

    Ivanel 2015.

  194. 194.

    On entrusting protection to that which cannot protect in the case of the administration of Western Sahara, without adjudication: Solomou 2010. Sivakumaran 2009; Wilde 2008.

  195. 195.

    In response to the European Court’s pragmatic streak, a group of prominent jurists submitted that there is no justification (Amerasinghe et al. 2009). On the illegal demographic changes promoted by the TRNC: Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006.

  196. 196.

    Steele 2017. A copy of the officially unpublished report can be obtained through the Olof Palme International Centre’s website: Hammarberg and Grono 2017.

  197. 197.

    Roussellier 2013.

  198. 198.

    After all the secessionist authorities are driven foremost by the purpose of erasing any trace of the ousted regime from the territory: Benvenisti 2012, p 61.

  199. 199.

    Ibid., p 119.

  200. 200.

    Ratner 2015.

  201. 201.

    Anonymous 19201921, p 123.

  202. 202.

    See this logic in US District Court of Utah, Aboitiz v Price, Judgment, 16 June 1951, 99 F Supp 602, p 610, which concerned the currency use regulations of the Japanese occupation in the Philippines: “An enemy conqueror is not a very likely person in whom to repose the trust of administering the occupied territories. And dangerous as it may be to recognise any authority in him, it is better to encourage some proper government than none at all. Without some kind of order, the whole social and economic life of the community would be paralyzed. So international law has recognised the right of the occupation to make regulations for the protection of his military interests and the exercise of police powers.” Gerson 19761977, pp 541–542.

  203. 203.

    Gowlland-Debbas 1990.

  204. 204.

    Lynk 2017, Recommendations.

  205. 205.

    According to Cullen and Wheatley this is in line with the subsidiary of the European Convention on Human Rights, see Cullen and Wheatley 2013, pp 711–712. See also Solomou 2010, p 633.

  206. 206.

    See on the features of such unlawful administrations, Sect. 4.5.2.

  207. 207.

    See, e.g., Berkes 2014.

  208. 208.

    See, e.g., d’Aspremont 2018; Singh 2011.

  209. 209.

    Gross 2017.

  210. 210.

    Hart’s internal point of view: Hart 1961.

  211. 211.

    Prost 2012.

  212. 212.

    Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, Chapter 2.

  213. 213.

    Arai-Takahashi 2012.

  214. 214.

    Koskenniemi 2008.

  215. 215.

    Experts authoritatively debunk these critiques: Kolb 2013, p 42, n 86; Haque 2017.

  216. 216.

    Giladi 2012, p 333.

  217. 217.

    Anonymous 19201921.

  218. 218.

    Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, p 259. See also, on the unsuitability of the volcanic violence of war to legal restrictions, Anonymous 19201921.

  219. 219.

    d’Aspremont 2012.

  220. 220.

    Since non-recognition requires that third states ensure that their national systems do not give effect to the illegally constituted rights and benefits: Talmon 2005.

  221. 221.

    See, e.g., Müller and Slominski 2016; Azarova 2017a.

  222. 222.

    See the example of revisions undertaken by the EU to its relations with Israel in Müller and Slominski 2016.

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Azarova, V. (2019). Towards a Counter-Hegemonic Law of Occupation: On the Regulation of Predatory Interstate Acts in Contemporary International Law. In: Gill, T., McCormack, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 20, 2017. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 20. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-264-4_4

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