Abstract
Non-State armed groups exert extensive influence on populations around the world. However, international law does not effectively regulate the relationship between armed groups and populations subject to their authority or influence and so much of this interaction occurs in a legal vacuum. This chapter proposes international human rights law as a solution. The application of international human rights law obligations to armed groups is increasingly accepted, but the precise content of the resultant obligations is unclear. Significantly, the development of the law in this regard presents a unique opportunity to actively engage armed groups, and to encourage their compliance with human rights law, and international law more broadly. It is suggested that if the practice of armed groups and their motivations are incorporated into the development of human rights obligations, then the resultant obligations can be used not only to regulate armed group activity but also to guide it. Human rights law can be used to demonstrate to armed groups how they can govern in the best interests of the affected population—thereby promoting human rights protection—and why it is in their interest that they do so—thereby promoting compliance. This chapter examines armed groups’ practice, motivations, and ideology and discusses armed group governance activities related to the administration of justice and service provision in order to illustrate how the proposed approach could proceed. Although the focus is on international human rights law, where international humanitarian law is applicable it must also inform the development of any obligations.
Daragh Murray is a Lecturer in International Human Rights Law at the School of Law & Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom. Email: d.murray@essex.ac.uk. Phone: 00(44)1 206 872661.
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Notes
- 1.
For the purposes of this chapter, non-State armed groups are those armed groups that (a) exist independently of the State and (b) are sufficiently organised to impose internal discipline.
- 2.
Hoffmann 2015, pp. 165–66; Buchanan E (2015) Battle for control of the DRC: Who are the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)? http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/battle-control-drc-who-are-democratic-forces-liberation-rwanda-fdlr-1526271. Accessed 30 April 2017; Mampilly 2015, pp. 65–67.
- 3.
Nebehay S (2015) Islamic State-controlled parts of Syria, Iraq largely out of reach: Red Cross. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-icrc-idUSKBN0M921N20150313. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 4.
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2013, p. 24; Bangerter 2012, p. 51; TamilNet (2003) Thamil Eelam judiciary said a basis for rebuilding northeast. http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=10277. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 5.
The law of armed conflict is also referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL).
- 6.
- 7.
PCIJ, Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Protocol of March 19th, 1931), Advisory Opinion, 5 September 1931, PCIJ Rep Series A/B, No. 41, Individual Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, 5 September 1931, p. 57.
- 8.
Relevant in this regard are prohibitions of “arbitrary” treatment, limitations built in to certain rights, and derogation regimes.
- 9.
It is noted that law of armed conflict provisions relating to detention, trial, humane treatment, and humanitarian assistance are of particular relevance to the issues discussed herein.
- 10.
See, generally, Murray 2016.
- 11.
Although the extent, or content, of these obligations typically remains unspecified. See, generally, Clapham 2014.
- 12.
At least not initially, certain advanced armed groups may be subject to obligations broadly equivalent to those of States, although the issue of sovereignty will remain a distinguishing factor.
- 13.
See Sect. 5.2.
- 14.
Sassòli 2010, p. 21.
- 15.
Bangerter 2011b, p. 8.
- 16.
UN Security Council 2009, para 41.
- 17.
International Committee of the Red Cross 2008, p. 13.
- 18.
See Murray 2016, pp. 195–197.
- 19.
This issue is discussed further in Murray 2016, pp. 170–171.
- 20.
Similarly, the law of armed conflict only applies to armed groups that have satisfied certain organisational requirements in situations of “sustained and concerted violence”. This threshold of intensity denotes the limitation of State authority.
- 21.
See, ECtHR, Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, Grand Chamber Judgment, 8 July 2004, Application No. 48787/99 (Ilascu), para 313.
- 22.
Mampilly 2011, p. 114.
- 23.
Murray 2016, Chapter 5(III).
- 24.
Ibid., pp. 181–183.
- 25.
The ability to exert control over group members is a requirement for international legal personality.
- 26.
See, for example, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
- 27.
This obligation requires the authority to directly provide for the fulfilment of a right, “when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize that right themselves by the means at their disposal”. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000, para 37.
- 28.
This obligation requires “positive measures to assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right” in question. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2002, para 25 (emphasis added).
- 29.
This obligation requires the provision of, inter alia, appropriate education with respect to the right in question. Ibid.
- 30.
Armed groups do, however, engage in direct service provision in accordance with the obligation to provide. For instance, the LTTE provided primary health care in areas under their control in Sri Lanka. Stokke 2006, p. 1031.
- 31.
For instance, in Senegal “state health teams, accompanied by ICRC staff, vaccinated people in areas controlled by armed groups”: International Committee of the Red Cross 2015, p. 107. In Syria, the State and armed groups have negotiated humanitarian access in certain situations: BBC News (2014) Syria crisis: Evacuation operation in Homs begins. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26078328. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 32.
For instance, in certain SPLM controlled areas of Southern Sudan, the armed group facilitated the provision of education by allowing Jesuit Relief Services to establish and operate the education system. Mampilly 2011, pp. 160–161.
- 33.
Murray 2016, p. 195.
- 34.
Ibid., p. 197.
- 35.
See, for example, Ilascu, above n 21, para 313.
- 36.
- 37.
Solomon E (2015) The Isis economy: Meet the new boss. https://www.ft.com/content/b2c6b5ca-9427-11e4-82c7-00144feabdc0. Accessed 26 April 2017.
- 38.
Arjona et al. 2015, p. 1.
- 39.
Mampilly 2015, p. 48.
- 40.
- 41.
International Crisis Group 2013, p. 21.
- 42.
Roggio B (2013) Al Nusrah Front poised to take over last major city on Euphrates River. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/al_nusrah_front_pois.php. Accessed 30 April 2017.
- 43.
Caris and Reynolds 2014, pp. 15–17 and 19.
- 44.
Stokke 2006, p. 1028.
- 45.
Ibid.
- 46.
International Crisis Group 2008, p. 7.
- 47.
Kalyvas 2015, pp. 126–127.
- 48.
Human Rights Watch 2007b, p. 5.
- 49.
Watson I, Razek R (2013) Rebel court fills void amid Syrian civil war. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/25/world/meast/syria-rebel-court/index.html. Accessed 21 April 2017.
- 50.
International Crisis Group 2008, p. 20; Roy A (2010) Walking with the comrades. http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/walking-with-the-comrades/264738. Accessed 21 April 2017.
- 51.
Sivakumaran 2009, p. 493.
- 52.
UN General Assembly 2008, para 32.
- 53.
Kuol 1997, p. 12.
- 54.
Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 10 and 22.
- 55.
International Crisis Group 2006a, p. 20.
- 56.
See Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 133.
- 57.
Caris and Reynolds 2014, pp. 18–19.
- 58.
Weiss and Hassan 2015, p. 224 and 228.
- 59.
Weiss and Hassan 2015, pp. 227–228.
- 60.
Sivakumaran 2009, p. 494.
- 61.
- 62.
International Crisis Group 2011, p. 17.
- 63.
Babak Q (2010) Afghanistan: Taliban justice “fairer” than state’s. http://www.infosud.org/Afghanistan-Taliban-justice-fairer,8710. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 64.
See generally Arjona et al. 2015.
- 65.
Pool 2001, p. 100.
- 66.
Shah 2013, p. 489.
- 67.
Al Jazeera English (2011) Colombia rebel army brings healthcare to the jungle. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hxkoiZVJRQ. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 68.
Cunningham E (2014) Islamic State imposes a reign of fear in Iraqi hospitals. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-imposes-a-reign-of-fear-in-iraqi-hospitals/2014/11/25/94476f3e-6382-11e4-ab86-46000e1d0035_story.html?utm_term=.f6d6eb24a6c7. Accessed 21 April 2017; Caris and Reynolds 2014, p. 22.
- 69.
Kindt 2009, p. 132.
- 70.
Somer 2015, pp. 17–18.
- 71.
Ibid.
- 72.
Cambanis T (2013) Hizbollah Mahdi schools mix math with doctrine. https://www.ft.com/content/e0be1122-2695-11e3-9dc0-00144feab7de. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 73.
Khaja N (2014) Afghanistan Conflict: Life inside a Taliban stronghold. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-29658839. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 74.
Förster 2015, p. 208.
- 75.
Bangerter 2011a, p. 11.
- 76.
International Crisis Group 2006b, p. 22.
- 77.
“In recent months, the Taliban opened a northern front in Kunduz, Baghlan and Badakshan provinces, with a strong contingent of al-Qaeda foreigners among them, according to senior Afghan officials. In all these areas, a new saying prevails: ‘Government courts for the rich (because the judges are bribable), Taliban justice for the poor.’ And Taliban justice, they say, is usually more swift and fair.” McGirk T (2009) Behind the Taliban's Resurgence in Afghanistan. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1923303,00.html. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 78.
International Crisis Group 2006a, p. 20.
- 79.
Barrett 2014, p. 43.
- 80.
Solomon 2015, above n 37.
- 81.
Ibid.
- 82.
- 83.
Daragahi B (2016) Syria’s Al-Qaeda Branch Now Wants To Rule Like ISIS. https://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/syrias-al-qaeda-branch-now-wants-to-rule-like-isis?utm_term=.klM6lxVJK#.tmWNdn3JW. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 84.
- 85.
See generally Bangerter 2011a. These issues are discussed further below.
- 86.
Weinstein 2007, p. 163.
- 87.
Arjona et al. 2015, p. 3.
- 88.
Hoffmann 2015, p. 185.
- 89.
Coggins 2015, p. 113.
- 90.
SCSL, Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Judgment, 2 March 2009, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, para 707.
- 91.
It is not suggested that all of these groups adhered to the phases of revolution developed by Mao.
- 92.
Tse-tung 1989, p. 44.
- 93.
Quoted in Shah 2013, p. 488.
- 94.
Stetler 1970, p. 98.
- 95.
Ibid., p. 103. In relation to the experiences of the NRA in Uganda, see also Weinstein 2007, p. 175.
- 96.
For a compilation of relevant practice see http://www.theirwords.org run by Geneva Call.
- 97.
Tse-tung 1989, p. 92.
- 98.
Bangerter 2012, p. 70.
- 99.
Quoted in Human Rights Watch 1998.
- 100.
Guevara 2007, p. 61.
- 101.
Bangerter 2012, p. 95. From the same document, see similarly: ELN/FARC principle 1, “our daily behaviour, and the purpose underlying our activities, should be borne in the people’s interests”; KLA “Improper behaviour with respect to the civilian population is to be prevented in all KLA units”; EGP Guatemala, “I will respect our people, their property, and their customs”.
- 102.
Guevara 2007, p. 67.
- 103.
Bangerter 2011a, p. 6.
- 104.
Ibid., p. 7.
- 105.
Ibid., p. 9.
- 106.
Ibid., p. 8.
- 107.
Mampilly 2015, p. 48.
- 108.
As demonstrated, for example, by the derogation clauses in treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the limitations built into certain rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression or freedom of assembly.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
An example in this regard is the importance attributed to the Islamic State’s equal application of the law to both affected individuals and the group’s own members. See the comment of Ghazwan Abdul Rahman in Mahmood M (2015) Life in Mosul one year on: “ISIS with all its brutality is more honest than the Shia government”. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/mosul-residents-one-year-on-isis-brutality. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 112.
Weinstein 2007, p. 171.
- 113.
See above, Sect. 5.4.
- 114.
TamilNet, above n 4. See further, Stokke 2006, p. 1027.
- 115.
Human Rights Committee 1999, para 13.
- 116.
Human Rights Committee, Albert Womah Mukong v Cameroon, Views, 21 July 1994, Communication No. 458/19 91, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para 9.8.
- 117.
IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi et al. v Peru, Judgment, 20 May 1999, Series C No. 59, para 121.
- 118.
ECtHR, Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, Judgment, 16 April 1979, Application No. 6538/74, para 49.
- 119.
Ibid.
- 120.
Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 3.
- 121.
National Transitional Council/ Free Libyan Army 2011.
- 122.
See above Sect. 5.3.1.
- 123.
- 124.
“Somaliland” in Geneva Call 2010, p. 30.
- 125.
See Murray 2016, pp. 240–247.
- 126.
Cockburn P (2015) Isis, a year of the caliphate: Day-to-day life in the “Islamic State”—where any breach of restrictive, divinely inspired rules is savagely punished. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-a-year-of-the-caliphate-day-to-day-life-in-the-islamic-state-where-any-breach-of-restrictive-10348151.html. Accessed 21 April 2017.
- 127.
See Murray 2016, Chapter 8(I).
- 128.
This is discussed in Sect. 5.6.2.1.
- 129.
This is discussed in Sect. 5.6.2.2.
- 130.
In relation to the social justice underpinning, see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999a, para 4.
- 131.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2009, para 2.
- 132.
Ibid., para 7.
- 133.
See generally, ibid.
- 134.
See, for example, BBC News (2016) Islamic State committing genocide against Yazidis, says UN. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36547467. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 135.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000, para 12.
- 136.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999a, para 13.
- 137.
Ibid., para 8.
- 138.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000, para 12(d).
- 139.
Ibid., para 43.
- 140.
See, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1999b, para 57.
- 141.
Situations in which obligations cannot be satisfied on the basis of the armed group’s resources alone are discussed in the next section.
- 142.
These issues are discussed further below in Sect. 5.6.2.2.
- 143.
Khaja N (2014) Afghanistan Conflict: Life inside a Taliban stronghold. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-29658839. Accessed 10 April 2017.
- 144.
For example, Jesuit Relief Services assisted the SPLA in the establishment of an education system in southern Sudan. The establishment of parallel services is not ideal, however, given the additional resource constraints imposed.
- 145.
See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000, para 63.
- 146.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1990, para 10.
- 147.
Murray 2016, pp. 193–194.
- 148.
This is the case, for example, in Syria, Israel, and Libya today.
- 149.
See generally Magone et al. 2011.
- 150.
Neuman 2011, p. 85.
- 151.
Crombé 2011, p. 57.
- 152.
Ibid., 2011 p. 62.
- 153.
Coggins 2015, p. 113.
- 154.
Suykens 2015, p. 152.
- 155.
Mampilly 2011, p. 114.
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Case Law
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ECtHR, Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, Judgment, 16 April 1979, Application No. 6538/74
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Murray, D. (2018). Engaging Armed Groups Through the Development of Human Rights Obligations: Incorporating Practice, Motivation and Ideology to Promote Compliance with International Law. In: Gill, T., McCormack, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 19. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_5
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