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The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Reach of Free Movement Law

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The Reach of Free Movement

Abstract

This chapter discusses two underrated and connected aspects that determine the applicability of the Charter in the area of the market freedoms. First, the Charter can be a decisive standard of review for domestic measures only when they are covered by EU law but are not precluded by it. In this respect, the distinction between non-preclusion and non-application of EU law is overlooked in the case law and in the scholarship. Second, because the applications of EU law and the Charter are aligned, the latter suffers from the uncertainties of the former. This chapter concludes that the entry into force of the Charter has exposed the blurred contours of the application of EU law, in particular in the area of the market freedoms.

The work is the outcome of both authors’ collaboration. Amedeo Arena drafted Sects. 13.113.3, Filippo Fontanelli drafted Sects. 13.413.7.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Fransson equivalence dictates that the scope of application of EU law and the Charter to State measures is the same, ratione materiae. Whereas (then) President Skouris praised the Fransson-equivalence, it arguably creates more problems than it solves. See, respectively, Skouris 2013 and Fontanelli 2013.

  2. 2.

    The importance of non-precluded measures under the Charter is discussed in Fontanelli 2014.

  3. 3.

    TFEU, Article 34.

  4. 4.

    TFEU, Article 36.

  5. 5.

    Case C-441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandels, ECLI:EU:C:2006:141.

  6. 6.

    Case C-142/09, Lahousse and Lavichy, ECLI:EU:C:2010:694.

  7. 7.

    For instance, legal commentators have highlighted the difficulty in determining the exact boundaries of the EU exclusive competence in the area of the ‘establish[ment] of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’ as per Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. See, for instance, Dashwood 2004, p. 371 (arguing that such definition is inaccurate); Mastroianni 2005, p. 398 (noting that the above definition adopts the pre-Lisbon teleological approach to the vertical division of powers); Schütze 2008, p. 717 (arguing that the drafters have fallen victim to an ‘ontological fallacy’ insofar as the category of ‘rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’ does ‘not, by definition, require the exclusion of all national action within their scope’).

  8. 8.

    See Case C-198/13, Julian Hernández and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, para 36 (‘the mere fact that a national measure comes within an area in which the European Union has powers cannot bring it within the scope of EU law’). See also Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10, Gueye and Salmerón Sánchez, ECLI:EU:C:2011:583, paras 55, 69 and 70; and Case C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras 104–105, 180–181.

  9. 9.

    See Case C-348/96, Calfa, ECLI:EU:C:1999:6, para 17 (‘Although in principle criminal legislation is a matter for which the Member States are responsible, the Court has consistently held that Community law sets certain limits to their power, and such legislation may not restrict the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law’). See also Case 186/87, Cowan, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47, para 19; Case 203/80, Casati, ECLI:EU:C:1981:261 para 27.

  10. 10.

    That test is firmly grounded in the wording of several TFEU provisions in the area of internal market: Articles 30 and 34 TFEU prohibit custom duties and quantitative restrictions in trade ‘between Member States’; Article 45(1) TFEU, concerning the free movement of workers, expressly refers to ‘nationality’; Article 49 TFEU, prohibiting restrictions on establishment ‘by citizens of a Member States in the territory of another Member State’; Article 56 TFEU, in turn, prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services ‘in respect of national of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’; finally, Article 69 TFEU prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital ‘between Member States, as well as between Member States and third countries’.

  11. 11.

    See Arena 2011, p. 207 (noting that the Court’s ‘traditional’ approach to purely internal situations implies that the existence of a cross-border element in the case’s factual matrix entails the presumption that the national measure has an impact on cross-border trade). See also Tryfonidou 2009, p. 200 (‘Under this approach … if the goods that are involved in the facts have remained confined within the territory of one and the same Member Sate, the situation immediately qualifies as purely internal and this signifies the end of the enquiry as to a possible violation of Article 28 EC’).

  12. 12.

    Case C-135/08, Rottmann, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104; Case C-438/05, Viking, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772; Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806; Case C-390/12, Pfleger and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:281.

  13. 13.

    Opinion in Case C-165/14, Rendón Marín, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, para 113.

  14. 14.

    See Case C-281/15, Sahyouni, ECLI:EU:C:2016:343, para 23 ‘It follows therefrom that neither the provisions of Regulation No. 1259/2010, referred to by the referring court, nor those of Regulation No. 2201/2003, nor any other legal act of the European Union applies to the dispute in the main proceedings’.

  15. 15.

    Case C-212/04, Adeneler and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2006:443, para 42.

  16. 16.

    Case C-238/05, AsnefEquifax, ECLI:EU:C:2006:734, para 17.

  17. 17.

    See for instance Case C-571/10, Kamberaj, ECLI:EU:C:2012:233, para 40.

  18. 18.

    Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, ECLI:EU:C:1990:360, para 37.

  19. 19.

    Case C-448/98, Guimont, ECLI:EU:C:2000:663, para 23.

  20. 20.

    Case C-325/15, Z.Ś. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:107, paras 32–33.

  21. 21.

    See also the express derogations laid down in Article 36, 45(3), 62, and 65 TFEU.

  22. 22.

    For a non-exhaustive list, see Case C-288/89, Gouda, ECLI:EU:C:1991:323, para 14: ‘the overriding reasons relating to the public interest which the Court has already recognized include professional rules intended to protect recipients of the service (Joined Cases 110/78 and 111/78, Van Wesemael, ECLI:EU:C:1979:8, para 28); protection of intellectual property (Case 62/79, Coditel, ECLI:EU:C:1980:84); the protection of workers (Case 279/80, Webb, ECLI:EU:C:1981:314, para 19; Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81, Seco v EVI, ECLI:EU:C:1982:34, para 14; Case 113/89, Rush Portuguesa, ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, para 18); consumer protection (Case 220/83, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:1986:461, para 20; Case 252/83, Commission v Denmark, ECLI:EU:C:1986:462, para 20; Case 205/84, Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1986:463, para 30; Case 206/84, Commission v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:1986:464, para 20; Commission v Italy, cited above, para 20; and Commission v Greece, cited above, para 21), the conservation of the national historic and artistic heritage (Commission v Italy, cited above, para 20); turning to account the archaeological, historical and artistic heritage of a country and the widest possible dissemination of knowledge of the artistic and cultural heritage of a country (Commission v France, cited above, para 17, and Commission v Greece, cited above, para 21).’

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131, para 13; Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, ECLI:EU:C:2006:544, para 35; Case C-212/97, Centros, ECLI:EU:C:1999:126, para 24.

  24. 24.

    Case C-403/98, Monte Arcosu, ECLI:EU:C:2001:6, para 26 (‘although […] the provisions of […] regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application, some of their provisions may none the less necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the Member States.’).

  25. 25.

    Case C-367/09, SGS Belgium and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2010:648, paras 34–35.

  26. 26.

    See, generally, Arena 2016.

  27. 27.

    See, generally, De Cecco 2006; Rott 2003.

  28. 28.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and others EU:C:2011:865.

  29. 29.

    Article 11 of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive).

  30. 30.

    See Schütze 2009, p. 195: ‘Where European law does not harmonize all aspects within a policy area, Community terminology speaks of partial harmonization’.

  31. 31.

    Joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95, and C-36/95, De Agostini, ECLI:EU:C:1997:344, para 32.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., paras 33–34 and 38.

  33. 33.

    Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, ECLI:EU:C:1993:905.

  34. 34.

    Case C-483/12, Pelckmans Turnhout, ECLI:EU:C:2014:304, para 24, emphasis added.

  35. 35.

    Case C-169/91, Stoke-on-Trent, ECLI:EU:C:1992:519, para 11.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., para 17.

  37. 37.

    See for instance the orders in Case C-328/15, Târșia, ECLI:EU:C:2016:273; Case C-520/15, Aiudapds, ECLI:EU:C:2016:124.

  38. 38.

    See Case C-71/02, Karner, ECLI:EU:C:2004:181, para 35.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., para 43.

  40. 40.

    Article 51(1) of the Charter.

  41. 41.

    Of course, the Charter also applies to the acts of EU institution, and has already proved to be an important touchstone of their legality. See for instance Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; Case C-236/09, Association Belge and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:100; Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.

  42. 42.

    Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.

  43. 43.

    Namely, it concluded that the cumulating of criminal and administrative sanctions did not necessarily breach the principle of ne bis in idem protected in Article 50 of the Charter.

  44. 44.

    Case C-234/12, Sky Italia, ECLI:EU:C:2013:496.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., paras 23–24.

  46. 46.

    Case C-308/14, Commission v United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436.

  47. 47.

    Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, Article 1, let j.

  48. 48.

    C-308/14, Commission v United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 80.

  49. 49.

    See Article 7 of the Charter.

  50. 50.

    See Articles 15–17 of the Charter.

  51. 51.

    Case C-122/15, C, ECLI:EU:C:2016:391.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., footnotes omitted.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., paras 65–66.

  54. 54.

    The judgment of the Court did not address the claim under Article 45 TFEU and only found that Directive 2000/78, the framework directive on non-discrimination on the workplace, did not apply to the circumstances of the case.

  55. 55.

    Case C-115/15, NA, ECLI:EU:C:2016:487.

  56. 56.

    As explained above, citizenship rights and market freedoms share their negative normative value, and sit uneasily with the non-preclusion category. This is why cases on citizenship and cases on fundamental freedoms, for the purpose of this chapter, can be studied together.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., para 122 (emphasis added).

  58. 58.

    Interestingly, the case was almost hypothetical, as she had been granted residence by the UK under the ECHR.

  59. 59.

    Opinion in Case C-165/14, Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:75, para 120, emphasis added.

  60. 60.

    Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254. On this case, see Cruz Villalón 2010.

  61. 61.

    See, e.g., Case C-389/96, Aher-Waggon, ECLI:EU:C:1998:357, para 16: ‘it is necessary to consider whether a Member State which, like the Federal Republic of Germany, has introduced stricter noise limits has, in exercising that power, infringed other provisions of Community law, in particular Article 30 of the Treaty’; Case C-6/98, ARD, ECLI:EU:C:1999:532, para 42: ‘the attainment of the objective of Directive 89/552 […] is not affected in any way if Member States impose stricter rules on advertising […] on condition, however, that those rules are compatible with other relevant provisions of Community law’.

  62. 62.

    Case C-198/13, Julian Hernández and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, para 44.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., para 48.

  64. 64.

    Case C-235/14, Safe Interenvios, ECLI:EU:C:2016:154, para 79.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., paras 99, 109.

  66. 66.

    The Fransson case in this respect is paradigmatic, as it concerns Swedish measures passed before Sweden’s accession to the EU.

  67. 67.

    Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses, ECLI:EU:C:2015:832.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., para 68 (emphasis added).

  69. 69.

    Ibid., para 98.

  70. 70.

    On the reception of Fransson in Swedish law, see Nergelius 2016, pp. 97–98.

  71. 71.

    Please note that this “spontaneous harmonisation” effect is not restricted to the Charter, but extends to other areas of EU law. For instance, the prospect of creating reverse discrimination against their nationals induced Member States to amend or repeal their laws as a whole, whereas EU law only required to disapply them vis-à-vis nationals of other Member States. A case in point is the Italian legislation on pasta products, which the ECJ only declared inapplicable to producers from other Member States (Case 407/85, Drei Glocken, ECLI:EU:C:1988:401, para 25), but was eventually struck down as a whole by the Italian Constitutional Court in Judgment no. 443 of 1997.

  72. 72.

    Case C-548/15 de Lange.

  73. 73.

    Emphasis added.

  74. 74.

    Respectively, Case C-144/04, Mangold, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21.

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Fontanelli, F., Arena, A. (2017). The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Reach of Free Movement Law. In: Andenas, M., Bekkedal, T., Pantaleo, L. (eds) The Reach of Free Movement. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_13

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