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Legitimacy and the Charter of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon

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Abstract

Has the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Lisbon Treaty strengthened our reasons for accepting the powers entrusted to the European Union?—The Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted and later transformed into primary law in order to enhance the legitimacy of the EU. This echoed a critique of the gradually expanding powers of the EU, including the expanding reach of the right to free movement, more supranational decision-making procedures, and new Union powers in novel policy areas such as the area of justice and home affairs. One line of criticism held that the wide powers of the Union were not balanced with a sufficient level of democratic control and effective protection against abuse. The Lisbon Treaty sought to enhance legitimacy in three ways: Decision-making processes were to some extent democratised; the Member States agreed that the Union shall accede to the ECHR; and the Charter was transformed into primary law. There is a partly competing perspective that posits that the EU’s legitimacy may depend more on its ability to facilitate effective problem-solving of acute public policy issues, including migration, terror, and economic crises. In this chapter, we analyse to what extent the transformation of the Charter into primary law has already succeeded, and may continue to succeed, in providing better reasons for accepting the powers entrusted to the EU. In this context, we provide, first, an analysis of certain questions regarding the interpretation and application of the Charter, questions which are key to assessing what changes to EU law the said transformation has led to and may lead to, as compared to older epochs of EU law, when fundamental rights were based on unwritten law. In the final assessment, we argue that the answer to the legitimacy question depends on the extent to which European courts will allow Member States flexibility regarding how fundamental rights are protected in different institutional environments. Effective problem-solving may require the ability to adapt different solutions to various locations and to different situations, based upon the weighing of diverse interests.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This has been a central concern for modern political philosophy, particularly since the European Enlightenment, and is reflected in the positions of Locke, Rousseau and Kant. Despite their divergent theoretical stance, they all claimed that the only public authorities that deserved recognition were those based upon principles under which subordination did not violate freedom. The claim is, perhaps, most clearly articulated by Rousseau: “MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.” Rousseau 1992 [1762], p. 914.

  2. 2.

    Habermas 2001, p. 113. For application of this understanding of legitimacy to studies of the European integration project, see, for example, Joerges 2006. Habermas’ conception of legitimacy has been articulated slightly differently by others. For example, Joseph Raz claims that the question of normative legitimacy is about the moral reasons for obeying governing techniques; see Raz 1979. Another formulation is provided by John Rawls, who focuses on the rational reasons for accepting the institutional framework in which governing techniques are exercised; see Rawls 1999. However, for the purposes of this chapter, there is no need to distinguish between these various articulations.

  3. 3.

    See the Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999, The Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm#an4.

  4. 4.

    The European Convention for protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR).

  5. 5.

    See TEU Article 6(2) and Opinion 2/13.

  6. 6.

    In this chapter we focus on legitimacy in a normative sense, not on juridical, psychological or sociological concepts of legitimacy. Legitimacy in the normative sense differs from actual approval of authority (psychological conceptions of legitimacy), from legitimacy as (actual) obedience to authority (sociological conceptions of legitimacy), and from legitimacy established by reference to higher-order norms (juridical conceptions of legitimacy). This is not to deny that such other aspects of legitimacy may have normative relevance too. For a general analysis of interrelations between normative, legal and social aspects of legitimacy, see Beetham 1991.

  7. 7.

    See e.g. Craig and de Búrca 2008, Chapter 11.

  8. 8.

    Case 29/69, Stauder, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114; Case 4/73, Nold, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.

  9. 9.

    Case 5/88, Wachauf, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321, and C-260/89, ERT, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254.

  10. 10.

    ECJ Opinion 2/94 on the Accession of the Community to the ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140, para 33.

  11. 11.

    See, for example, Case C-310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2006:521 and C-465/07, Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2009:94.

  12. 12.

    See Article 6 TEU.

  13. 13.

    The same goes for the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopted in 1977, OJ 1977, C 103/1.

  14. 14.

    Thus, for example, Jacobs 2002, p. 275. Klausen 2001 is among those who see new rights in the Charter.

  15. 15.

    This is argued by McGlynn 2001, pp. 582–598, who also presents a more general argument for there being new rights in the Charter (op.cit. p. 583).

  16. 16.

    The ECJ referred to the Charter inter alia in the following cases: Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, para 38; Case C-432/05, Unibet v. Justitiekanslern, ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, para 37; Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, ECLI:EU:C:2008:85, para 41. Prior to this, the Charter was referred to by a number of Advocates General (see, for example, AG Jacobs’ Opinion in Case C-50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197; AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office National d’Emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2002:103, as well as by the Court of First Instance (see, for example, Case T-177/01, Jégo Quéré et Cie SA v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2002:112), the European Court of Human Rights (see, for example, Goodwin v. UK [2002] 35 EHRR 18) and national courts (see, for example, R (on the application of Robertson) v. Wakefield MDC [2002] QB 1052, 170)).

  17. 17.

    See Rosas and Armati 2010, p. 154.

  18. 18.

    For further analysis, see, for example, Lock 2010, pp. 777–798.

  19. 19.

    See Opinion 2/13.

  20. 20.

    There are some other significant news, too, such as the extended jurisdiction of the ECJ to the former Third Pillar. We do not undertake to map all the changes that the Treaty of Lisbon has created with regard to fundamental rights protection, only those connected to the Charter’s new status as primary law.

  21. 21.

    This is argued by Curzon 2011, in particular at p. 158. See also Rasmussen 2008.

  22. 22.

    See, for example, Article 6(3) TEU, which states that “Fundamental rights … shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”.

  23. 23.

    In Case 4/73, Nold, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, the ECJ declared that it could not uphold community measures that are incompatible with fundamental rights. In Case C-256/90, Mignini, ECLI:EU:C:1992:173, a regulation was set aside upon the basis of incompatibility with fundamental rights. The principle that the limitations which fundamental rights place on the EU institutions also apply to Member States when they implement EU law is expressed, for example, in Case 5/88, Wachauf, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321 and in C-292/97, Karlsson, ECLI:EU:C:2000:202.

  24. 24.

    See Weiler 1995, p. 68.

  25. 25.

    See, for example, de Búrca 2001, p. 137.

  26. 26.

    See C-260/89, ERT, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 an early case showing that Member States must respect fundamental rights when derogating from EU law (in this case, from the four freedoms), and see subsequently C-368/95, Familiapress, ECLI:EU:C:1997:325; Case C-459/99, MRAX, ECLI:EU:C:2002:461; Case C-60/00, Carpenter, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434.

  27. 27.

    The reason is that “old” norms, i.e., those that already exist by virtue of general principles, clearly continue to apply both in the agency-situation and in the derogation-situation.

  28. 28.

    Barnard 2008, p. 263.

  29. 29.

    This is also suggested by Di Federico 2011, in particular at 39–40.

  30. 30.

    See Case C-390/12, Pfleger, ECLI:EU:C:2014:281.

  31. 31.

    C-390/12, Pfleger, ECLI:EU:C:2014:281, para 36.

  32. 32.

    See for the opposite opinion Snell 2015.

  33. 33.

    See, for example, de Búrca 2001.

  34. 34.

    See Case C-617/10, Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 19.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    For a discussion, see Snell 2015 and Dougan 2015.

  38. 38.

    See Opinion of GA Sharpston in Case C‑34/09, Zambrano, ECLI:EU:C:2010:560.

  39. 39.

    Op.cit. para 163.

  40. 40.

    For further discussions of such concerns, see below in Sect. 10.4.

  41. 41.

    See Article 52(1).

  42. 42.

    Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333; Case C-36/02, Omega, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614.

  43. 43.

    For some “classics” on the distinction between rules and principles, see Esser 1974; Dworkin 1967–68; 1977, Chapters 2 and 3; Alexy 1994, pp. 71 et seq.; Alexy 2000.

  44. 44.

    See, concurring, Fredman 2006, p. 57, and Di Federico 2011, p. 41.

  45. 45.

    Saying that a legal instrument “contains” rights and principles is somewhat misleading. It would be more accurate to say, for example, that it contains provisions and wordings that give expression to rights and principles. But this is the language used in Article 52(3) and (5) of the Charter, and we have therefore chosen to use the same language.

  46. 46.

    Article 52(4) of the Charter.

  47. 47.

    Article 52(3) of the Charter.

  48. 48.

    The exact way of wording these criteria can be discussed. We have used the same wording here as the one used by Craig and de Búrca 2008, p. 277, for formulating the criteria for direct effect of treaty provisions. The ECJ has, in an extensive number of judgments, confirmed that the treaties provide private parties with rights that are enforceable before national courts, provided that the treaty provisions in question are articulated in a precise, unconditional and independent way.

  49. 49.

    See Ward 2009.

  50. 50.

    See, also, the line of thinking set out in Protocol 30 to the Treaty of Lisbon, which sets out that Title IV of the Charter (which contains provisions for socio-economic rights and principles), does not create justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom.

  51. 51.

    See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. More generally, see Sect. 10.2 and the Second Epoch of Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU.

  52. 52.

    See, generally, Scharpf 1999 and also Majone 2005.

  53. 53.

    See Sabel and Cohen 2004.

  54. 54.

    Op.cit., p. 168.

  55. 55.

    See Eriksen 2011.

  56. 56.

    For this point, see Kennedy 1978–1979.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Professor Mads Andenæs and Professor Tarjei Bekkedal, both of the University of Oslo, for their comments on this chapter.

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  1. Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Karl Johans gate 47, St. Olavs plass, PO Box 6706, N-0130, Oslo, Norway

    Christoffer C. Eriksen

  2. Law firm Advokat Jørgen A. Stubberud, Stasjonsveien 109, N-1746, Skjeberg, Norway

    Jørgen A. Stubberud

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Mads Andenas

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Tarjei Bekkedal

  3. Faculty of Public Management, Law and Safety, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Luca Pantaleo

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Eriksen, C.C., Stubberud, J.A. (2017). Legitimacy and the Charter of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon. In: Andenas, M., Bekkedal, T., Pantaleo, L. (eds) The Reach of Free Movement. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_10

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