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Intelligence Accountability in a Globalizing World. Towards an Instrument of Measuring Effectiveness

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Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the ‘accountability gap’ with regard to international intelligence cooperation. As a result of globalisation, and especially after 9/11, this cooperation has become vital for national security. But as mechanisms of oversight and accountability are national only, they have had trouble keeping track of these developments. The chapter discusses the reasons why intelligence accountability is problematic, and proposes an innovative analytical instrument for closing this gap.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Henceforward, we will refer to ‘intelligence agencies’, meaning both security and intelligence agencies.

  2. 2.

    Aucoin and Heintzman 2000, pp. 244–245.

  3. 3.

    Born and Leigh 2007; Eskens et al. 2015; Ott 2003; Phythian 2007.

  4. 4.

    Bovens 2010.

  5. 5.

    On the relationship between trust and acceptance from a socio-psychological perspective, see: Malone and Fiske 2013; Terwel et al. 2011.

  6. 6.

    Bovens et al. 2008, p. 226.

  7. 7.

    See further Braat 2016b, pp. 534–538.

  8. 8.

    Braat 2012, pp. 185–201.

  9. 9.

    Ott 2003.

  10. 10.

    Phythian 2007.

  11. 11.

    Born and Leigh 2007.

  12. 12.

    Baudet 2011; Baudet 2016; cf. Eckel 2014.

  13. 13.

    Gill 2003, p. 1.

  14. 14.

    Lander 2004, pp. 484–485. Cf. Gill 2003, p. 2.

  15. 15.

    Gimenez-Salinas 2002; Rzeplinski 2002.

  16. 16.

    Stan 2009, pp. 8, 116–123.

  17. 17.

    Baudet 2011. Cf. Cameron 2005, pp. 34–56.

  18. 18.

    Blanton 2009; idem 2003.

  19. 19.

    Blanton 2002, pp. 50–58.

  20. 20.

    Blanton 2003, pp. 51–52.

  21. 21.

    Aldrich 2011, pp. 18–41.

  22. 22.

    Fung et al. 2007, pp. 6, 24–25; Braat 2016a, p. 394.

  23. 23.

    A striking example is the Dutch private foundation Argus. On the basis of the Dutch freedom of information act it files requests and collects information on ‘secret’ organisations with the intention of making this information accessible to the public and encouraging new research. See http://www.stichtingargus.nl (last visited 6 December 2016).

  24. 24.

    Braat 2016a, pp. 394–395.

  25. 25.

    Simmel 1906, p. 464.

  26. 26.

    Weber 2013, p. 992.

  27. 27.

    Aldrich 2011, p. 133.

  28. 28.

    See Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2006.

  29. 29.

    Personal communication by a high-ranking Dutch intelligence official.

  30. 30.

    The Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (WIV).

  31. 31.

    Braat 2012, p. 190.

  32. 32.

    Personal communications to the authors by Dutch intelligence personnel.

  33. 33.

    Technically speaking this is not true. For the UK to be freed from obligations stemming from the ECHR it would not only need to leave the EU, but the Council of Europe, the actual sponsor of the Convention, as well.

  34. 34.

    Long 1949, p. 257.

  35. 35.

    For example, a well functioning internal documentation system which archives all internal documents, including emails; a legal department that oversees all operational activities and the use of special powers; managers who assume responsibility over their departments, etc.

  36. 36.

    See also the advice of the Dutch Council of State on the new law and the TIB in particular: Raad van State 2016, Advies W04.16.0097/I, Kamerstukken II 2016/2017, 34 588, nr. 4, 21 September 2016.

  37. 37.

    Blom 2013, pp. 94–98. Cf. De Baets 2009.

  38. 38.

    Both in public administration and in academia there is much support for the continuing important role of lawyers in intelligence accountability. For example, see Eskens et al. 2015.

  39. 39.

    The first in-house historian of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, Dick Engelen, published two significant operational histories of the service: Engelen 1995, and Engelen 2007. His successor, Eleni Braat, published a socio-cultural history of the service: Braat 2012.

  40. 40.

    De Jong 2015.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Baudet 2013.

  42. 42.

    The CIA is a good example of an agency which actively and structurally participates in the (academic) debate on its own history, for example through publications, conference papers, and education.

  43. 43.

    Such was the case with Dick Engelen, the first official in-house historian of the Dutch Security Service and one of the first worldwide to publish his work. The responsible minister of the Interior supported his academic independence and an academic supervisory committee had full access to the entire archive.

  44. 44.

    Andrew 2009; Jeffery 2010.

  45. 45.

    Horner 2014; Blaxland 2015; Blaxland and Crawley 2016.

  46. 46.

    Blom 2013, pp. 94–98.

  47. 47.

    Jaeger and Bertot 2010.

  48. 48.

    As the British government introduced the Intelligence Service Act in 1993 it committed itself to more openness. It subsequently transferred a considerable amount of declassified documents to the British National Archives. Aldrich 2010 made use of this move towards greater openness.

  49. 49.

    Braat 2012, pp. 107–128, 151–158.

  50. 50.

    See also Sect. 10.5.3 on ‘a proactive stance of committee members’.

  51. 51.

    Phythian 2007, pp. 75–99.

  52. 52.

    Braat 2016b, pp. 534–538.

  53. 53.

    Idem.

  54. 54.

    Quoted in Ott 2003, p. 74.

  55. 55.

    Hijzen 2014, pp. 227–238; Hijzen 2016.

  56. 56.

    For a discussion, see Hillebrand 2012.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Eleni Braat

  2. Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

    Floribert Baudet

Authors
  1. Eleni Braat
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  2. Floribert Baudet
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Correspondence to Eleni Braat .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty of Military Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands

    Floribert Baudet

  2. Department of History and Art History, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Eleni Braat

  3. Veteraneninstituut , Doorn, The Netherlands

    Jeoffrey van Woensel

  4. Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Independent scholar, retired Saxion University of Applied Sciences, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Aad Wever

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Braat, E., Baudet, F. (2017). Intelligence Accountability in a Globalizing World. Towards an Instrument of Measuring Effectiveness. In: Baudet, F., Braat, E., van Woensel, J., Wever, A. (eds) Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8_10

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