Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Jus ad bellum economicum and jus in bello economico: The Limits of Economic Sanctions Under the Paradigm of International Humanitarian Law

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Economic Sanctions under International Law

  • 3630 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter argues that economic sanctions—including sanctions imposed outside of the armed conflict context—should be regulated by the principles underlying international humanitarian law (IHL). It considers the challenges associated with applying other sources of law, namely international human rights law and the law on countermeasures, to economic sanctions and the benefits of viewing sanctions through IHL. The chapter then describes what limits would regulate economic sanctions when borrowing IHL principles. In doing so, the chapter constructs two general categories of rules: jus ad bellum economicum—or the principles concerning when economic sanctions can be used—and jus in bello economico—or the principles concerning limits governing sanctions programs.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICTY or the United Nations in general.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Padover 1942, p. 108.

  2. 2.

    See generally Hufbauer et al. 2007 (conducting a historical analysis of economic sanctions programs, their objectives, and their effectiveness in achieving intended results); Drezner 1999 (arguing that countries use sanctions under conditions that will produce the “feeblest results”).

  3. 3.

    See e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, para 89, U.N. Doc. A/52/1 (3 September 1997) (“the use of mandatory sanctions is a valuable tool available to the Security Council, permitting the United Nations to bring pressure to bear without recourse to force.”).

  4. 4.

    See generally Hufbauer et al. 2007.

  5. 5.

    Hufbauer et al. 2007, p. 5.

  6. 6.

    See generally Working Paper: The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/2000/33 (21 June 2000).

  7. 7.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, para 124, U.N. Doc. A/54/1 (31 August 1999) (“It is increasingly accepted that the design and implementation of sanctions mandated by the Security Council need to be improved, and their humanitarian costs to civilian populations reduced as far as possible.”).

  8. 8.

    Hufbauer et al. 2007, p. 5 (“the countries that impose sanctions are for the most part large nations that pursue an active foreign policy.”) and 63 (“The economy of the sender country is usually very much larger than that of the target country. In most cases, the sender’s GNP is over 10 times greater than the target’s GNP, and in over half the ratio is greater than 50.”).

  9. 9.

    The principal argument advanced in this chapter—that sanctions should be governed by the principles of IHL—is neither novel nor unique and others have opined on this matter, including the following whom the author directs the reader’s attention to as additional resource: O’Connell 2002, pp. 69–79; Reisman and Stevick 1998, pp. 127–140; Reinisch 2001, pp. 853–864.

  10. 10.

    See e.g., Reinisch 2001, p. 860.

  11. 11.

    See e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Articles 2–3, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (“Geneva Convention I”); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Articles 2–3, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Geneva Convention II”); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Articles 2–3, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Geneva Convention III”); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Articles 2–3, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“Geneva Convention IV”).

  12. 12.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Article 1, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Additional Protocol I”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 1, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (“Additional Protocol II”).

  13. 13.

    Segall 1999.

  14. 14.

    See Hufbauer et al. 2007, p. 4.

  15. 15.

    See generally Howlett 2004; LaRae-Perez 2002; Reinisch 2001; Segall 1999.

  16. 16.

    ICCPR, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; ICESCR, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.

  17. 17.

    See generally O’Connell 2002; Crawford 2001.

  18. 18.

    See generally Meron 1995, p. 78; Craven 2002, pp. 54–57.

  19. 19.

    See e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179–180; Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, para 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.629 (March 2004) (noting that the obligations imposed under the ICCPR extend to “anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.”); HRC López Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 12/52, para 12.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 A/36/40 (6 June 1979) (in interpreting the jurisdictional scope of the ICCPR, noting that “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”); Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR, Judgment, Series A vol. 310 (23 March 1995), para 62 (describing the jurisdictional limits of obligations owed under the ECHR); Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba (‘Brothers to the Rescue’), IACHR Report No. 86/99, Case No. 11589 (29 September 1999) (jurisdictional limits of obligations owed under IACHR).

  20. 20.

    ICESCR, Articles 6–9, 11–13, 15, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.

  21. 21.

    ICESCR, Article 2(1), 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.

  22. 22.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 180 (concluding that Israel has obligations to Palestinians in the occupied territories under the ICESCR); CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (26 June 2003) (finding that the obligations emanating from the ICESCR apply to all territories under the effective control of a State Party).

  23. 23.

    Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 180 (emphasis added).

  24. 24.

    Statement of the U.S. Representative at the UN Commission on Human Rights, para 84, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/SR.51 (16 April 2004); Craven 2002, p. 55 (“human rights may be regarded as the instantiation of a political philosophy concerned with the inter-relationship between government and individuals within specified territorial domains, and therefore largely inapplicable to the situation arising in the case of economic sanctions”); Miranda 2012, p. 810. But see Narula 2006, p. 737 (“The obligation of international cooperation, as interpreted under the General Comments, gets us on the road to broadening the extraterritorial application of the ICESCR.”).

  25. 25.

    CESCR General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (12 December 1997).

  26. 26.

    Idem; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, para 99, U.N. Doc. A/55/1 (30 August 2000) (“The costs of sanctions have too often been borne by ordinary people, not by the authoritarian Governments against which they were directed. Paradoxically, the political elites that compose the regimes themselves have often benefited economically from the black markets that have sprung up to circumvent the sanctions intended to exert pressure upon them.”).

  27. 27.

    CESCR General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (12 December 1997).

  28. 28.

    See Craven 2002, pp. 56–57; O’Connell 2002, p. 73 (“[r]ather than finding sanctions a violation of human rights per se, Security Council members have characterized sanctions as law enforcement tools to which a standard of humanitarianism applies”).

  29. 29.

    Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, Articles 22, 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (12 December 2001).

  30. 30.

    Yearbook of the UN International Law Commission, vol. 2, p. 75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (part 2) (Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility) (“the commission of one State of an internationally wrongful act may justify another State injured by that act in taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to achieve reparation for the injury.”).

  31. 31.

    Yearbook of the UN International Law Commission, vol. 2, p. 75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (part 2) (Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility) (“Countermeasures may only preclude wrongfulness in the relations between an injured State and the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act.”).

  32. 32.

    Idem, p. 76 (“Article 54 leaves open the question whether any State may take measures to ensure compliance with certain international obligations in the general interest as distinct from its own individual interest as an injured State. While Article 22 does not cover measures taken in such a case to the extent that these do not qualify as countermeasures, neither does it exclude that possibility.”).

  33. 33.

    Idem (Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility) (providing as an example for when countermeasures can be taken by third States: “the case of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole”); Cleveland 2001, p. 56 (“the jus cogens and erga omnes status of human rights norms under the U.N. Charter and customary international law, however, renders their breach subject to nonforcible countermeasures.”).

  34. 34.

    See Singh 2011. But see Calamita 2009.

  35. 35.

    Yearbook of the UN International Law Commission, vol. 2, pp. 131–132, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (part 2) (Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility).

  36. 36.

    Reinisch 2001, p. 860; Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 95.

  37. 37.

    Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration), 29 November 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1), 474–475.

  38. 38.

    Owen 2013, p. 115.

  39. 39.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 95.

  40. 40.

    O’Connell 2002, p. 3.

  41. 41.

    Letter from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1995/300 (13 April 1995).

  42. 42.

    The Secretary-General Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, para 124, U.N. Doc. A/54/1, 31 August 1999.

  43. 43.

    Sassoli 2009, pp. 45, 50.

  44. 44.

    Reisman 2009, p. 16.

  45. 45.

    See Sloane 2009, p. 64 (the advent of the UN Charter also resulted in the creation of a new jus ad bellum); Megret 2002, p.373 (the UN Charter’s “collective security system” was “designed to replace the previously existing jus ad bellum”).

  46. 46.

    See Helal 2014, p. 598; Sloane 2009, p. 64.

  47. 47.

    See McNeal 2014, p. 690 (consent of the host State can justify targeted killings by foreign State on host State’s territory); Deeks 2013, p. 33 (“international law does not currently preclude a state from using consent as a basis for employing force in another state’s territory”).

  48. 48.

    See Roscini 2010, p. 105 (noting that early Charter history and “[t]he travaux préparatoires also reveal that the drafters did not intend to extend the prohibition to economic coercion and political pressures.”); Nguyen 2013, p. 1114 (“During the drafting of the Charter, some states proposed that Article 2(4) include economic sanctions, but those proposals ultimately failed. The Western powers sought to confine Article 2(4) to the use of military force and allow the customary international law of non-intervention to govern other actions.”).

  49. 49.

    Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (24 October 1970); Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/22 (18 November 1987); see also Bowett 1972, pp. 1–2; Nguyen 2013, p. 1114 (“Subsequent attempts to include political and economic sanctions under the prohibition on force also failed. Thus, unfavorable trade decisions or severing diplomatic or economic relations are not prohibited force.”).

  50. 50.

    See 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334, 609 (1945); Doc. 2, 617(e)(4), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 251, 253–454 (1945); see also Schmitt 2013, p. 46; Bowett 1972, pp. 1–2; Nguyen 2013, p. 1114.

  51. 51.

    U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Special Committee on Friendly Relations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.110–114 (1970); Report of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 1969, U.N. GAOR 24th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969); Schmitt 2013, p. 46; Bowett 1972, pp. 1–2; Nguyen 2013, p. 1114.

  52. 52.

    See Cleveland 2001, p. 53 (“Nothing in customary international law, therefore, appears to bar the use of economic coercion”); Porotsky 1995, p. 918. But see Buchheit 1976, pp. 41, 68–69.

  53. 53.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 77 (“A State is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment, of the kind implied in a treaty of friendship and commerce”).

  54. 54.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, pp. 99–100.

  55. 55.

    S.C. Res. 418(1977), U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (4 November 1977).

  56. 56.

    Hufbauer et al. 2007, p. 10.

  57. 57.

    Idem, pp. 10–18.

  58. 58.

    See Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, p. 25, U.N. Doc. A/68/220-S/2013/475 (1 August 2013); see also S.C. Res. 1267(1999), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999), S.C. Res. 1333(2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), S.C. Res. 1343(2001), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (7 March 2001), S.C. Res. 1478(2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1478 (6 May 2003), S.C. Res. 1698(2006), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006).

  59. 59.

    See Working Paper: The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, paras 63–67, 79–82, 91–94, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/2000/33 (21 June 2000).

  60. 60.

    See e.g., Working Paper: The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, para 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/2000/33 (21 June 2000) (“the sanctions upon Iraq have produced a humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst catastrophes of the past decades.”).

  61. 61.

    Owen 2013, p. 115.

  62. 62.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 244.

  63. 63.

    Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (emphasis added).

  64. 64.

    Meron 2000, pp. 79–80; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen 1996 I.C.J. 375, 406 (“In effect, the Martens Clause provided authority for treating the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience as principles of international law, leaving the precise content of the standard implied by these principles of international law to be ascertained in the light of changing conditions, inclusive of changes in the means and methods of warfare and the outlook and tolerance levels of the international community. The principles would remain constant, but their practical effect would vary from time to time: they could justify a method of warfare in one age and prohibit it in another.”).

  65. 65.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 39.

  66. 66.

    The International Group of Experts was comprised of Professor Michael N. Schmitt from the United States Naval War College, Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg from Viadrina European University, Air Commodore (ret.) William H. Boothby from the United Kingdom Royal Air Force, Professor Thomas C. Wingfield from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Bruno Demeyere formerly from the Catholic University of Leuven, Professor Eric Talbot Jensen from Brigham Young University, Professor Sean Watts from Creighton University, Dr. Louise Arimatsu from Chatham House, Captain Geneviève Bernatchez from the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Forces, Colonel Penny Cumming from the Australian Defence Force, Professor Robin Geiss from the University of Potsdam, Professor Terry D. Gill from the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands Defence Academy and Utrecht University, Professor Derek Jinks from the University of Texas, Professor Jann Kleffner from the Swedish National Defence College, Dr. Nils Melzer from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Brigadier General (ret.) Kenneth Watkin from the Canadian Forces.

  67. 67.

    Schmitt 2013, pp. 48–51.

  68. 68.

    Idem, pp. 51–52.

  69. 69.

    See e.g., Acevedo 1984, p. 333. While in the Paramilitary Activities Case, the ICJ concluded that the economic sanctions program at issue did not constitute a breach of the principle of nonintervention, it maintained that its findings were strictly limited to “the economic plane as is here complained.” Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126. But see Cleveland 2001, pp. 53–54.

  70. 70.

    O’Connell 2002, pp. 75–76. But see Malloy 2003, p. 374.

  71. 71.

    Gabčikovo−Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40, 55–57 (identifying conditions that must be met for countermeasures to be justifiable); O’Connell 2002, p. 76 (“From all of these authoritative sources, two central principles of the law of countermeasures emerge: they must be used only in appropriate circumstances, i.e., to respond to a wrong, and they must be proportional to the injury suffered.”).

  72. 72.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101–103; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 186.

  73. 73.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (“The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.”).

  74. 74.

    Idem.

  75. 75.

    Schmitt 2013, p.55.

  76. 76.

    Idem.

  77. 77.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (holding that “whether the response to the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence”); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183, 196; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245.

  78. 78.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 141; Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183.

  79. 79.

    Idem.

  80. 80.

    See Cassese 2004, p. 355 (“[t]he victim of aggression must use an amount of force strictly necessary to repel the attack and proportional to the force used by the aggressor”).

  81. 81.

    Kretzmer 2013, p. 238.

  82. 82.

    S.C. Res. 1132(1997), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997); see also S.C. Res. 1940(2010), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1940 (29 September 2010).

  83. 83.

    S.C. Res. 918(1994), U.N. Doc.S/RES/918 (17 May 1994); see also S.C. Res. 1823(2008), U.N. Doc.S/RES/1823 (10 July 2008).

  84. 84.

    S.C. Res. 1696(2006), U.N. Doc.S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006); S.C. Res. 1737(2006), U.N. Doc.S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006).

  85. 85.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p.126.

  86. 86.

    Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Force of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (6 August 1999).

  87. 87.

    Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179–180.

  88. 88.

    Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89 (“[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law”).

  89. 89.

    Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom), Order Concerning Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 1992 I.C.J. 50, 61.

  90. 90.

    See also Idem.

  91. 91.

    Idem, p. 65.

  92. 92.

    Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order Concerning Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, 1993 I.C.J. 407, 440.

  93. 93.

    Idem.

  94. 94.

    Segall 1999; Gardam 1993, p. 318.

  95. 95.

    Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, Article 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (12 December 2001); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 198–199, 215 (recognizing that consent can be a basis by which the use of force of another state can be permitted). See generally Deeks 2013.

  96. 96.

    Yearbook of the UN International Law Commission, vol. 2, p. 73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (part 2) (Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility).

  97. 97.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126. Some have taken the view that the Paramilitary Activities Case establishes that only the legally recognized government may ever consent to the use of force on its territory. See e.g., Le Mon 2003, p. 750 (arguing that the decision in the Paramilitary Activities Case “not to discuss the standards of belligerency indicated that this system of gradations had likely been abandoned by the time of the adoption of the United Nations Charter”).

  98. 98.

    Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126.

  99. 99.

    For information, see Hathaway 2013; Wippman 1996; West and Murphy 1990.

  100. 100.

    Additional Protocol I, Articles 53, 54, 69, 70, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Additional Protocol II, Articles 14, 16, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.

  101. 101.

    Meron 1996, p. 240; Reisman and Stevick 1998, pp. 94–95; O’Connell 2002, p. 73.

  102. 102.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 57, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; O’Connell 2002, p. 73; Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 94; Owen 2013, p. 118.

  103. 103.

    Prosecutor v. D.Milošević, Case No. IT-98–29/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 53 (12 November 2009); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98–29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 190 (30 November 2006); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95–14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 109 (29 July 2004).

  104. 104.

    Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98–29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 190 (30 November 2006).

  105. 105.

    Additional Protocol I, Articles 54, 69, 70, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Additional Protocol II, Article 14, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.

  106. 106.

    Segall 1999.

  107. 107.

    See generally Cannizzaro 2006; Moussa 2008.

  108. 108.

    Cannizzaro 2006, p. 785; see also Moussa 2008, pp. 976–977; Steenberghe 2012, p. 124 (“the principal aim of proportionality under jus ad bellum being to minimise the disturbance of the international social order, while proportionality under jus in bello directly pursues humanitarian ends, in particular to limit the suffering of noncombatants in armed conflicts”).

  109. 109.

    Cannizzaro 2006, p. 785; see also Moussa 2008, pp. 976–977; Steenberghe 2012, p. 124.

  110. 110.

    Verri 1992, p. 75.

  111. 111.

    See Solis 2010, pp. 45, 50; United States v. Wilhelm List and Others (“The Hostage Case”), in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. XI/2, pp. 1253–1254 (1948).

  112. 112.

    See United States v. Wilhelm List and Others (“The Hostage Case”), in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. XI/2, pp. 1253–1254 (1948) (“Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money … . Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.”); see also Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No.IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para 44, n. 76 (5 December 2003).

  113. 113.

    Dörmann 2003, p. 81.

  114. 114.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 35(1)–(2), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

  115. 115.

    Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No.IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para 44, n. 76 (5 December 2003).

  116. 116.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 130.

  117. 117.

    Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No.IT-04-82-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, para 357 (10 July 2008) (“The principle of proportionality is inherent to military necessity and was already reflected in early definitions of military necessity.”) (citations omitted).

  118. 118.

    O'Connell 2002, p. 78. Article 14 of the 1863 Lieber Code defines military necessity as “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war.” (emphasis added). The Lieber Code can be found in The War of the Rebellion 1899, pp. 148–164. Article 23(g) of Hague Convention IV stipulates that destruction of property must be “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (emphasis added).

  119. 119.

    O’Connell 2002, p.78.

  120. 120.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257.

  121. 121.

    Prosecutor v. D.Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 53 (12 November 2009); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 190 (30 November 2006); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257.

  122. 122.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 48, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also 1863 Lieber Code, Article 22 in The War of the Rebellion 1899, pp. 148–164 (“as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms.”).

  123. 123.

    Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 91 (12 June 2002); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 106 (29 July 2004); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 132 (30 November 2006).

  124. 124.

    Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 271 (17 July 2008).

  125. 125.

    Idem, para 275.

  126. 126.

    Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras 131–134 (30 November 2006) (emphasizing that indiscriminate/disproportionate attacks do not always amount to direct attacks against civilians, but that, on a case-by-case basis, the indiscriminate/disproportionate character of an attack can assist in determining whether the attack was directed against the civilian population).

  127. 127.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 51(4), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

  128. 128.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257.

  129. 129.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 131; Owen 2013, p. 120.

  130. 130.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 132.

  131. 131.

    Askari 2003, pp. 68–69; Nyun 2008, pp. 466–467.

  132. 132.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 133 citing Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1986, p. 377.

  133. 133.

    See generally Barber 2009.

  134. 134.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, p. 133.

  135. 135.

    See Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

  136. 136.

    Reisman and Stevick 1998, pp. 133–134; Owen 2013, pp. 120–121.

  137. 137.

    Gardam 1993, p. 391; see also Reisman and Stevick, p. 131 (“[t]he principle of proportionality under international law caps the quanta of damage that the necessity inquiry suggests. Therefore even if necessary, a sanctions program cannot exceed the somewhat broadly construed bounds of proportionality. Collateral damage, as part of general damage, must be proportional.”).

  138. 138.

    Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 684.

  139. 139.

    Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 190 (30 November 2006); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 179 (17 July 2008).

  140. 140.

    Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No.IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para 58 (5 December 2003) (internal references omitted).

References

  • Acevedo D (1984) The US measures against Argentina resulting from the Malvinas Conflict. Am J Int Law 78:323

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Askari H et al (2003) Economic sanctions: examining their philosophy and efficacy. Praeger Publishers, Westport

    Google Scholar 

  • Barber R (2009) Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights law. Int Rev Red Cross 91:371

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowett D (1972) Economic coercion and reprisals by states. Va J Int Law 18:1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchheit L (1976) The use of nonviolent coercion: a study in legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. In: Lillich R (ed) Economic coercion and the new international economic order. The Michie Company Law Publishers, Charlottesville, p. 41

    Google Scholar 

  • Calamita N (2009) Sanctions, countermeasures, and the Iranian nuclear issue. Vanderbilt J Transnatl Law 42:1393

    Google Scholar 

  • Cannizzaro E (2006) Contextualizing proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese war. Int Rev Red Cross 88:779

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cassese A (2004) International law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cleveland S (2001) Norm internalization and US economic sanctions. Yale J Int Law 26:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Craven M (2002) Humanitarianism and the quest for smarter sanctions. Eur J Int Law 13:43

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crawford J (2001) The relationship between sanctions and countermeasures. In: Gowlland V (ed) United Nations sanctions and international law. Kluwer Law International, Leiden, p. 57

    Google Scholar 

  • Deeks A (2013) Consent to the use of force and international law supremacy. Harv Int Law J 54:8

    Google Scholar 

  • Dörmann K (2003) Elements of war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Drezner D (1999) The sanctions paradox: economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gardam J (1993) Proportionality and force in international law. Am J Int Law 87:391

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hathaway et al (2013) Consent-based humanitarian intervention: giving sovereign responsibility back to the sovereign. Cornell Int Law J 46:499

    Google Scholar 

  • Helal M (2014) Justifying war and the limits of humanitarianism. Fordham Int Law J 37:551

    Google Scholar 

  • Howlett A (2004) Getting “smart”: crafting economic sanctions that respect all human rights. Fordham Law Rev 73:1199

    Google Scholar 

  • Hufbauer G et al (2007) Economic sanctions reconsidered, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaRae-Perez C (2002) Economic sanctions as a use of force: re-evaluating the legality of sanctions from an effects-based perspective. Boston Univ Int Law J 20:161

    Google Scholar 

  • Le Mon C (2003) Unilateral intervention by invitation in civil wars: the effective control test tested. NY Univ J Int Law Policy 35:741

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaempfer W, Lowenberg A (1986) A model of the political economy of international investment sanctions: the case of South Africa. Kyklos Int Rev Soc Sci 39:377

    Google Scholar 

  • Kretzmer D (2013) The inherent right to self-defence and proportionality in jus ad bellum. Eur J Int Law 24:235

    Google Scholar 

  • Malloy M (2003) Oú est votre chapeau?: economic sanctions and trade regulation. Chicago J Int Law 4:371

    Google Scholar 

  • McNeal G (2014) Targeted killing and accountability. Geo Law J 102:681

    Google Scholar 

  • Megret F (2002) ‘War’? legal semantics and the move to violence. Eur J Int Law 13:361

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meron T (1995) Extraterritoriality of human rights treaties. Am J Int Law 89:78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meron T (1996) The continuing role of custom in the formation of international humanitarian law. Am J Int Law 90:238

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meron T (2000) The Martens Clause, principles of humanity, and dictates of public conscience. Am J Int Law 94:78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miranda L (2012) The role of international law in intrastate natural resource allocation: sovereignty, human rights, and peoples-based development. Vanderbilt J Transnatl Law 45:785

    Google Scholar 

  • Moussa J (2008) Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of law. Int Rev Red Cross 90:963

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Narula S (2006) The right to food: holding global actors accountable under international law. Columbia J Transnatl Law 44:691

    Google Scholar 

  • Nguyen R (2013) Navigating jus ad bellum in the age of cyber warfare. Calif Law Rev 101:1079

    Google Scholar 

  • Nyun T (2008) Feeling good or doing good: inefficacy of the US unilateral sanctions against the military government of Burma/Myanmar. Wash Univ Glob Stud Law Rev 7:455

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connell M (2002) Debating the law of sanctions. Eur J Int Law 13:63

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Owen M (2013) The limits of economic sanctions under international humanitarian law: the case of the Congo. Tex Int Law J 48:103

    Google Scholar 

  • Padover S (1942) Wilson’s ideals. American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • Porotsky R (1995) Economic coercion and the general assembly: a post-Cold War assessment of the legality and utility of the thirty-five-year old embargo against Cuba. Vanderbilt J Transnatl Law 28:901

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinisch A (2001) Developing human rights and humanitarian law accountability of the Security Council for the imposition of economic sanctions. Am J Int Law 95:851

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman W (2009) Sanctions and international law. Intercult Hum Rights Law Rev 4:9

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman W, Stevick D (1998) The applicability of international law standards to United Nations economic sanctions programmes. Eur J Int Law 9:86

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roscini M (2010) Worldwide warfare—jus ad bellum and the use of cyber force, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law XIV:85

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandoz Y et al (eds) (1987) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • Sassoli M (2009) The implementation of international humanitarian law: current and inherent challenges. In: McCormack T (ed) Yearbook of international humanitarian law. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, p. 45

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt M (2013) Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Segall A (1999) Economic sanctions: legal and policy constraints. Int Rev Red Cross 81:763

    Google Scholar 

  • Singh S (2011) Non-proliferation law and countermeasures, in nonproliferation law as a special regime. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sloane R (2009) The cost of conflation: preserving the dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the contemporary law of war. Yale J Int Law 34:47

    Google Scholar 

  • Solis G (2010) The law of armed conflict: international humanitarian law in war. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Steenberghe R (2012) Proportionality under jus ad bellum and jus in bello: clarifying their relationship. Isr Law Rev 45:107

    Google Scholar 

  • Verri P (1992) Dictionary of the international law of armed conflict. Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • West M, Murphy S (1990) The impact on U.S. litigation of non-recognition of foreign governments. Stanf J Int Law 26:435

    Google Scholar 

  • Wippman D (1996) Military intervention, regional organizations, and host-state consent. Duke J Comp Int Law 7:209

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, P.O. Box 13888, 2501 EW, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Nema Milaninia

Authors
  1. Nema Milaninia
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nema Milaninia .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Hague Centre for Law and Arbitration, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Ali Z. Marossi

  2. The Hague, The Netherlands

    Marisa R. Bassett

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 T.M.C. Asser Press and the author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Milaninia, N. (2015). Jus ad bellum economicum and jus in bello economico: The Limits of Economic Sanctions Under the Paradigm of International Humanitarian Law. In: Marossi, A., Bassett, M. (eds) Economic Sanctions under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-051-0_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation