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Increasing the Cost of Rape: Using Targeted Sanctions to Deter Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

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Abstract

Increasingly, the UNSC has applied targeted sanctions against individuals and entities in an effort to deter sexual violence against civilians in conflict. The use of targeted sanctions for this purpose marks a fundamental shift in the international community’s perceptions regarding conflict-related sexual violence, now considered a threat to international peace and security warranting UNSC intervention. This chapter considers the UNSC’s use of targeted sanctions to deter wartime sexual violence, as one available tool within the larger framework of women, peace and security initiatives to combat sexual violence in conflict. While the UNSC’s ability to impose targeted sanctions has the potential for deterrence, improved implementation is needed to increase the cost of permitting or using sexual violence in conflict. The chapter concludes with recommendations to improve the effectiveness of targeted sanctions through consistent, comprehensive, and transparent action against responsible persons.

The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, para 115, U.N. Doc. A/67/92- S/2013/149 (14 March 2013).

  2. 2.

    Statement of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to UN Security Council, Sexual Violence in Conflict is One of the World’s Most Vicious Crimes; Global Community Must Use all its Tools to End It, p. 1, U.N. Doc. SC/10977 (17 April 2013); Security Council Adopts Text Urging Targeted Sanctions against Perpetrators of Sexual Violence during Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. SC/11043 (24 June 2013).

  3. 3.

    Statement of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to UN Security Council, Sexual Violence in Conflict is One of the World’s Most Vicious Crimes; Global Community Must Use all its Tools to End It, p. 1, U.N. Doc. SC/10977 (17 April 2013).

  4. 4.

    See e.g., S.C. Res. 1261(1999), U.N. Doc S/RES/1261 (20 August 1999); S.C. Res. 1325(2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000); S.C. Res. 1612(2005), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (26 July 2005).

  5. 5.

    S.C. Res. 1820(2008), para 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008).

  6. 6.

    To assist in improving this track record, the UNSC called upon the Secretary-General to rapidly deploy “a team of experts to situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict” to work with national authorities to strengthen national capacity to enhance criminal accountability for sexual violence in armed conflict. S.C. Res. 1888(2009), para 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009).

  7. 7.

    The UNSC specifically demanded “that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence, including measures such as, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence and vetting candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associated with serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including sexual violence.” S.C. Res. 1888(2009), para 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009).

  8. 8.

    Idem, para 10.

  9. 9.

    Idem, para 4.

  10. 10.

    Idem, para 24.

  11. 11.

    Idem, para 27(c).

  12. 12.

    Idem, paras 3, 18(c).

  13. 13.

    S.C. Res. 1960(2010), para 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (16 December 2010).

  14. 14.

    Idem, para 7.

  15. 15.

    Idem, para 5.

  16. 16.

    S.C. Res. 2106(2013), para 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2106 (24 June 2013).

  17. 17.

    Idem, para 13.

  18. 18.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security, para 7, box 2, U.N. Doc. S/2013/525 (4 September 2013).

  19. 19.

    Security Council Adopts Text Urging Targeted Sanctions against Perpetrators of Sexual Violence during Armed Conflict, p. 2, U.N. Doc. SC/11043 (24 June 2013).

  20. 20.

    The UNSC Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee added Boko Haram to its sanctions list in May 2014, following the group’s abduction of approximately 300 girls from a school in northern Nigeria and threats to sell the girls into slavery. The reasons for listing do not expressly include sexual violence. U.N. Doc. SC/11410 (22 May 2014).

  21. 21.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, para 61, U.N. Doc. A/67/92- S/2013/149 (14 March 2013).

  22. 22.

    Idem.

  23. 23.

    Idem, para 62.

  24. 24.

    Idem, para 63.

  25. 25.

    Idem, para 64.

  26. 26.

    Idem, para 68.

  27. 27.

    S.C. Res. 2002(2011), para 1(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/2002 (29 July 2011).

  28. 28.

    Security Council Report 2013a, pp. 27–28.

  29. 29.

    S.C. Res. 1844(2008), para 8(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (20 November 2008).

  30. 30.

    S.C. Res. 2002(2011), pp. 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2002 (29 July 2011).

  31. 31.

    Idem, p. 2.

  32. 32.

    UNSC, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011), paras 99–100, U.N. Doc. S/2012/544 (13 July 2012).

  33. 33.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 29.

  34. 34.

    S.C. Res. 1521(2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) (establishing the Liberia Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts).

  35. 35.

    S.C. Res. 1315(2000), para 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (14 August 2000).

  36. 36.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Part III, para 12, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (4 October 2000); see also Human Rights Watch, Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict (26 February 2001).

  37. 37.

    Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment (29 May 2007).

  38. 38.

    Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case. No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (18 May 2012), affirmed on appeal; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 265 (26 September 2013).

  39. 39.

    Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (2 March 2009), pp. 677–687; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (20 June 2007), pp. 569–573.

  40. 40.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 31.

  41. 41.

    S.C. Res. 1807(2008), para 13(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1807 (31 March 2008).

  42. 42.

    UNSC, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para 48, U.N. Doc. S/2008/43 (3 February 2008).

  43. 43.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 31.

  44. 44.

    UNSC, Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paras 89–90, U.N. Doc. S/2009/253 (18 May 2009).

  45. 45.

    UNSC, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paras 341–344. U.N. Doc. S/2009/603 (23 November 2009).

  46. 46.

    UNSC, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, paras 144–146, U.N. Doc. S/2010/596 (29 November 2010).

  47. 47.

    Security Council Report 2013a, pp. 32–33.

  48. 48.

    Press Release, Sanctions Committee concerning Democratic Republic of Congo Adds One Individual to Assets Freeze, Travel Ban List, U.N. Doc. SC/10461 (28 November 2011).

  49. 49.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 32.

  50. 50.

    Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Public Redacted Version), para 551 (30 September 2008).

  51. 51.

    See infra Sect. 3.4.4 (noting the different standards of proof applicable in the noncriminal context).

  52. 52.

    Moreover, the heightened standard of criminal responsibility applied by the Trial Chamber is controversial. See Press Release, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Partial Conviction of Katanga by ICC; Acquittals for Sexual Violence and Use of Child Soldiers (7 March 2014) http://www.iccwomen.org/images/Katanga-Judgement-Statement-corr.pdf (accessed 19 July 2014).

  53. 53.

    Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/18 (26 May 2004); Security Council Report 2013a, p. 34.

  54. 54.

    Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict 2013, paras 72–73.

  55. 55.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 36.

  56. 56.

    UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1591(2005) concerning the Sudan Prepared in accordance with Para 2 of Resolution 1713(2006), U.N. Doc. S/2007/584 (3 October 2007).

  57. 57.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 36.

  58. 58.

    UNSC, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, para 647, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (1 February 2004).

  59. 59.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 37. The four ICC indictees from Darfur who remain at large are: President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir; Ahmad Muhammed Harun (government official); Ali Muhammad Al-Al-Rahman (Kushayb) (Janjaweed leader); and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein (Defence minister). They are charged with rape as an act of genocide (Al Bashir), as a crime against humanity (Al Bashir, Hussein, Harun and Kushayb), and as a war crime (Hussein, Harun and Kushayb). Hussein, Harun and Kushayb have also been indicted for sexual violence as persecution and outrages on personal dignity as a war crime. See Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice: Gender Report Card on the ICC 2013, pp. 54–55, 31 October 2013, http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Gender-Report-Card-on-the-ICC-2013.pdf.

  60. 60.

    S.C. Res. 1945(2010), para 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1945 (14 October 2010).

  61. 61.

    S.C. Res. 2035(2012), para 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2035 (17 February 2012); see also S.C. Res. 2091(2013), para 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2035 (14 February 2013) (requesting the Panel of Experts to report on, inter alia: “violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations and abuses against children, … and to provide the Committee with information on the individuals and entities that meet the listing criteria in para 3(c) of resolution 1591.”).

  62. 62.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 38; See also S.C. Res. 2187(2014), U.N. Doc. S/RES/2187 (25 November 2014), (strongly condemning ongoing “ethnically targetted violence, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence” but emphasizing that the Government of South Sudan bears primary responsibility for holding those responsible accountable).

  63. 63.

    Human Rights Watch 2014, p. 95.

  64. 64.

    Statement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa Bangura to the Security Council on the Situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), p. 3, New York, 22 January 2014, available at http://stoprapenow.org/uploads/files/SRSG%20Bangura%20Statement%20to%20Security%20Council%20on%20situation%20in%20CAR%2022%20January%202013.pdf (accessed 20 July 2014).

  65. 65.

    UN Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, CAR: Number of Sexual Violence Cases ‘astronomical,’ 20 January 2014, http://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/28989-car-number-of-sexual-violence-cases-astronomical.

  66. 66.

    High Commissioner Pillay stressed the responsibility of parties to the conflict “to refrain from committing, ordering, inciting or instigating violations of international law and to prevent subordinates from committing such violations.” She also reiterated that “[p]eople who commit serious human rights violations after receiving instructions, directions and orders may also have direct individual criminal responsibility for their actions and omissions”, reflecting various modes of liability that have been used before international criminal tribunals and courts to hold perpetrators accountable. UN News Centre, Central African Republic: Amid Ongoing Violence, UN Rights Chief Urges Accountability, 19 February 2014, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/central-african-republic-amid-ongoing-violence-un-rights-chief-urges-accountability.

  67. 67.

    The UNSC emphasized the need for national capacity to bring perpetrators to justice for “violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and of human rights abuses” and reiterated ICC jurisdiction over some crimes. S.C. Res. 2127(2013), paras 14, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2127 (5 December 2013). It also called on all parties to armed conflict in the CAR “to issue clear orders against sexual violence,” and the transitional government “to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable, in line with its Resolutions 1960(2010) and 2106(2013), and to facilitate immediate access for victims of sexual violence to available services.” Idem, para 23.

  68. 68.

    The UNSC requested the Secretary-General to create an international commission of inquiry to “immediately” “investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights in CAR by all parties since 1 January 2013, to compile information, to help identify the perpetrators of such violations and abuses, point to their possible criminal responsibility and to help ensure that those responsible are held accountable.” S.C. Res. 2127(2013), para 24, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2127 (5 December 2013).

  69. 69.

    Idem, para 56.

  70. 70.

    Idem, paras 57, 59.

  71. 71.

    Resolution 2134(2014), paras 30, 32, 37(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/2134 (28 January 2014).

  72. 72.

    Idem, para 37(g).

  73. 73.

    Idem, preamble.

  74. 74.

    Copelon 1994, p. 212.

  75. 75.

    Statement of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to UN Security Council, Sexual Violence in Conflict is One of the World’s Most Vicious Crimes; Global Community Must Use all its Tools to End it, p. 4, U.N. Doc. SC/10977 (17 April 2013).

  76. 76.

    Statement of Martin Briens in Statement of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to UN Security Council, Sexual Violence in Conflict is One of the World’s Most Vicious Crimes; Global Community Must Use all its Tools to End It, p. 8, U.N. Doc. SC/10977 (17 April 2013).

  77. 77.

    See Statements of Representatives in Statement of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to UN Security Council, Sexual Violence in Conflict is One of the World’s Most Vicious Crimes; Global Community Must Use all its Tools to End It, p. 4, U.N. Doc. SC/10977 (17 April 2013). See Statement of Gary Quinlan (Austrian representative: urging that “under many sanctions committees, the perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence fit within existing listing criteria”, which should be applied more rigorously); Statement of Cesare Maria Ragaglini (Italian representative: urging that “a powerful response” by UNSC was needed, such as stepping up pressure on perpetrators through targeted sanctions committee measures); Statement of Raimonda Murmokaite (Lithuanian representative: stressing the importance of consistent application of rape/sexual violence as designation criteria in sanctioning entities); Statement of Jim McLay (New Zealand representative: urging that sanctions could play an important role in combating the most serious and systematic incidences (DRC), that listing criteria should be regularly updated, and that Secretary-General’s recommendation be implemented, to provide similar powers to the Sanctions Committees responsible for Somalia, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb and Guinea-Bissau.). But see Statements of Nestor Osorio and Asoke Mukerji (Colombian and Indian representatives: emphasizing that Secretary-General’s reports are limited to situations of armed conflict on the UNSC’s agenda; “situations of concern” exceed that mandate).

  78. 78.

    Security Council Report 2013a, p. 36.

  79. 79.

    Idem. Ultimately, the Resolution was adopted with 12 positive votes, no negative votes and three abstentions. See UNSC, 5423rd Meeting of the Security Council, 25 April 2006, U.N. Doc S/PV.5423.

  80. 80.

    Security Council Report, February 2014 Monthly Forecast, Central African Republic, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-02/2014_02_central_african_republic_1.php. (noting that present options for the Security Council include “listing individuals for violations of the criteria set out under resolution 2134, either by the Council or in the Committee”).

  81. 81.

    The ad hoc international criminal tribunals have interpreted and applied customary international law in defining the crimes and modes of liability in their cases. As a result, their case law provides persuasive authority regarding the elements of crimes and modes of liability under customary international law. See Brady 2012, pp. 77–80; Goy 2012, pp. 3–5; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of Resolution 1820, March 2009, http://www.unrol.org/files/32914_Review%20of%20the%20Sexual%20Violence%20Elements%20in%20the%20Light%20of%20the%20Security-Council%20resolution%201820.pdf.

  82. 82.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, para 5, U.N. Doc. A/67/92- S/2013/149 (14 March 2013).

  83. 83.

    See e.g., Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04/-01/07, Trial Chamber Judgment, para 110 (7 March 2014); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras 349–422 (29 July 2004); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47, Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras 194–232 (22 April 2008); Prosecutor v. Mucić et al. (Čelebići), Case No. IT-96-21 Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras 248–268, 313–314 (20 February 2001); see also Jarvis and Martin Salgado 2013, pp. 108–111 (explaining challenges in proving superior responsibility with respect to sexual violence).

  84. 84.

    See e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case. No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para 6994, (18 May 2012) (planning; aiding and abetting); Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras 367–369, 1152 (1 September 2004) (aiding and abetting).

  85. 85.

    Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 30 (17 December 2004). The same standard applies for planning and instigating crimes. Idem, paras 31–32.

  86. 86.

    See e.g., UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of Resolution 1820, paras 61–69, March 2009, http://www.unrol.org/files/32914_Review%20of%20the%20Sexual%20Violence%20Elements%20in%20the%20Light%20of%20the%20Security-Council%20resolution%201820.pdf.

  87. 87.

    See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 30(3), 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2013.

  88. 88.

    See e.g., S.C. Res. 1960(2010), para 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (16 December 2010) (encouraging the Secretary-General to include in his annual reports submitted pursuant to Resolutions 1820(2008) and 1888(2009) “detailed information on parties to armed conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of sexual violence, and to list in an annex to these annual reports the parties that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the Security Council agenda”) (emphasis added).

  89. 89.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, para 128(a), U.N. Doc.A/67/92- S/2013/149 (14 March 2013).

  90. 90.

    DRC Sanctions Committee List, p. 12 (as of 30 June 2014) http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf (accessed 20 July 2014) (Sultani Makenga, military leader of M23, “has committed and is responsible for serious violations of international law involving the targeting of women and children in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement;” the militants operating under his command “have conducted rapes… as part of a policy to consolidate control in Rutshuru territory”).

  91. 91.

    Idem, p. 37 (Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, Commander-in-Chief of the Mayi Mayi political branch, “planned and ordered a series of attacks …. In the course of the attacks, children were raped and were abducted, subjected to forced labor and subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.”).

  92. 92.

    Idem, p. 41 (Innocent Zimulinda Zimurinda, Lt. Col. in FARDC: human rights groups alleged that he was responsible “for the rape of a large number of women and girls” between February and August 2007).

  93. 93.

    Idem, pp. 19, 28–29 (listing three FDLR-FOCA commanders—Leopold Mujyambere, Pacifique Ntawunguka, and Stanislas Nzeyimana—and citing evidence collated by the UNSC DRC Sanctions Committee Group of Experts report of 13 February 2008 that “girls recovered from FDLR-FOCA had previously been abducted and sexually abused).

  94. 94.

    Idem, pp. 2–14.

  95. 95.

    Idem, p. 52 (FDLR “has committed serious violations of international law involving the targeting of women and children and conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, and forced displacement.”).

  96. 96.

    Idem, p. 67 (M23 “has been complicit in and responsible for committing serious violence of international law involving the targeting of women and children in situations of armed conflict in the DRC including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction, and forced displacement.”).

  97. 97.

    Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee List, UNSC, Security Council Committee Concerning Côte d’Ivoire Issues List of Individuals Subject to Measures Imposed by Resolution 1572(2004), pp. 1–2, U.N. Doc. SC/8631 (7 February 2006) (referring to COJEP (“Young Patriots”) Leader Charles Blé Goudé and Eugene Ngoran Kouadio Djue).

  98. 98.

    Idem, p. 2 (referring to Chief Corporal New Force Commandant, Korhogo Sector, Martin Kouakou Fofié).

  99. 99.

    S.C. Res. 1572(2004), para 9, U.N. Doc S/RES/1572 (15 November 2004); UNSC, Security Council Committee Concerning Côte d’Ivoire Issues List of Individuals Subject to Measures Imposed by Resolution 1572(2004), U.N. Doc. SC/8631 (7 February 2006) (despite no references to the women, peace and security agenda in any of the resolutions authorizing the sanctions regime, three individuals listed were cited for rape or the sexual abuse of women as part of the justification for their designation).

  100. 100.

    The indictees are charged with rape and other forms of sexual violence as a crime against humanity and as underlying acts of persecution. Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice: Gender Report Card on the ICC 2013, pp. 56–57, 61–62, 31 October 2013, http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Gender-Report-Card-on-the-ICC-2013.pdf.

  101. 101.

    See Tzanakopoulos 2010, pp. 249–267.

  102. 102.

    Bothe 2008, p. 549.

  103. 103.

    Security Council Report 2013b, p. 8. The Focal Point for Delisting was created through Resolution 1730(2006), which includes an annex establishing basic procedures for the delisting process. See S.C. Res. 1730(2006), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (19 December 2006).

  104. 104.

    The Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, para 152, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2 December 2004).

  105. 105.

    G.A. Res. 60/1, para 109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005).

  106. 106.

    See UNSC, 5474th Meeting of the Security Council, p. 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5474 (22 June 2006).

  107. 107.

    Idem.

  108. 108.

    S.C. Res. 1904(2009), para 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (17 December 2009); S.C. Res.1989(2011), para 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (17 June 2011); S.C. Res. 2083(2012), para 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2083 (17 December 2012).

  109. 109.

    See United Nations, Office of the Ombudsperson of the Security Council’s 1267 Committee, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/ (accessed 20 July 2014).

  110. 110.

    United Nations, Office of the Ombudsperson of the Security Council’s 1267 Committee, Approach to and Standard for Analysis, Observations, Principal Arguments and Recommendation, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/approach.shtml (accessed 20 July 2014).

  111. 111.

    See e.g., Commonwealth Secretariat, Model Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism, Part II, p. 8, September 2002, https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Commonwealth_modellaw_terr.pdf (accessed 20 July 2014).

  112. 112.

    See e.g., EU Council Regulation 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran and Repealing Regulation EU No. 961/2010, Articles 3(5), 5(3), 18(2).

  113. 113.

    United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.

  114. 114.

    United Nations, Office of the Ombudsperson of the Security Council’s 1267 Committee, Approach to and Standard for Analysis, Observations, Principal Arguments and Recommendation, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/approach.shtml (accessed 20 July 2014).

  115. 115.

    Naarden 2003, pp. 347–348 citing Memorandum from UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Office to International Police Task Force Commissioner, Local Police Officers Suspected of War Crimes, 6 August 2001. See also Gambari v. Secretary-General, UNDP Judgment No. UNDT/2012/193, 6 December 2012 paras 44–45 (articulating the standard for assessing misconduct by UN employees as “well founded”, “ a grounded suspicion”, “reasonable suspicion”, or “probable cause”).

  116. 116.

    Naarden 2003, p. 348.

  117. 117.

    UNSC, 6964th Meeting of the Security Council, pp. 15, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6964.

  118. 118.

    For example, The UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism endorsed the Ombudsperson’s procedures in 2012, but recommended further changes to meet international due process standards, such as making the decisions of the Ombudsperson binding and increasing procedural transparency. UNGA, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, pp. 22–23, U.N. Doc. A/67/396 (26 September 2012); see also Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Kadi, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 18 July 2013, para 134. This case is analyzed in detail in other chapters in this volume.

  119. 119.

    See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 28, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; ICTY Statute, Article 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/893 (25 May 1993); ICTR Statute, Article 6(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (8 November 1994). These are premised on Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, Article 86(2), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287: The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.

  120. 120.

    Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, paras 200–203 (17 March 2009).

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  1. James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, 1201 East Speedway, Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA

    Najwa M. Nabti

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Nabti, N.M. (2015). Increasing the Cost of Rape: Using Targeted Sanctions to Deter Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. In: Marossi, A., Bassett, M. (eds) Economic Sanctions under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-051-0_3

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