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The Need for International Judicial Review of UN Economic Sanctions

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Economic Sanctions under International Law

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Abstract

In the beginning of 1990s, with the disappearance of the flames of Cold War, the UNSC began to establish economic sanctions against States that were thought to endanger international peace and security. In many cases, these sanctions were so severe that they seemed to contravene human rights standards. Such concerns gave rise to the idea of subjecting UNSC measures to judicial review in the international legal system. Many experts believe that the burden of maintaining international peace and security is so important that the UNSC should be free to apply any due strategies or actions. Although the UN Charter does not identify any body or organization to control the UNSC, by reference, one can infer that the UNSC’s actions are not absolutely unlimited. Several recent cases from the ECJ have made international law experts hopeful of resolving this predicament. These cases have served as a kind of indirect judicial review, influencing the UNSC by removing its sanctions and directing its performance. This is notable in that the ECJ is outside of the UN framework.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    U.N. Charter, Article 39. Apart from self-defense, provided for in Article 51, this provides the only case in which measures may be taken that include the use of force.

  2. 2.

    See Reisman and Stevick 1998, pp. 86–141; Provost 1992, pp. 577–639.

  3. 3.

    Targeted sanctions can include travel bans, arms embargoes, or financial sanctions such as the freezing of assets. They do not aim to target the State and its population, but they rather target selected persons or sectors of the economy. See Zamani and Mazaheri 2011, pp. 115−161.

  4. 4.

    See ICCPR, Article 12, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Article 2, Protocol 4 to ECHR, 16 September 1963, E.T.S. 46.

  5. 5.

    See Article 1, Protocol 1 to ECHR, 20 March 1952, E.T.S. 9.

  6. 6.

    See ICCPR, Article 17, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (protecting individuals’ privacy, family, home, or correspondence, honor, and reputation); ECHR, Article 8, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (protecting private and family life).

  7. 7.

    See ICCPR, Article 14, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; ECHR, Article 6, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.

  8. 8.

    See ECHR, Article 13, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.

  9. 9.

    See ICCPR, Article 6, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; ECHR, Article 2, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.

  10. 10.

    In the case of the Sierra Leone sanctions regime, the UN Sanctions Committee was requested to lift the travel ban on humanitarian grounds for one of the listed persons, Foday Sankoh, so that Sankoh, who was in custody of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, could receive medical treatment in Accra, Ghana. Sankoh died while the committee deliberated for months over the request, asking for written assurances that Sankoh be kept in custody and that the request be accompanied by more specific information such as details about the purpose of the travel and dates of departure and return. See UNSC, Report of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone, paras 13–14, U.N. Doc. S/2004/166 (27 February 2004).

  11. 11.

    Exemption clauses were used in the context of the Iraq–Kuwait crisis in relation to sanctions on Iraq. See S.C. Res. 687(1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (3 April 1991).

  12. 12.

    See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.

  13. 13.

    The higher specificity and intensity of targeted sanctions may directly affect individuals’ human rights, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy, and the right to property.

  14. 14.

    Reinisch 2009, p. 262.

  15. 15.

    UDHR, Articles 8, 10, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).

  16. 16.

    ICCPR, Articles 2, 14, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

  17. 17.

    ECHR, Article 6, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.

  18. 18.

    Engel and Others v. Netherlands, 5100/71, 5101.71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72, para. 81, 8 June 1976.

  19. 19.

    Ovey and White 2002, p. 141.

  20. 20.

    König v. Germany, paras 88–89, 6232/73, 28 June 1978.

  21. 21.

    Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, paras 80–83, 7151/75, 7152/75, 23 September 1982.

  22. 22.

    Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands, paras 26–40, 8562/79, 29 May 1986.

  23. 23.

    See Vidacar S.A. and Opergrup S.L. v. Spain, 41601/98; 41775/98, 20 April 1999.

  24. 24.

    S.C. Res. 1267(1999), paras 2, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999).

  25. 25.

    S.C. Res. 1572(2004), para 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/172 (15 November 2004).

  26. 26.

    Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Appointed pursuant to Resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Association Individuals and Entities, paras 41–42, U.N. Doc. S/2005/572 (9 September 2005).

  27. 27.

    Tinnelly & Sons Ltd. and Others and McElduff and Others v. the United Kingdom, para 72, 62/1997/846/1052–1053, 10 July 1998, citing Stubbings and Others v. the United Kingdom, para 50, 22083/93, 22095/93, 22 October 1996.

  28. 28.

    Klass v. Germany, paras 62–64, 5029/71, 6 September 1978.

  29. 29.

    Idem, para 67.

  30. 30.

    Idem, para 72.

  31. 31.

    Under the ECHR, decisions on asylum are not covered by Article 6. See generally EU Council, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R (98)13, On the Right of Rejected Asylum Seekers to an Effective Remedy against Decisions on Expulsion in the Context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

  32. 32.

    See Roberts 1995.

  33. 33.

    The Lockerbie Case, in particular, sparked debate on the limits of UNSC power that resulted in an intense discussion as to how such limits could be enforced. See Alvarez 1996; Watson 1993.

  34. 34.

    Martenczuk 1999, p. 526.

  35. 35.

    Watson 1993, p. 14.

  36. 36.

    See Franck 1992.

  37. 37.

    Akande 1997, p. 326.

  38. 38.

    See Martenczuk 1999, p. 527.

  39. 39.

    Talmon 2005, p. 178.

  40. 40.

    Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J 151.

  41. 41.

    Talmon 2005, p. 167.

  42. 42.

    Idem, p. 168.

  43. 43.

    Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 45.

  44. 44.

    International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128.

  45. 45.

    S.C. Res. 284 (1970), U.N. Doc. S/RES/284 (29 July 1970).

  46. 46.

    Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 22.

  47. 47.

    Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 2005 E.C.R. II‐3649; Case T-306/01; Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533.

  48. 48.

    EU Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida Network and the Taliban, and Repealing Council Regulation (EC) 467/2001, Annex 1.

  49. 49.

    Idem, Article 2(1).

  50. 50.

    The Sanctions Committee was established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1267(1999). See S.C. Res. 1267(1999), para 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (15 November 1999).

  51. 51.

    The Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 230 provides that “[t]he Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted [by the Community institutions].” If it is found that a Community act is vitiated by any of the annulment grounds listed in Article 230(2) TEC, such as “lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers,” Article 231(1) provides that the “Court of Justice shall declare the act concerned to be void.” Under these quasi-constitutional judicial review powers the ECJ has developed a case law broadly reviewing the legality of Community legislation. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Articles 230–231, November 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340).

  52. 52.

    U.N. Charter, Article 103.

  53. 53.

    Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 2005 E.C.R. II‐3649, para 226.

  54. 54.

    Idem, paras 233–292.

  55. 55.

    The fact that it was a Grand Chamber of the ECJ underlines the significance of these cases. See Statute of the Court of Justice, Article 16, 10 March 2001 O.J. (C 80) (stating that the ECJ sits in a Grand Chamber—consisting of eleven out of the total of 27 judges, instead of the normal chamber size of three or five judges—“when a Member State or an institution of the Communities that is party to the proceedings so requests”).

  56. 56.

    Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 3 September 2008.

  57. 57.

    Idem, para 326.

  58. 58.

    Idem, para 287.

  59. 59.

    Idem, para 285.

  60. 60.

    Idem, paras 327–328.

  61. 61.

    Idem, para 334.

  62. 62.

    Idem, para 336.

  63. 63.

    Idem, para 344.

  64. 64.

    Idem, para 51.

  65. 65.

    Idem, para 357.

  66. 66.

    Idem, paras 364–365.

  67. 67.

    EU Commission Regulation (EC) 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 Amending for the 101st Time Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed against Certain Persons and Entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida Network and the Taliban, Annex.

  68. 68.

    Idem, preamble, para 6.

  69. 69.

    Żenkiewicz 2012.

  70. 70.

    Posch 2009.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabatabai University, Dehkadeh Olympic, 148968451, Tehran, Iran

    S. Ghasem Zamani & Jamshid Mazaheri

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  1. S. Ghasem Zamani
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Correspondence to S. Ghasem Zamani .

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  1. Hague Centre for Law and Arbitration, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Ali Z. Marossi

  2. The Hague, The Netherlands

    Marisa R. Bassett

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Zamani, S.G., Mazaheri, J. (2015). The Need for International Judicial Review of UN Economic Sanctions. In: Marossi, A., Bassett, M. (eds) Economic Sanctions under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-051-0_12

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