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Legal Argumentation and Legal Interpretation

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Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation

Part of the book series: Argumentation Library ((ARGA,volume 1))

Abstract

As an introduction to the discussion of theories of legal justification in the following chapters, this chapter discusses the central topics in the literature on interpretation and application of legal rules in particular, and the law in general. The central focus of this introduction is on the discretionary space judges have in interpreting and applying the law and the way in which they must account for the decisions taken in this decision process by means of argumentation. First, in Sect. 1.2, the central problems in the interpretation and application of legal rules will be discussed. Section 1.3 concentrates on methods of legal interpretation and types of legal reasoning. In Sect.1.4 specific attention is paid to the role of legal interpretation and argumentation in the context of EU law and international law and the way in which courts use their discretionary space in a multi-layered system of law. Section 1.5 forms the conclusion with attention for the argumentative character of the law in light of the discretionary space of the judge and the fact that the correctness of the decisions taken in the interpretation process depends on the quality of the argumentation put forward in defence of these decisions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the introduction and discussion of the distinction between clear cases and hard cases see Dworkin (1986), Hart (1958, 1961), Fuller (1958), MacCormick (1978:195–228).

  2. 2.

    For a discussion of the views of Hart and Dworkin with respect to the discretion of the judge and the possibility of ‘one right answer’ see for example Bayles (1992:165–190), Coleman (1988), Fish (1987), Greenawalt (1987), MacCormick (1978:229 ff.), Peczenik (1989:302–312).

  3. 3.

    See for example Hage (1997:107–115) and Verheij (1996:5–9, 57–97) for a discussion of situations in which arguments may be defeated in terms of exceptions to rules. As Verheij (1996:57 ff.) points out, there can also be exceptions to a principle. See also Schauer (1991:112 ff.).

  4. 4.

    See for example Hage (1997:107 ff.) who distinguishes these two ways in which the normal course of the application of a rule may be interrupted in terms of defeasibility and exclusionary reasons . For a discussion of the defeasibility of law see Beltrán & Ratti (2012).

  5. 5.

    For another view of legal rules as conclusive reasons see Dworkin (1978:22–28, 78–80). See also Schauer (1991:115–118).

  6. 6.

    Hage (1997:123) defines defeasibility as ‘the situation where the conditions of a valid rule or principle are satisfied, but the conclusion nevertheless does not follow’.

  7. 7.

    Other considerations that can form a reason not to apply a legal rule are so-called exclusionary reasons (or preemptive reasons). For a discussion of exclusionary reasons see Raz (1975, 1978).

  8. 8.

    For a further discussion of Alexy’s views on the distinction between rules and principles and the solution of conflicts between rules and principles see Sect. 7.5.1 of this book.)

  9. 9.

    For conflicts of rules see also Schauer (1991:188–191).

  10. 10.

    Balancing as a method of legal decision-making is applied in the context of constitutional law , in cases of competing rights and interests. For a discussion of balancing of constitutional rights in the US and Europe see for example Bomhoff (2013).

  11. 11.

    As is indicated in the preceding section, the interpretation methods and types of legal reasoning that apply in a particular legal system can, in Hart’s terms, be considered as secondary rules that concern the interpretation, creation and application of the primary rules.

  12. 12.

    See MacCormick and Summers (1991).

  13. 13.

    For a discussion of these methods see Sect. 1.4 of this chapter.

  14. 14.

    For a more detailed explanation of the various types of legal reasoning as forms of legal argumentation see the various chapters of this book in which these forms of reasoning are discussed such as Chap. 7 on the theory of Alexy and Chap. 10 on the pragma-dialectical theory.

  15. 15.

    For a discussion of analogy reasoning and argumentation see Brewer (1996) Kloosterhuis (2006, chapter 4), Sunstein (1996).

  16. 16.

    For a discussion of the argumentum ad absurdum in legal argumentation see Alexy (1989:345), Bustamante (2013), Kloosterhuis (2006:73 ff.).

  17. 17.

    For a discussion of a contrario reasoning and argumentation see Jansen (2002, 2005).

  18. 18.

    See for example Bustamante (2013), Feteris (2015).

  19. 19.

    For a similar project with regard to precedents see MacCormick and Summers (1997).

  20. 20.

    See MacCormick and Summers (1991:100–128).

  21. 21.

    In legal theory this argumentation of the first order is also called internal justification (Aarnio 1977, Alexy 1989, Wróblewski 1974) and deductive justification (MacCormick 1978).

  22. 22.

    Other terms for the argumentation of the second order are external justification (Aarnio 1977, Alexy 1989, Wróblewski 1974) and second-order justification (MacCormick 1978).

  23. 23.

    In a pragma-dialectical approach of argumentation, similar patterns are distinguished, although with some minor differences. See for example Kloosterhuis (2006: 87 ff.), Plug (2000). For a further discussion of argumentative patterns in the pragma-dialectical approach see Chap. 10 of this book. For a discussion of different argumentation structures see also Sect. 2.6 of this book on AI and Law.

  24. 24.

    Plug (2000:193 ff.) gives a dialectical characterization of the two forms of the conflict-setting pattern of argumentation.

  25. 25.

    For the implementation of weighing and balancing for different contexts such as constitutional rights see for example Alexy (2003), Bomhoff (2013) Klatt and Meister (2012), Klatt and Schmidt (2012). For a discussion of the content and structure of weighing and balancing see Chap. 7 of this book in which the theory by Alexy and others on weighing and balancing is discussed.

  26. 26.

    In contrast with EU law where the interpretation and argumentation culture is relatively homogenous, in international public law the interpretation culture is less homogenous. Different international courts and tribunals have their own tradition of interpreting and applying the relevant law. For an overview of recent studies of the interpretative practice of international courts and tribunals of public law see Waibel (2011). For theoretical studies of legal interpretation and argumentation in international public law see for example d’Aspremont (2015), Bianchi (2010), Bianchi et al. (2015), Koskenniemi (2005), Venzke (2014).

  27. 27.

    See Paunio & Lindroos-Hovinheimo (2010) and Paunio (2013) for a discussion of legal reasoning of the ECJ and the role of linguistic arguments in ECJ case law, as well as the problematic nature of these arguments from the viewpoint of legal certainty and predictability. In their view, systemic and teleological argumentation are required to assure convincing, acceptable and transparent legal reasoning in the context of multilingual EU law . See also Gerards (2012:28, note 5) about the limited importance of linguistic and systematic interpretation .

  28. 28.

    For a discussion of other principles of interpretation such as the margin of appreciation, proportionality , etcetera see Gerards (2012).

  29. 29.

    See also Poiares Maduro (2007:4–5).

  30. 30.

    Pontier & Burg (2004:8–9) approach the meta-teleological way the Court of Justice interprets the law and justifies its decisions from the perspective of Dworkin’s view of law as integrity based on certain principles. They explain how the Court tries to take into account all the principles and objectives underlying the Convention as a whole. On the basis of a case study of the case law of the Court in the period 2001–2004 after the Brussels Convention, they conclude that also in cases in which the words of the Convention clearly point to a solution, the Court still feels obliged to consider the underlying principles of the Convention.

  31. 31.

    See Poaires Maduro (2007:8 ff.). The term ‘meta-teleological interpretation ’ is introduced by Lasser (2004). This form of interpretation is used in particular by the ECJ. For a discussion of the use of meta-teleological interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) see Gerards (2009:428–430, 2012:34).

  32. 32.

    See Lasser (2004:232–233), Poiares Maduro (2007:5).

  33. 33.

    For a discussion of the method of autonomous interpretation and its risks see Gerards (2012:42–49).

  34. 34.

    For a discussion of the use of the autonomous method of interpretation by the ECtHR see Gerards (2009).

  35. 35.

    For a discussion of the method of consensus interpretation and its risks see Gerards (2012:50–59). A consensus interpretation can also be based on a definition that is given in an international treaty that has been signed and ratified by (nearly) all the member states.

  36. 36.

    For a discussion of the use of the method of evolutive interpretation by the ECtHR see Gerards (2009:428–430, 2012: 37).

  37. 37.

    For a discussion of the reasoning of the ECJ see Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Moral Soriano (2001).

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  1. Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Eveline T. Feteris

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Feteris, E.T. (2017). Legal Argumentation and Legal Interpretation. In: Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4_1

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