Abstract
There is no better way to honor Husserl than to obey his most advertised motto: “Zu den Sacken,” i.e., “Go to the things.” But what are “the things” in Husserl’s sense? Right here seems to be one of the paradoxes about Husserl’s present fame. For in Husserl’s final interpretation these “things” led him not to the “objects,” but toward “subjectivity” as the ultimate foundation for the new scientific rigor which he wanted to bring to philosophy. Just how subjective is phenomenology proper? There is no sense in tackling it before there is at least some measure of agreement about the meaning of the almost hopelessly ambiguous term “subjective.” Even if we disregard here the scholastic meaning, which our modern usage has reversed, so many uses of the term remain that an initial clarification is imperative.
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References
See my article on “Phenomenology of Direct Evidence” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II, 1942, pp. 427–56.
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© 1966 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Spiegelberg, H. (1966). How Subjective is Phenomenology?. In: Natanson, M. (eds) Essays in Phenomenology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5403-3_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5403-3_7
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