Skip to main content

The Consciousness-Corporeality Problem

  • Chapter
The Origins of Life

Part of the book series: Analecta Husserliana ((ANHU,volume 66))

  • 164 Accesses

Abstract

Science is a system of true statement about reality. This means that each science contains inside itself definite methodological premises and ontological assumptions concerning the structure of the reality and cognitive processes which make scientific statements intelligent. These fundamental assumptions and premises are the philosophical basis of scientific cognition.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. See Chapter 1 of Descartes’ Principia philosophiae,wherein he produced forms of thought about reality as independent of thinking and objective; but all that work is developed in the reality of thinking itself.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Although acting and being acted upon are often quite different, nevertheless the action and the exposure to action are always the same phenomenon that has two names, because it can be related to two different subjects“. R. Descartes, Passions de l’âme. Oeuvres de Descartes publiées par Ch. Adam et P. Tannery. Réédition. Vol. XI (Paris: 1969–1974), 327. Quoted after gexapT P. Crpacrx; yulx.// Cog. Vol. 1 (Moscow: 1987), p. 482.

    Google Scholar 

  3. This misunderstanding of the nature of the cogito and Descartes’ argument can clearly be seen in the Fifth Disquisitio of Gassendi. See R. Descartes, Méditations,Oeuvres, Vol. VII.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Cf. Spinoza’s arguments in Ethica about the adequate idea of a thing as of a state of a body, understood as actual objectual motion along with the form of the thing itself. This understanding of thinking as a method of action of a body, i.e., of a spatially spread phenomenon, is the basis of his concept of substance.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Hegel, Encyclopädie d. philosoph. Wissenschaft. Quoted after Terenb 3HI1,IlxnonelHx 4HJIOCO4CKHX HayK. Vol. 1 (Moscow: 1974), p. 123.

    Google Scholar 

  6. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Quoted after 5hI,IK H HHTenIIeKT (Moscow: 1995 ), pp. 14–49.

    Google Scholar 

  7. E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen. Hua, I, p. 86. Quoted after CsacbaH K.A. KeVoMexoJLorIhqecxoe no3xaxIIe (Yerevan: 1986 ).

    Google Scholar 

  8. The concept of `layer of consciousness’ is a concept of meta-language, the language of study and theoretical description, but not of natural language concerning consciousness. In the meaning of a proposed description of the actionally symbolic work of consciousness, the latter is a tabula rasa.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Within the frames of understanding of the ideality of this time, the problems of Zeitbewußtsein are taken up in Husserl’s Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Cf.: “There is self-consciousness, generating the imagination I conceive, which must have the possibility of accompanying all the other imaginations and be the same in every consciousness, therefore this self-consciousness cannot be accompanied by any other (imagination), so I also call it the primary apperception. I also call its entity a transcendental entity of self-consciousness to mark the possibility of apriori cognition on the basis of this entity. Really, diverse imaginations that are given in certain contemplations would not be my imaginations if they did not belong all together to self-consciousness alone; in other words, being my imaginations (although I would not realize them as such), nevertheless they necessarily must conform in self-consciousness, because otherwise they do not all belong to me”. I. Kant, Kritik d. reinen Vernunft. Quoted after Kawr 11. Coq. B 6-TH T. Vol. III (Moscow: 1964 ). pp. 191–192.

    Google Scholar 

  11. M. K. Mamardashvili, [The Classical and Non-classical Ideals of Rationality) (in Russian ), ( Moscow: 1994 ), pp. 80–89.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Komarov, S.V. (2000). The Consciousness-Corporeality Problem. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Origins of Life. Analecta Husserliana, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3415-8_22

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3415-8_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5430-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3415-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics